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A COLONIST

ON

THE COLONIAL QUESTION.

BY

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OF

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## PREFACE.

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THE PURPORT of the accompanying treatise may be explained in a few words. 'Colonial Emancipation' is now warmly advocated by a pretty strong party in England, and the policy adopted by the Gladstone Administration would seem to indicate that the minds of some of our leading statesmen are becoming imbued with 'emancipationist' principles. These principles appear to me to be highly incorrect; but I am forced to admit that the present relationship of Fatherland and Colonies cannot possibly form the basis of a permanent connection, and that, in the absence of a modification of the terms of union, a disruption of the Empire is not likely to be long delayed. I have consequently sought to set forth the reasons which lead me to believe that 'emancipation' would be at once most disastrous to England and very



mischievous to the Colonies; and have endeavoured to prove that in the application of the Federal system of government to the Empire is to be found the means, not only of averting disruption, with all its evils, but also of permanently strengthening the integrity of the Empire, and largely augmenting the benefits of imperial unity.

The controversial character of the earlier part of the work is to me a matter of regret. But I felt that I should not be doing justice to the subject were I to lay before my readers only one side of the case, and that in no manner was it possible to bring both sides before them so effectually as by allowing the opponents of my own views to speak for themselves. Our controversy is merely in reference to the means whereby the interests of our fellow-countrymen may best be advanced.


I do not for a moment suppose that I have exhausted the immense subject under review. The labours of our wisest statesmen and most careful thinkers would be requisite for the accomplishment of that task. My highest hope is that what I have written may perhaps induce some such men to turn their attention to it. Since the

MS. was completed, I have had the pleasure of seeing that in the second series of 'Short Studies on Great Subjects' one of the latter has already done so.

I must warn English readers against taking me for an exponent of Colonial, or even of Canadian, public opinion. The policy which I recommend has not been sufficiently discussed to admit of the formation of any public opinion on the subject. I speak to my countrymen both at home and in the Colonies, but for nobody except myself.

J. M.

TORONTO : *March* 9, 1872.



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*Errata.*

Page 1, line 8, *for Times read Daily News.*

„ 65, „ 5 from bottom, *for her read its.*

„ 165, „ 6, *for as usual, was read was practically.*

„ 165, „ 10, *after pretation, add, while offering access to all the fisheries on payment of a small license-fee.*

## THE COLONIAL QUESTION.

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MANY YEARS SINCE it was predicted by far-seeing men that the terms of the connection between England and her Colonies, and the comparative expediency of maintaining the tie or severing it, would form one of the leading political questions in the next generation. The time has arrived, and the prediction has been fulfilled. Ever since the publication of Mr. Goldwin Smith's letters in the *Times*, the subject has taken a firm hold on English thought, and been discussed with a large amount of earnestness. As yet, however, the only conclusion which seems to have been reached in England is that matters are in an unsatisfactory condition. Emancipationists not only assert that all the advantages which have been supposed to be derived from 'an Empire on which the sun never sets' are, in fact, 'a mockery, a delusion, and a snare,' but also declare that the Colonies constitute a positive burden to England. Their opponents, whilst stoutly denying the correctness of these doctrines, find themselves, apparently, rather at a loss to indicate the nature of the benefits which are derived by England from her Colonial Empire. Both agree that it is a source of expense; that so long as England undertakes the defence



of the Colonies the expense must increase; and that English ratepayers should not be taxed for the benefit of colonists. But having gone thus far together, they seem unable to concur in anything further, save that if the Colonies wish for independence they are perfectly welcome to it, for never will England draw the sword to retain unwilling subjects beneath her sway. It is true that of late years signs of better things have appeared. Men of eminence have begun to hint that a reorganization of the Empire might be both practicable and beneficial; and a Ministry acting on what is practically an emancipationist policy has been checked in its course. But all parties, nevertheless, seem to believe that the present relations between England and her Colonies cannot long constitute a basis of union. It is impossible that in a free country any political question of importance can long remain in this condition; least of all in an age and country so fond of innovation as our own have now become; and this more particularly when a reduction of taxation is promised as the fruit of an adoption of the emancipationist policy. An early settlement is inevitable; and that settlement, be it what it may, cannot fail to influence the whole future of the British race in both hemispheres. Under these circumstances, we have been led to think that a connected review of the whole controversy by a colonist might help to clear up misunderstandings on both sides, and thus assist to hinder the decision of the question taking the form of 'a leap in the dark.'

Before entering on the merits of the case, it may be well to cast a glance backwards, with a view to discover the causes of the crisis in which the Empire is now involved. How does it happen that parties have come to contend that the possession of an immense Colonial Empire is not only not advantageous, but positively pernicious, to England? The solution of this question is to be found

in certain social changes which have occurred in England, and certain political changes which have been established in the relations between the Mother-country and the Colonies.

Modern colonisation may be considered to have begun with the discovery of America. The objects sought to be gained by it seemed to have been :—First, the acquisition of increased revenues, either by the working of mines, or the enlargement of the national territory and resources ; secondly, an outlet for criminals and a surplus population ; thirdly, a supply of those fruits of the earth not to be produced at home ; fourthly, a market for home manufactures ; fifthly, an increase of martial strength, through an increased population, and the possession of important strategical positions.

In order fully to attain these ends, colonies were generally treated as subject and inferior states. The mother-country ruled them absolutely ; and, in some cases, went so far as to prescribe when, where, and how they should trade. English Colonies were ruled much more mildly than those of other European states ; but even England prevented her Colonies from trading with foreign nations, and prohibited colonial manufactures, in order to secure to herself a monopoly of their trade.

But in course of time England began to think that some of these things were unattainable by means of colonies ; and that their possession was not essential, or was perhaps prejudicial, to the attainment of others. It came to be considered inexpedient for the state to work mines. An attempt to tax the Colonies failed miserably, and drew after it a formal abandonment of the policy. The Colonies refused to receive the off-scourings of the Mother-country. It was found that the mere fact of countries being British Colonies did not always suffice to attract emigration to them. And instead of the Colonies

proving a source of martial strength, it appeared that they drew away from England a large number of troops who might otherwise have been employed in her own defence. Thus, commercial advantages, in the shape of a monopoly of colonial trade, were thought to be the only benefits derivable from the Colonies, and ere long this tie, too, was snapped.

Possessed of a monopoly of colonial trade, inhabited by an energetic race, holding by her ships the dominion of the seas, receiving from men of genius discoveries of inestimable value, England attained such success in commerce that she feared no rival, and felt herself strong enough to allow her Colonies freedom of trade and to compete with the world for their custom. She came to require more raw material for manufacturing purposes than they were producing. She also saw that she could purchase it cheaper from foreign nations than from her Colonies whilst possessed of differential duties; and thought that, by purchasing from foreigners, she would gain their custom for her manufactures, while retaining that of the Colonies. Hence the adoption of free trade, by which the commercial ties between the different parts of the Empire were reduced to the level of those with foreigners, as they were allowed equal commercial privileges with those accorded to Britons in all parts of the Empire. This step alone was a most serious blow to Imperial unity, but it induced yet another. Under the old system of colonial administration the Imperial Parliament not only possessed and wielded all the prerogatives of a Federal Legislature, but also could interfere in the local affairs of each colony. Whilst commercial advantages were derived from the connection, the Colonies submitted to this polity, though not without sundry complaints. But on the inauguration of free trade they lost any motive for submitting to it, and as England thought

that she had lost any motive for insisting on its retention, she established a system of colonial self-government, in order to reconcile the Colonies to the loss sustained by them through the repeal of the differential duties. Hence has sprung the danger of a disruption of the Empire, as these commercial and political changes destroyed old motives for amity, and furnished new means of quarrelling. For although the concession of colonial self-government has unquestionably increased the loyalty of the Colonies, the peculiar system adopted contained some defects which have practically destroyed the unity of the Empire. It endowed different parts of it with prerogatives more lofty than had ever before—unless, perhaps, in the case of the Dutch Republic—been wielded by any save the supreme power. It failed to establish any arbiter in case of difficulty arising from the exercise of these prerogatives; and it omitted altogether to define the duties which the several countries thus endowed, and owning one and the same sovereign, owed to each other. Under the circumstances each was left free to consider its own interests exclusively, and did not fail to do so. Hence it followed that in the Colonies the newly-acquired right of self-government was stretched to its utmost limits, producing some results not at all expected by its English advocates; who, thereupon, began to declare that there was no benefit derived from trade with the Colonies which would not be derived from trade with the same countries as independent states; that their possession tended to involve the mother-country in war on their account, and that their garrisons not only cost her a large sum annually, but also weakened her military resources. As these parties had before arrived at the conclusion that the only benefit derivable from colonies was their trade, the inevitable corollary of their commercial theory was that the Colonies were useless to England; and, as they held that all re

ductions of military expenditure were so much clear gain to the nation, the conclusion to which their second theory led was that the Colonial Empire was pernicious to her best interests. These sentiments are so well expressed in the following extract from Mr. Goldwin Smith's writings, that we quote it in illustration of them :—

‘In ancient times empire was empire. The Roman extorted from his dependencies both military force and revenue. Spain extorted revenue. We are too moral to extort either force or revenue from our dependencies, even if we had the power. While we monopolised their trade in a general reign of monopoly, they brought us a real advantage, though of a narrow and selfish kind. Now they bring us no advantage at all. But the system has been established; many prejudices and some interests are bound up with it, and reasons must be found, or invented, for maintaining it. The reasons found, or invented, are, as might have been expected, various and discordant enough. Now it is the amount of colonial trade; now it is the preference of our people for the Colonies as places of emigration. When facts overturn all these arguments, it is glory, national spirit, prestige. I give an agent an immense sum of money to invest for me. He tells me he has bought me an estate. I ask to see the estate; he tells me that the money is laid out not in an estate, but in houses. I ask to see the houses; he tells me that it is not laid out in houses, but in railway shares. I ask for my scrip; he tells me that it is not laid out in railway shares, but invested in the funds. I ask for the transfer receipt; and he tells me that it is not invested in the funds, but in something much better and nobler—in *prestige*. I look in the French dictionary for *prestige*, and find that it is an illusion, a juggling trick, an imposture.’

Such are the opinions of a large and powerful party in

England; and such the course by which, in our opinion, they have been led to their conclusions. We admit that circumstances have been very much altered during the last twenty-five years; but we do not think that these alterations render a disruption of the Empire inevitable, or that they should lead either England or the Colonies to desire it. To the Colonies 'emancipation' would bring evils which they should strive, by every means in their power, to avert; to England it would bring but few of the promised benefits, and those few would have to be paid for so dearly that it is pretty certain the bargain would be an exceedingly bad one. But, besides this, there are, we believe, means by which all difficulties may be permanently settled, leaving England in possession of all the benefits originally sought for from colonies, and the Colonies in possession of all the advantages derivable from British connection and self-government. For the present, however, we have nothing to say as to the manner in which we believe that these ends may be attained. Our first duty is to examine the correctness of the emancipationist theories. If the Colonies are really useless to England, and their abandonment would be beneficial, it is absurd to suppose that she will retain the burden, even if it were not asserted that a termination of the connection would be advantageous to the Colonies also. As nobody has advocated colonial emancipation so boldly and fully as Mr. Goldwin Smith, we shall take him as the champion of the emancipationist party, considering that we do them full justice when we quote his arguments in support of any of their theories. As the corner-stone of their position rests on the assumption that the 'emancipation' of the Colonies would not induce any commercial loss to England, we shall, in the first place, examine the correctness of that theory.

## CHAPTER I.

## THE COMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF EMANCIPATION.

WHEN Mr. Smith asserts that there is no advantage in the shape of convict stations, revenue, or military force derived by England from the Colonies, we are content to admit that he is right, though we are of opinion that all these advantages might be derived from them. But when he goes on to say that the colonial trade is no more valuable than that with foreign countries, and that there is no benefit gained from the trade with the Colonies which would not be gained from the trade with the same countries if independent states, we dispute both propositions, and join issue on their correctness. Mr. Smith, replying to the *Times*, states his case as follows:—

‘But figures, as it happens, prove that the *Times*, in estimating the value of our export trade to the Colonies so highly as it does in comparison with our export trade to foreign countries, is the victim of a great though not uncommon error. Our exports in 1861 were:—

	£	£
To foreign countries . . . . .	—	82,854,000
To the East Indies, Ceylon, Singapore, and Hong Kong, which are not British Colonies, but only dependencies . . . . .	—	19,656,000
To the British Colonies in :		
North America . . . . .	3,696,000	
Australia . . . . .	10,701,000	
The West Indies . . . . .	2,463,000	
	<hr/>	16,860,000

Thus the export trade to the British Colonies was less by three millions than that to India and China, while it

was only about one-fifth of that to foreign countries.'—  
*The Empire*, p. 25.

The above statement is incorrect in point of fact; the conclusions drawn from it are incorrect in principle. Mr. Smith omits several most important colonies from his list, and this without transferring them to his list of 'dependencies,' so that, in his calculation, the exports to them do not appear either amongst those to foreign countries, colonies, or dependencies, but are quietly ignored! This is rather a serious error, as its effect is to make the colonial trade of 1861 appear almost one-sixth less than its real amount. We will, however, remedy the omission. There are such places as Cape Colony, Natal, Mauritius, Honduras, the West African Settlements, and detached countries like St. Helena, Bermuda, and the Falkland Islands, the exports to which amount, in the aggregate, to a very considerable sum. Taking these places into consideration, we would submit the following statement as affording the correct view of England's exports to the Colonies in 1861. The returns of population are taken from the *Statistical and other Tables relating to the Colonial and other Possessions of the United Kingdom*, 1861, p. iii.:—

	Imports from England	Population	Rate per Head
	£		£ s. d.
British America . . .	3,696,000	3,305,000	1 2 4
West Indies . . . .	2,463,000	1,081,000	2 5 6
Australia . . . . .	10,701,000	1,333,000	8 0 6
Cape Colony and Natal .	1,986,000	419,000	4 14 9
Mauritius . . . . .	551,000	322,000	1 14 2
Gold Coast . . . . .	144,000	151,000	0 19 0
Sierra Leone . . . .	180,000	41,000	4 7 9
Gambia . . . . .	56,000	6,000	9 6 8
Honduras . . . . .	201,000	25,000	8 0 9
Other possessions . . .	76,000	20,000	3 16 0
<b>Total . . . . .</b>	<b>20,054,000</b>	<b>6,703,000</b>	<b>2 19 10</b>



It will be seen that we here concede Mr. Smith's distinction between colonies and dependencies, and that we have included in our list none which do not strictly come under the former title. We have adhered to the trade returns of 1861, as we wished to meet Mr. Smith on his own ground. But we wish here to notice the fact that the returns of that year do not convey a correct idea of the quantity of English goods usually consumed in British North America. The four years ending with 1861 were the least prosperous period known in Canada for twenty years previously. The average exports to the British American provinces in the five years ending with 1856 were, Mr. Smith tells us, 4,189,000*l.*, and the exports to them in the years 1862-3-4 were 3,993,000*l.*, 4,819,000*l.* and 5,611,000. Hence it appears that these Colonies usually consume English goods to the extent of 1*l.* 10*s.* per head of their population. From these facts it follows that not only has Mr. Smith misstated the value of the colonial trade in 1861, by omitting exports to the amount of 3,194,000*l.*, but also that the exports of that year are likely to lead to an under-estimate of its value.

These points, however, are not the circumstances to which we invite the special attention of our readers. All that for which we have contended may be admitted, and still the gross amount of the colonial trade appear small in comparison with that to foreign countries. Emancipationists argue that this fact proves it to be less *valuable*: their reasoning is about as correct as that of a buyer who estimates the value of goods irrespective of their quality. The colonial trade is less valuable than that with all the rest of the world only as the trade with Belgium or Denmark must be less valuable than that with all Europe, or as a part must be less valuable than the whole. Colonists numbered by the million cannot consume as much English goods, in gross, as can foreigners numbered by

the hundred-million, since to effect this it would be requisite that each colonist should consume one hundred times as much English goods as a foreigner. This colonists do not, and cannot, do. But as the total value of English exports in 1861 was 125,000,000*l.*, of which 20,054,000*l.* went to the Colonies, with a population of 6,700,000, against 105,000,000*l.* to all the rest of the world, the population of which, to be within the mark, we will estimate at 700,000,000, it appears that foreign countries and dependencies imported from England at the rate of 3*s.* per head of their population, and the Colonies at within a fraction of 3*l.* Which of these is the more *valuable* trade—that in which each consumer takes goods to the amount of three shillings or of three pounds? What say emancipationists on the question—Ought we, in computing the value of a trade, to consider only its sum total? As well might we estimate the cheapness of goods by comparing prices whilst ignoring qualities. Did the Colonies import from England only at the same rate as does the rest of the world, the exports to them in 1861 would have amounted to only 1,000,000*l.*, instead of 20,000,000*l.* This fact, we think, is decisive as to which is the more valuable trade.

It may, perhaps, be alleged that, notwithstanding the facts adduced, our statement is calculated to mislead, as by far the largest part of foreign consumers consist of half-civilized people who do not take anything like even three shillings per head, whilst civilized nations take much more; and that if the exports to the Colonies be compared with those to nations which have arrived at a like stage of civilization, the difference between the colonial and the foreign rate of importation will appear much less, if not disappear altogether. It will certainly appear less than in the total; but will still show a large balance in favour of the Colonies. This will be seen from a survey of the

following statement showing the exports from England in 1861 to the different countries of Europe, excepting Russia and Turkey, which we omit as being uncivilized, and to include which would make the result much more in our favour:—

	£
Sweden and Norway . . . . .	1,096,000
Denmark . . . . .	913,000
Prussia . . . . .	2,495,000
Hanover . . . . .	1,029,000
Hanse Towns . . . . .	9,248,000
Holland . . . . .	6,439,000
Belgium . . . . .	1,926,000
France . . . . .	8,896,000
Portugal . . . . .	1,987,000
Spain . . . . .	2,936,000
Sardinia . . . . .	2,198,000
Austria . . . . .	968,000
Tuscany . . . . .	1,062,000
Papal States . . . . .	447,000
Two Sicilies . . . . .	2,071,000
Greece . . . . .	286,000
Wallachia and Moldavia . . . . .	162,000
Total . . . . .	44,159,000

We shall not trouble our readers with a recapitulation of the rate per head taken in each of these countries. For our present purpose it is enough to remark that as their collective population in 1861 was about 160,000,000, and they imported from England in that year to the extent of 44,159,000*l.*, the rate of export to them was about 5*s.* 6*d.* per head.

In view of the facts revealed by these statistics a quotation from the *Empire* on the value of different sorts of trade may not be inappropriate. Mr. Smith says:—

‘The best of all trades is the home trade with the butcher and baker, which cheap governments foster and governments of imperial aspirations bring to decay. The next best trade is that with neighbouring countries,

because in that trade the expense of carriage is not great, and the state of supply and demand are certainly known. The worst is that with distant countries like Australia, because the carriage is expensive, and the speculation hazardous.'<sup>1</sup>

The facts of the case scarcely warrant these conclusions. The trade which Mr. Smith pronounces the worst was, in the year under review, fifteen times as great, proportionately, as that with Holland, the neighbouring state which imported most largely from England, and thirty-two times as great as the average taken by all the 'neighbouring states.' It is also probable that a large part of the goods imported into Holland was for export to its own colonies; and, consequently, that the entire importation should not be credited to it. But even allowing this doubt to go against us, the result is not only enormously in favour of the proportionate value of 'the worst trade,' but even its sum total, 10,701,000*l.*, largely exceeded the exports to any one European state. That it is unwise to state theories without examining facts is a proposition to which we believe that Mr. Smith would assent; but the most charitable view which can be taken of the conduct of himself and his school is that they have forgotten to put it in practice. Here the facts are again in favour of the colonial trade, for the total exports to 'neighbouring states' inhabited by 160,000,000 of civilized people were little more than double the amount of those to the Colonies with a population of 7,000,000, and the 5*s.* 6*d.* per head taken in the neighbouring states is only one-twelfth of the 3*l.* per head taken in the Colonies. Were the Colonies 'emancipated' and importing from England at the same rate as those countries, the exports to which, according to Mr. Smith's theory, constitute the most valuable exterior trade, they would have taken

<sup>1</sup> *The Empire*, p. 93.

from England in 1861 goods to the value of only 1,750,000*l*.

Still Mr. Smith has one last hope. His stronghold is the United States. There it is that we have the bright results of the 'emancipation' policy; there is the happy sample of the spectacle which the Colonies would present if only freed from the influence of their Fatherland: why not let them enter on the same glorious course which the States have pursued? Such seem to have been Mr. Smith's feelings when he published the *Empire!* and such are still the feelings of the more advanced liberal emancipationists in England to-day. The course which has led to the ascendancy of an aristocracy of demagogues, and their rule to national disruption and civil war, the full consequences of which are yet undeveloped, are not calculated to induce less vehement progressionists to emulate them. We shall have something to say on this point hereafter. At present we have only to examine the relative value of the colonial trade and of that with the United States.

In 1861 the exports from England to the States amounted to 9,058,000*l*., and their population in the preceding year was 31,445,000, which gives 5*s*. 9*d*. per head as the amount of goods imported from England, or about one-twelfth of the amount consumed by each colonist.

It may be replied, however, that the year 1861 was an exceptional period, owing to the troubles which then fell on the States, and that the returns of other years would show a much more favourable result. This is true, but the issue will still be found to be in favour of the colonial trade. It is difficult to present a clear view of this subject, but we will strive to do so.

The population of the United States in 1850 was 23,191,000, and in 1860 31,445,000, showing an increase

of 8,254,000 within the decade, or at the rate of 825,400 per annum. We are, of course, aware that the increase was not equal in each year, and as the nearest approximation to the actual population in the five years prior to the civil war, we take the figures of a statement published in the *New York Tribune*, showing the population of the United States in each year from 1790 to 1867. According to the *Tribune's* estimate and the British trade returns, the population of the States and their imports from England in each of the five years ending with 1861 were as follows:—

Year	Population	Imports
		£
1857	28,697,895	18,985,939
1858	29,584,660	14,491,448
1859	30,498,826	22,553,405
1860	31,443,321	21,667,065
1861	32,392,909	9,058,326
	152,617,611	86,756,183

From this it appears that, taking one year with another, the average imports of British goods by the inhabitants of the United States during the above period were at the rate of about 11s. 4d. per head, being about one-sixth of the amount taken by colonists in the aggregate, one-half that taken by much-abused British America at the period of its greatest depression, and one-third of the proportion usually consumed by it; nay, *less than that taken by some European countries!* We fear that we cannot compliment Mr. Smith on his talents as a statistician, seeing that, although a cursory glance at the figures would seem to confirm his views, a close examination proves them to be utterly erroneous. Mr. Smith, and emancipationists generally, in comparing the value of

foreign and colonial trade, omit to notice the most important point in any comparison—the relative resources of the competitors. When these are thrust aside the strongest, of course, will be awarded the palm. But when it can be proved that a given amount of power in one party has accomplished more than a like amount in the other, that party has fairly proved its superiority to its competitor, even though overcome in the contest, inasmuch as it follows that, if resources were equalized, it would conquer. This, it seems to us, is exactly the position of the colonists. Each of them consumes 2,000 per cent. more of British goods than is consumed by each foreigner generally, 1,200 per cent. more than is consumed by each inhabitant of civilized Europe and 550 per cent. more than is consumed by each American.

This brings us to Mr. Smith's great blow on the subject of colonial trade. He remarks, very justly we admit, that—

‘Arguments drawn from the amount of the colonial trade prove nothing, unless it can be shown that the prosperity of the trade in some way depends on the continuance of the political connection. The immense increase of our trade with the United States since the severance of their political connection with the mother-country proves that the reverse is the truth; the defenders of the system of dependency seem always unwilling to face this fact.’<sup>1</sup>

We are not at all unwilling to face the fact, or to accept the challenge. The facts which we have already noted go a long way towards proving, if indeed they do not conclusively prove, that the prosperity of the trade *does* depend on the continuance of the political connection. Here are certain countries which consume British goods to the amount of 3*l.* per head per annum, against 1*l.* 4*d.* per head consumed in the States. Is it unfair to suppose that if they were

<sup>1</sup> *The Empire*, p. 41.

to follow in the same path as that in which the States have walked, their imports from England would decline to the same proportion? in which case they would have imported in 1861 only to the amount of 3,500,000*l.*, instead of 20,000,000*l.* We will show that there is abundant reason to expect the occurrence of such a decline; and we will prove that the history of English trade with the States authorises a conclusion directly contrary to that which emancipationists draw from it.

If the Colonies were separated from England, they would be forced to undertake the burden of their own defence; and we suppose that, in face of the history of the world since 1848, even a Quaker would not assert that armaments could be dispensed with. The cost of these armaments would largely increase the sum which they would require to raise by taxation. In what manner would the increased revenue be supplied? Mr. Smith and his friends will say that it should be raised by direct taxation. But even the fiercest free-trader amongst them will now probably hesitate to say that what men *should* do they *will* do. Mr. Smith, writing several years since, complains of the disposition on the part of the Colonies to adopt a protectionist policy. Subsequent events show that the same disposition still exists. Though such a policy has not yet been adopted in its entirety in any of the Colonies, every weakening of the ties which unite them to the Mother-country is evidently strengthening the position of the protectionists and giving them a stronger hold on popular feeling. It can scarcely be supposed that this tendency could be successfully resisted in case of separation from England and need of increased revenue occurring, as they would, simultaneously. It is almost certain that these events would at once give the victory to the protectionists; for they would quickly be reinforced by many who would now support them did they not con-



sider protection to be unfair to England; and by those who hold with Dr. Arnold that 'the *summum bonum* of political economy and of human life are not identical; and, therefore, many questions in which free trade is involved and the advantages of large capital, &c., although perfectly simple in an economic point of view, become, when considered politically, very complex; and the economical good is very often, from a neglect of other points, made in practice a direct social evil.' Both these parties would, after separation, join the protectionists on principle; and the mass of the people, if confronted, as they would be, with the alternative of new direct, or increased indirect, taxes, would certainly choose the latter. It is an indisputable fact that all countries which possess any commerce have always preferred indirect to direct taxation, and customs to excise duties. Nowhere is this tendency stronger than in the young nations of the earth, as is demonstrated by the commercial policy of the United States. But even if inclined to adopt direct taxation, it would be impossible for the Colonies to do so to the requisite extent. In the most thickly-settled districts in Canada, collectors would have to walk about two miles to call at five properties, as five 'lots,' each of which usually constitutes a farm, cover that frontage; and in the newly-settled districts they might have to walk five miles to find one or two. In Australian pastoral districts the case would be still worse. These facts, we think, prove decisively that any attempt to raise by direct taxation such an amount of revenue as would be required in case of separation must necessarily fail; and that that event would compel the Colonies to increase their customs duties, even if not inclined to do so.

It has been said, however, that protectionist tariffs have already been adopted, and that England has consequently nothing to fear on this head. Mr. Adderley, in his letter to Mr. Disraeli, published in 1862, remarked

that England was already confronted by Morrill tariffs. This plea is easily answered. The tariff of Canada, there referred to, was raised solely from necessity, and as soon as that necessity had been overcome it was reduced. The general rate on manufactured goods in the Canadian tariff is now about fifteen per cent. This is certainly not a protectionist tariff, as is proved by the very large increase of importations which has occurred of late. As to other colonies, Australia more particularly, there is yet time to stop the advance towards protection by dealing with the whole of the colonial question in a statesmanlike manner; but, most assuredly, should England adopt the emancipationist policy, she will thereby render inevitable the establishment of protectionist tariffs in all the Colonies.

Mr. Smith, however, does not care for this contingency. He tells us that 'the enormous increase in our trade with the United States since the severance of the connection proves that the prosperity of the trade is not dependent on the continuance of the political connection.' We reply that he has spoken rather rashly. The total amount of British exports to the States has, of course, increased since their separation from England: it would be strange, indeed, if (in 1861) 31,000,000 or (in 1870) 38,000,000 people did not consume more goods than did 3,000,000 in 1774. But notwithstanding this increase, it is perfectly easy to prove that the trade with the States is much less valuable than was the trade with the same countries whilst colonies, and immeasurably inferior to what it would have been to-day had the connection been maintained.

According to the article 'Imports and Exports,' in McCulloch's *Commercial Dictionary*, the average of the exports to the North American Colonies from 1749 to 1755 was 1,238,000*l.* per annum; and of those to the United States from 1784 to 1792 2,800,000*l.* Mr. Ban-

croft, in his *History of the United States*, vol. iii. p. 90, estimates the population of the thirteen Colonies in 1750 at 1,260,000; and from 1784 to 1792 the average population must have been somewhere about 3,500,000, for it was 3,900,000 at the first official census, taken in 1790. Thus it appears that in the middle of the last century the Colonies imported from England at the rate of about 1*l.* per head per annum; and from 1784 to 1792, immediately after their independence, at the rate of 16*s.* In 1861 the rate had fallen to 11*s.* 4*d.* per head; and this despite the enormous increase in the quantity of manufactured goods consumed by all ranks and conditions of men everywhere since 1750 and 1784. Besides, in 1750, England was the sole and only manufacturer for the States, and in 1784 probably remained in a similar position. The exports at these periods, therefore, represent the entire amount of manufactured goods consumed in the States. But in 1861 the States manufactured to such a large extent for themselves that it is probable they did not draw from England more than one-fourth or one-fifth of their total consumption of such goods. Had England supplied as large a proportion of the goods consumed in the States during the five years ending with 1861 as in either of the former periods, her annual exports to them would probably have been nearer 100,000,000*l.* than 17,000,000*l.* But leaving this plea out of sight, good and true though we believe it to be, it is evident that between 1784 and 1861 the population of the States had increased about 900 per cent.; that if the English trade with them had increased in the same proportion, the average exports to them would have been 25,000,000*l.*; and that, if they had been importing from England between 1857 and 1861 at the same rate as from 1749 to 1755, they would in 1860 have imported within a few thousands of 32,000,000*l.*, instead of at the rate of 17,000,000*l.* These figures, we think, prove that Mr. Smith is alto-

gether wrong in assuming that 'the enormous increase in our trade with the United States proves that the prosperity of the trade is not dependent on the political connection;' but, on the contrary, prove that it is so dependent, and, when conjoined with the statistics of the foreign and colonial trade at present, approach as nearly to a demonstration as is possible, save in mathematics. Colonies now take a larger proportion of British goods than is taken by foreign States; a foreign State now takes a smaller proportion of British goods than it took when it constituted a group of British Colonies, and, in common with all the civilized world, consumed much less manufactured goods than at present. If this be not sufficient proof, very little reliance can be placed in inductive reasoning.

Mr. Smith next attempts to institute an invidious comparison between the rate of increase in the colonial, as compared with that of the foreign, trade, in the following language:—

'The export trade to foreign countries has been increasing much more rapidly and steadily than that to the British Colonies, although the markets in Australia have been multiplying so fast. The foreign trade has increased over 40,000,000*l.* since 1847; the colonial trade only 10,000,000*l.*'<sup>1</sup>

Assuming the amounts to be correctly stated, the conclusion is incorrectly reached. As Mr. Smith states the foreign trade in 1861 to have amounted to 82,000,000*l.*, an increase of 40,000,000*l.* would show that it had just *doubled*; as he estimates the colonial trade at 16,860,000*l.*, an increase of 10,000,000*l.* would show that it had almost *trebled*; or, taking it at what we have proved to be the correct amount, the increase from 1847 would show it to have much more than *trebled*. Which is, 100 or 200 per cent., the more rapid rate of increase? In 1847 the

<sup>1</sup> *The Empire*, p. 26.

colonial was about one-seventh of the foreign trade. In 1861 it was one-fourth !

We cannot help saying that arguments such as those used above by Mr. Smith are not such as we should have expected from that gentleman. His conclusions are usually based on a single point of the case, an ignorance of all other points, and even of the causes which have produced the fact on which he relies. Is it not evident that such a course of reasoning must, almost always, lead to error ? And is it not self-evident that the trade with countries whose population is recruited by immigration as well as by natural increase must augment much more rapidly than that with countries recruited by natural increase only ? On the increase of colonial trade we copy from the *Westminster Review* for July 1870, p. 23, the following extract from an essay read by Mr. Hyde Clarke before the Society of Arts :—

‘ We have seen that the combined trade of these regions [the British Possessions] has in the space of sixteen years increased fourfold, that is, from 65,000,000*l.* in 1850 to 280,000,000*l.* in 1866. We have seen that at the beginning of that period the aggregate of colonial imports was 33,000,000*l.*, and of exports 31,000,000*l.*, and that at the end of it these figures had become 137,000,000*l.* and 143,000,000*l.* respectively. But, what to my countrymen will be a still more interesting result, is the fact that the consumption by the Colonies of British manufactures has kept pace with the rest of their trade, the imports from the United Kingdom having been in 1850 18,000,000*l.*, and in 1866 61,000,000*l.* The exports from the Colonies to the mother-country have increased in a yet greater ratio. In 1850 they correspond with the imports, being 18,000,000*l.*; in 1866 they were 74,000,000*l.* In sixteen years, therefore, the trade of the United Kingdom with her Colonies advanced from 37,000,000*l.* to 135,000,000*l.* If we exclude India from

the estimate, we find that what may be strictly regarded as the colonial trade of Great Britain—the simple result of Anglo-Saxon colonisation during the last twenty years—the fruits of the efforts and enterprise of Anglo-Saxon colonists in Australia, Canada, South Africa, and the Indian islands, has advanced from 34,000,000*l.* in 1850 to 157,000,000*l.* in 1866.'

These facts constitute pretty strong evidence that colonial trade is not such a 'slow coach' as Mr. Smith would fain represent it to be. We close the commercial side of the question with the following tables showing the value of English goods exported to the Colonies and certain foreign countries in 1869 and 1870, and their population according to the latest returns. The tables of exports are copied from the Board of Trade returns, as published in the London *Economist*, March 4, 1871; and those of population—save for British America, which we state according to the census of 1871 for the Dominion, and the latest estimates for provinces not comprised in it—from the *Year Book* for 1871. An examination of them will show that the relative proportion of goods consumed has changed very little since 1861:—

	1869	1870	Population
	£	£	
British America . .	5,159,000	6,800,000	3,903,000
West Indies . . .	1,834,000	2,462,000	1,097,000
Guiana . . . .	654,000	851,000	
Honduras . . . .	126,000	160,000	25,000
Australasia . . . .	13,411,000	9,902,000	1,683,000
Cape Colony and Natal	1,572,000	1,867,000	759,000
Mauritius . . . .	381,000	483,000	322,000
Western Africa . .	623,000	658,000	48,000
Other possessions .	88,000	79,000	say 25,000
Total . . . .	23,848,000	23,262,000	7,862,000

The exports to Western Europe and the United States—the countries with which we compared the colonial trade of 1861—were in the same years as follows:—

	1869	1870	Population
	£	£	
Sweden and Norway . . . .	1,564,000	2,014,000	5,897,000
Denmark . . . . .	1,574,000	2,023,000	1,783,000
Prussia . . . . .	5,239,000	2,938,000	38,514,000
Germany . . . . .	19,601,000	17,432,000	
Holland . . . . .	10,709,000	11,222,000	3,735,000
Belgium . . . . .	4,003,000	4,476,000	4,839,000
France . . . . .	11,438,000	11,645,000	38,067,000
Portugal . . . . .	1,638,000	1,927,000	3,987,000
Spain . . . . .	2,204,000	2,513,000	16,301,000
Italy . . . . .	6,162,000	5,266,000	24,273,000
Austria . . . . .	1,341,000	1,714,000	35,943,000
Greece . . . . .	974,000	842,000	1,332,000
Wallachia and Moldavia	907,000	559,000	3,864,000
Total . . . . .	65,354,000	64,571,000	178,535,000
United States . . . . .	24,624,000	28,334,000	38,555,000

From the above tables it can be seen that in the years 1869 and 1870 each colonist consumed English goods to the amount of 2*l.* 19*s.* 11*d.*, against 7*s.* 3*d.* taken by each inhabitant of Western Europe, and 13*s.* 8*d.* by each American. We have previously shown that Americans when colonists, and when they, in common with all the world, consumed much less manufactured goods than they do at present, imported from England at the rate of 1*l.* per head. Do not these facts decisively prove that the colonial trade is much more valuable than that with foreigners, and that maintenance of the connection is requisite to keep it so?

As we remember to have seen a statement to the effect that tables similar to the above had lately been published in England, it may be as well to state that we have never seen them; that the above argument was set forth by the writer six years since in a Toronto newspaper, and that the original idea of the relative superiority of colonial trade was derived from a passage in the second volume of Alison's *Europe*, 1815-52, vol. ii. p. 6.

## CHAPTER II.

DIPLOMATIC, MILITARY, AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS  
OF EMANCIPATION.

IN urging the disruption of the Empire on pleas based on diplomatic, military, and financial considerations, emancipationists take higher ground than that which they occupy when surveying the commercial aspects of the question. There they only say that the Colonies are useless to England, and that no *loss* would accrue from separation. But, in urging the latter pleas, they contend that the Colonies are positively *pernicious* to the mother-country, inasmuch as they tend to involve her in war for their defence, draw away her troops for their garrisons, and her revenue for paying them; and that, as emancipation would deliver her from the dangers of war to which they now expose her, and would, practically, strengthen her army by enabling her to concentrate it in England, besides relieving her from the charge of paying the colonial garrisons, she would be a positive gainer in a diplomatic, military, and financial point of view by its adoption. All these pleas are urged in the strongest manner against British America, as it is—or has been—the most vulnerable of the Colonies on each of these points. Mr. Smith thus states the case:—

‘If there had been a war with the United States, the “Trent” would have been the occasion, but Canada would have been the cause. It is because we have a



dependency on that continent easily assailable, and which because it is a dependency it is not thought immoral to assail, that the idea of a quarrel with England rises in the minds of the Americans whenever their temper or the desire of relief from internal difficulties leads them to think of foreign war.'<sup>1</sup>

And, again, even more distinctly, he affirms that Canada is the sole cause which can induce a war with the States:—

‘For Canada, and for Canada alone, we stand always on the brink of a war with the great Anglo-Saxon Republic, our best mart, and, if we were not compelled to stand in the path of her advancing greatness, our closest and surest ally.’<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, Canada's only danger of aggression is said to arise from her connection with England:—

‘There is but one way to make Canada impregnable, and that is to fence her round with the majesty of an independent nation. To invade and conquer an independent nation without provocation is an act from which, in the present state of opinion, even the Americans would shrink.’ And in a note he adds—‘even the Americans as they were while their Government was filled with the aggressive insolence of the Southern slave-owner. I know not what reason we have for believing that a Government representing the industrious and thrifty citizens of the North is likely to be military and aggressive.’<sup>3</sup>

Perhaps after having seen the history of the ‘Alabama’ controversy, Mr. Smith may be less confident of the pacific temperament of his Northern friends than he was when writing the above. It is pretty certain that a good many other people have altered opinions much the same as those expressed by him. But however this may be, the sentiments conveyed in the above extracts must be

<sup>1</sup> *The Empire*, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 131.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* p. 2.

met; for they represent living issues, held even more strongly to-day than when they were written. The whole course of reasoning is a mass of inconsistencies which go far to destroy its entire force.

Mr. Smith tells us that the States neither are, nor are likely to become, aggressive, and fills several pages with arguments intended to establish these propositions. If this view be correct, England need not fear that Canada will ever form a *casus belli* between herself and the States, and the first plea which emancipationists urge in favour of its abandonment is inoperative. There is no danger, or rather no *possibility*, of aggression from a non-aggressive people and government.

Mr. Smith, however, in defiance of his own argument to prove that the States are not aggressive, maintains that 'the possession of Canada, and that alone, keeps England constantly on the brink of war with the great Anglo-Saxon Republic,' and not only this, but also that Canada's sole danger of attack arises from the connection with England. One of these propositions may be correct, but both of them cannot be so. If the States be aggressive, and entertain hostile feelings towards both England and Canada, it is plain that a severance of the connection would not alter this feeling. If they had hostile feelings or designs against one of them only, then it is true that the other would escape being drawn into war when the victim was attacked by having previously dissolved the partnership; but that *two* countries can ever escape an assault directed against *one* only, by severing their political connection, is clearly impossible. Therefore, before we can be sure that this new, honourable, and truly British mode of averting aggression—by running away from aggressors!—would be effectual in the case of either England or Canada, we must be sure that one only of these countries is in danger of aggression from the States,

and must know which of them it is. This we cannot tell; and, therefore, must remain ignorant as to which of them might gain safety by the above device; but we may be sure that, in case of the States becoming aggressive, emancipation could not bring safety to *both* England and Canada. If the assault were directed against one only, that one would still remain open to attack; if against both, it would be their interest to form an alliance to resist it.

These inconsistencies pervade the reasonings of the whole of the emancipationist school on this subject. They hold up Canada as a standing *casus belli* between England and the States; but as it would be too cruel a blow to their feelings to admit that their model Republic could be aggressive, and as they know that the British people would never abandon their offspring to the tender mercies of an aggressor, they stoutly deny that the States are aggressive, and assert that Canada's only danger of attack is to be found in her connection with England; *forgetting that, if this be true, it invalidates their former theory that it is Canada which brings danger to England*; whilst there can be no doubt that, if Canada really does bring danger to England, the danger to herself must continue to exist after the severance of the connection. Thus, in establishing either one of these theories, they overturn the other.

But is the doctrine with which we are now more immediately concerned, that 'for Canada, and Canada alone, England stands always on the brink of a war with the great Anglo-Saxon Republic,' correct? We say that it is grossly incorrect. The 'Trent' affair is a case in point. Mr. Smith says that had hostilities arisen out of that event Canada would have been 'the cause,' though the 'Trent' affair would have been 'the occasion.' We are unable to extract any other meaning from this nice distinction than that the 'Trent' affair would have been seized

upon as affording a pretext for an attempt to annex Canada, which, we suppose, is very far from Mr. Smith's idea. But whatever meaning he may have intended to convey, the glaring fallacy of the proposition that Canada would have been 'the cause' of war in that case is sufficiently proved by the fact that, had Canada been separated from England at the time of the commission of the outrage, reparation must have been demanded all the same, and war ensued had it been refused. The same remarks apply to the enlistment question (during the Russian war) and the subsequent long controversy on the 'Alabama' claims. What had Canada to do with any one of these difficulties? The emancipationist theory on this subject is equivalent to saying that geographical contiguity is essential to the creation of a *casus belli*, which is a manifest absurdity. It is, therefore, ridiculous to say that Canada is the sole cause which can induce war between England and the States, though it may be one of the causes which can induce that event, as both the people of the United States and their rulers set a much higher value on Canada than is done by British emancipationists.

To this possibility there are, however, countervailing considerations. Does Canada act only as a *casus belli*? May she not also act as a pacificator? In the 'Trent' affair we are pretty sure that she did so act. For in Canada England was furnished with a base of operations for her army, ready access to the States' northern frontier, and the means of strengthening her forces by the addition of from 50,000 to 80,000 hardy recruits. May not these things, and the consequent fact that a war with England and British America is certain to be more dangerous to the States than a war with England single-handed, denuded of Canada, and thus able to assail the States only as a naval power, have been the causes, as they certainly

were amongst the causes, which led the States to yield, and so averted war? And as we have shown before that war, on account of Canada, can arise only in case of the States being an aggressive Power, the question arises whether considerations such as these are not much more likely to avert aggression than is any flattering of their vanity by withdrawing from their neighbourhood in fear of encountering their prowess; nay, whether such are not the only arguments which can prevent aggression on the part of a Power inclined to attempt it.

It thus appears that the only event in which the emancipationist theories on this subject can prove correct is in that of the States desiring to annex Canada, and of England consenting to stand aside and allow them to do so. There can be no danger of aggression from a non-aggressive Power, and if the States were aggressive, and their hostile feelings directed against England alone, she would not escape the assault by cutting Canada adrift. The increased chances of war with the States which Canada brings to England are consequently reduced to very small proportions; and still further reduced when on the other side of the account we place the motives for keeping the peace which are furnished to them by the union of the two countries, rendering a war with both much more dangerous than with England alone—a motive which grows with the growth of Canada. As to the other Colonies, we do not think that they have, during the present century, created a single difficulty with any foreign Power.

The position which we have taken, in reference to the connection with Canada rendering England more formidable in a war with the States, would certainly be disputed by any logical emancipationist, for the party contends that the military strength of England is weakened by the

dispersion of her army in colonial garrisons. Mr. Smith's argument in support of this view is as follows:—

‘As regards the position of England in Europe, I contend that she would become not more, but less, insular, when disencumbered of her distant dependencies. Why cannot she now speak the one word of spirited foreign policy that is worth speaking—the word that would set Italy free? Because her armies and fleets are scattered, and she is in fear of her dependencies all over the globe.’<sup>1</sup>

There is no doubt that this view of the case is, in some measure, correct. If the colonial garrisons were withdrawn to England, and still kept in pay there, England would, under present circumstances, have a larger army disposable for operations in Europe without her Colonies than with them. But for a war with the States such a policy would certainly weaken her. For it should be remembered that with Canada for an ally England could find employment for at least 200,000 American troops in their own country, or on its borders, and that without Canada these troops would be disposable for action elsewhere. Has it never occurred to Englishmen that their scene of action might be in the British Islands? We are tolerably sure that it has not; and, also, that the suggestion of such a possibility may, at first, rather tend to excite the risible muscles of the reader than his apprehensions of such an event. But reflection will soon alter this. Sixty years ago England transported her forces across the Atlantic and attacked the States at many points on their own soil. Since that time steam navigation has immensely lessened the difficulty of expeditions across the sea, as has been repeatedly proved by experience. Under these circumstances, there are but two means by which such an invasion could be prevented from reaching the British Islands. One is that England should possess

<sup>1</sup> *The Empire*, p. 35.

such a superiority at sea as would enable her to blockade the States' seaports, and so hinder the sailing of the armament, and the other is that she would be able to destroy it at sea. The former contingency, however, is very unlikely to prove a fact, and the latter is dependent on the chance of meeting the hostile fleet. Hence, there are no other difficulties in the way of an invasion of the British Islands by the States than such as are peculiar to any military enterprise undertaken across the sea; and if anybody should suppose that it would not be attempted, or the requisite force not forthcoming, he would labour under a sad delusion. The population of the States now exceeds that of the United Kingdom by about twenty-five per cent. They have raised armies quadruple those of England, and the *matériel* of an immense force is still available at almost any moment. Their navy is pretty formidable; and a war with England would cause an enormous fleet to spring into being with mushroom rapidity, by letters of marque bringing private enterprise to the work of its augmentation. How can Englishmen suppose that so terribly energetic a people as the Americans would employ their immense resources in watching for some expeditions of 10,000 or 15,000 men, which England might send over to make casual landings on their coasts, instead of employing them to strike at the heart of their foe. If there were any doubt on the matter at any time, there certainly can be none while Fenianism exists in both Ireland and America; and this under so strong a form that not only are raids from the latter country into British territories planned, but also executed, in time of peace. What, then, would be done in time of war? And what would be a more effectual check on any scheme of invasion than the fact that, before attacking other people, the States would require to guard their own land against the assaults of from 100,000 to

200,000 men in Canada? England complains of having to undertake the defence of Canada, whilst the fact is that, in a war with the States, Canada would constitute a breakwater to defend England against the storm, for unless she were defending herself in America, she would probably have to do it at home. It is really strange to hear British statesmen talking of Canada being likely to prove a weakness to England in a war with the States; or, averring that it is impossible to defend Canada in Canada, and that the only way to defend her is to withdraw the British troops and strike elsewhere. If Canada be indefensible by the union of English and Canadian forces, how can she be defensible by those of Canada alone? and if England could not confront the States in a friendly country with those united forces, how could she confront them in a hostile country with her own alone? For a war with the States, emancipation would unquestionably weaken England, though we will grant that, by enabling her to withdraw the colonial garrisons, it would strengthen the force disposable for operations in Europe, if the troops were still kept under pay.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Early in 1870, and subsequent to the writing of the above, some admirable letters from a gentleman subscribing himself 'A Colonist' were published in the *Times*. In the second of these letters the writer takes precisely the same ground that we have done. He says:—

'In my last letter I contended that the colony which is most exposed of all was defensible in case of war, and that on the grounds of military expediency it would be more to the advantage of England to defend than to retire from Canada. Let me now look at the alternative of the case: that Canada is given up and that the whole Confederation in any future struggle is neutral. This, it is to be kept in mind, involves the consequence that on no part of the Atlantic coast north of Bermuda, nor on the American side of the Pacific Ocean, would England possess a single harbour where she could coal, or refit a vessel, or obtain supplies. To repair damages a ship must return to England, and if the United States were left free to operate with all their power against Bermuda, how long could that island be held?



The financial argument is the last plea in favour of a disruption of the Empire which we have to consider. England has been accustomed to garrison the Colonies, and the expense of so doing would, it is contended, be saved by declaring the Colonies independent, and ceasing to garrison them. The following is Mr. Smith's estimate of the expense:—

‘The military expenditure on the whole of the depen-

Being within easy access to the United States, it must, at all events, however guarded, be reduced or actual capture, be closely blockaded, and, for all effectual purposes, would be useless. If Bermuda fell, how long would the West Indies remain British? And might not the contagion of dissolution extend to Australia and the other Colonies of the empire? If Canada were abandoned on the ground that she was difficult to defend, would the Pacific or Australian Colonies not claim the right to be neutral? In the language of Lord Grey, “the policy of abandoning a part of our colonial empire could scarcely be adopted without giving so great a shock to the feeling of confidence and security in the remainder as greatly to increase the difficulty of maintaining it.” England would thus be deprived of active allies, numbering nearly seven millions of people, all over the globe, and her enemy would gain immensely in the means of inflicting injury on her commerce in every sea. And what of the fact that Newfoundland is within six days’ steaming of Ireland? If all the ships of England are to be withdrawn from the American possessions, that island at once becomes a safe base of operations against Ireland, whence men and munitions of war could and would be despatched as opportunity or the chances of success warranted.

‘To sum up, therefore, in such a war, if the policy of abandonment is to be followed, England loses whatever advantage is to be found in the alliance and active support derived from Canada alone of half a million of fighting men, of whom 70,000 are as hardy seamen as the world can produce; of the employment of a very large share of the enemy’s resources and men in difficult and exhausting expeditions; in having no harbours to repair and coal her ships and to fit out expeditions within easy access of the enemy’s country, and of so being able to harass a coasting trade which extends from Maine to Cape Horn, and from Cape Horn to the Columbia River. She relinquishes, besides, all hope of executing what some regard as a strategetic operation possessing elements of probable success—a descent on California by a force drawn from India and collected at Vancouver’s Island; and, above all, she risks alienating the active support of every other possession, and turning them, if no worse befalls, into the condition of neutrals; and she furnishes a safe footing to a hostile force on an island less than six days’ sail from Ireland.’

dencies for the year ending March 1858, was 3,590,000*l*. The expenditure on the North American Colonies was 473,000*l*.; on the West Indies, 384,000*l*.; on the Australian Colonies, 340,000*l*. At the Cape we had an army of 10,759 regular troops, and the military expenditure alone was 830,687*l*.<sup>1</sup>

As these statistics are now somewhat old, it may be well to turn to some of a more recent date. We find it stated in the *Year Book* for 1871, pp. 278-9, that according to a parliamentary return issued in the session of 1870, the cost of the colonial possessions of the Empire falling to the charge of the British Exchequer was 4,100,000*l*. in the financial year 1866-7, and 3,969,426*l*. in 1867-8. Full details are given of the cost in each colony or station, but with these we shall not trouble our readers. Following the classification which we have adopted when examining the amount of the colonial trade, we deduct the items for Gibraltar, Malta, Hong Kong, Ceylon, Labuan, and the Straits Settlements, amounting collectively to 1,012,914*l*. in 1866-7, and 1,106,306*l*. in 1867-8, leaving the cost of colonial garrisons in the former year 3,090,090*l*. and in the latter 2,863,120*l*. It is certain that since then still further reductions have been made; but we shall not take the expenditure under the Gladstone Administration as a fair test of the cost of the Colonies, as we believe the measures adopted by it to be inconsistent either with the security of the Colonies or the integrity of the Empire. We are, therefore, content to admit that the defence of the Colonies must constitute a charge of from 2,500,000*l*. to 3,000,000*l*. on the Imperial Exchequer.

There is no doubt that if England were to abandon the Colonies, withdraw their garrisons to the United Kingdom *and there disband them*, she would save the cost

<sup>1</sup> *The Empire*, p. 75.

of their maintenance. But as many people are led to believe, by the confusion of emancipationist arguments on this subject, that by the adoption of that policy England would gain both a saving of expense and an increase of her available force, we think it right to indicate the fallacy of that idea. Were the Empire dissolved and the troops required to garrison the Colonies concentrated in England, they would certainly be more easily moved to any point in Europe, and more available for her own defence than if scattered over the Colonies, but they would still have to be kept embodied and paid. To save the expense, it would be necessary to disband them; and were this done, England's available force would not be one whit greater, but decidedly less, than with these troops in the Colonies. Either the advantage of a decrease of expenditure, or a concentration of troops, might be gained, but not both of them. Against this, however, is to be placed the loss of certain benefits derived from the Colonies of which people seem to be strangely forgetful, and which we shall strive to indicate further on.

Mr. Smith's case against the Colonies is summarised in the extract which we quoted as a fair sample of the emancipationist spirit, and which we reproduce here for the purpose of analysing it:—

‘In ancient times empire was empire. The Roman extorted from his dependencies both military force and revenue. Spain extorted revenue. We are too moral to extort either force or revenue from our dependencies, even if we had the power. While we monopolised their trade in a general reign of monopoly, they brought us a real advantage, though of a narrow and selfish kind. Now they bring us no advantage at all. But the system has been established; many prejudices and some interests are bound up with it, and reasons must be found or invented for maintaining it. The reasons found or in-

vented are, as might be expected, various and discordant enough. Now it is the amount of the colonial trade; now it is the preference of our people for the Colonies as places of emigration. When facts overturn all these arguments, it is glory, national spirit, *prestige*. I give an agent an immense sum of money to invest for me. He tells me he has bought me an estate. I ask to see the estate: he tells me that the money is laid out not in an estate but in houses. I ask to see the houses: he tells me that it is not laid out in houses but in railway shares. I ask for my scrip: he tells me that it is not laid out in railway shares but invested in the funds. I ask for the transfer-receipt, and he tells me that it is not invested in the funds but in something much better and nobler, in *prestige*. I look in the French dictionary for *prestige*, and find that it is an illusion, a juggling trick, an imposture.<sup>1</sup>

A vigorous and well-written outburst, we must say, but a very poor argument is the above. 'We are too moral to exact either force or revenue from our dependencies,' though the burden of Mr. Smith's argument is the *injustice* which the Colonies inflict on England by drawing on her force and revenue for their defence, instead of furnishing the requisite armaments from their own resources. His ideas of morality and justice would, therefore, seem to be that they conflict with one another—in this case, at least. Besides, his memory must be rather bad if he fancies that England is so 'moral' as to believe herself bound to present her dependencies with forces and refuse to take anything from them. Canada has furnished troops when attacked; offered to furnish them during the Russian war, and raised a regiment of the line whilst the Indian rebellion was in progress. India furnishes double pay for British troops within her limits, and her native troops have been employed on

<sup>1</sup> *The Empire*, pp. 93, 94.

exterior expeditions more than once. These facts dispose of the 'too moral' theory, which is in direct opposition to all the rest of Mr. Smith's ideas; but one who writes so hotly can scarcely be expected to perceive the contradiction. 'While we monopolised their trade in a general reign of monopoly, they brought us a real advantage, though of a narrow and selfish kind.' This is the most astounding sentence in the book. We are much surprised that Mr. Smith has not been denounced by his political friends for the proposition. It is almost enough to make Adam Smith, Peel, and Cobden stir uneasily in their graves: an advantage gained by a Protectionist policy and lost by that of free trade! Seriously, it would seem as if Mr. Smith did not know his own mind. Anybody reading his letters would take him for a free trader *par excellence*; and the ideas of free traders on this subject were in direct contradiction to the theory broached by him. They held that, under that monopolising process which Mr. Smith declares to have been 'a real advantage,' Canada cost England some millions annually, through differential duties on her timber and wheat; the West Indies some more through those on sugar; and Australia yet others through those on wool: consequently, that the Colonies were, under this 'general reign of monopoly,' a positive loss to England in a commercial point of view, but would become an advantage under a free trade policy, as England would thus import from them less the differential duties, and export to them as fully as before by being able to undersell any competitor. This seems to have been the case, as articles of colonial produce did decline in value in the English markets, and English exports to the Colonies have nearly quadrupled in amount. If the colonial connection were an advantage to England under the reign of monopoly, it assuredly remains so under free trade, whatever may be

the case with the Colonies. 'The reasons invented are various and discordant enough. Now it is the amount of the colonial trade.' A very good argument, we should say, seeing that the amount of that trade is twenty times greater, proportionately, than is the foreign trade. 'Now it is the security of the colonial trade.' No small benefit at any time, but stronger than ever when the reign of universal peace promised by Progressionists still seems to lie in the dim future. 'Now it is the preference of our people for the Colonies as places of emigration.' If the people do not prefer them they could easily be led to do so by a slight departure from the 'let alone' policy. 'When facts overturn all these arguments, it is glory, national spirit, *prestige*. . . . I look in the French dictionary for *prestige*, and find it is an illusion, a juggling trick, an imposture.' But facts, as we have seen, do not overturn these arguments; and, as we shall see, there are some others to offer.

Having thus followed Mr. Smith's arguments in favour of emancipation—for the points on which we have quoted from him are really the only reasons which he offers in favour of that policy—we think we may sum up the result of our inquiries by saying that the value of the strictly colonial trade was, in 1861, 20,000,000*l.* per annum, or about one-fourth of the foreign trade; that between 1847 and 1861 the trade with the Colonies, according to Mr. Smith's own showing, increased twice as fast as that with foreign countries—though this rate of increase does not seem to have been maintained since that date; that the comparative value of the colonial, as compared with the foreign, trade was as 20 to 1 in 1861, and about 15 to 1 in 1869 and 1870; that there is strong reason to believe that the maintenance of the political connection is essential to the continuance of this difference, and that the Colonies, if 'emancipated,' would import

only at the same rate as foreign countries, in which case England would immediately lose from 15,000,000*l.* to 20,000,000*l.* per annum; that the possession of bases of military operations in the Colonies may sometimes serve to maintain peace, and almost always to secure victory in war, by making England a more formidable foe than she would be without them; but that if England were to adopt the emancipationist policy she could, by withdrawing her troops and disbanding them, save the cost of the colonial garrisons; or, by still keeping them under arms, strengthen her army in Europe. Hence it appears that the sole and only argument established in favour of emancipation is that one or other of these advantages could be gained from it. In forming a judgment on the question, however, against this single advantage must be placed those disadvantages which we have endeavoured to show that it would induce. Even on these points alone, judgment, we think, ought to go against emancipation; but as our readers may not agree with us, we shall show them some further evils which a disruption of the Empire would bring on England.

## CHAPTER III.

## COUNTERVAILING CONSIDERATIONS.

It has been well observed by De Tocqueville that 'Reason shows and experience proves that no commercial prosperity can be durable if it cannot be united, in case of need, to naval force.' Of no country was, or is, this proposition so true as of the United Kingdom. Naval supremacy is the life of England. Let her fleets be conquered and she is ruined; because, in that event, not only would the trade on which millions of her people depend for subsistence be destroyed, but even the food which they consume would be hindered from reaching her shores. The maintenance of that supremacy should, therefore, be the supreme object of British statesmen and the British people. All other objects should be made subordinate to it, and anything tending to diminish England's naval resources should be looked on with intense suspicion, if the mere fact of its having such a tendency should not alone suffice to lead to its rejection. Colonial emancipation would have such a tendency.

The emancipation of the Colonies would not lessen the amount of naval force which England would require to maintain. So long as her commerce extends to every quarter of the globe, so long will she require to maintain fleets in every quarter to protect it. But fleets, to be efficient, must be kept in repair; and to keep them in repair it is necessary to possess harbours in which they



may be refitted, and procure supplies at pleasure. At present British fleets enjoy this advantage most completely. There is not an ocean in the world without a British port on its shores. In these ports are, or may be, the means of keeping the fleets efficient, and of securing them shelter if pursued by the foe. But let colonial emancipation be adopted and how different would be the situation! Fleets thousands of miles from England without a spot where they could refit, or keep up that supply of coal which has now become as much a naval requisite as guns and powder. How would a British fleet stand after a battle if it had no means of refitting nearer than in England? Is it not evident that defeat, under such circumstances, would be ruinous, and victory useless, if the enemy had a port to which they could retire, seeing that in such a case they would be prepared to re-enter the lists sooner than their opponents could be ready to meet them? If it be said that certain 'stations' could be retained for naval purposes, the answer is that to fortify and garrison them would cost as much as the colonial garrisons have done, whilst the objects in view would not be attained nearly so completely as under the present régime.

The creation of a marine power is the work of a considerable time, since to form a sailor requires many years' apprenticeship and to commence early in life. Thus the naval strength of any nation is proportionate to the amount of its shipping and sailors. Were the Colonies separated from England, their shipping and seamen would go with them, and the force available to man the British navy would, thereby, be very seriously reduced.

According to the *Statesman's Year Book* for 1869, p. xx. the total number of vessels, steam and sailing, belonging to Great Britain and Ireland at the end of 1866 was 28,971, with a tonnage of 5,779,000 tons. In the same publica-

tion, p. 308, it is stated that 'at the close of 1866 the Colonies and possessions of the United Kingdom had 12,146 vessels of 1,458,000 tons registered at their ports, an increase on the previous year of above 1,700 vessels, and above 160,000 tons.' According to these statistics the colonial marine was, in 1866, equal to about one-fourth that of England, to which extent her naval resources would be at once reduced by emancipation.<sup>1</sup> To how much the loss would amount in the future it is difficult to say. Detailed calculations in reference to the future are never very reliable. In the present instance the various returns of the tonnage of the colonial marine at different periods, which have fallen under our notice, contain so many discrepancies that we shall refrain from quoting any statistics in reference to its rate of increase. But throughout all there shines forth the broad truth that colonial is increasing so much more rapidly than English shipping that, should the same rate of growth be maintained on both sides, it will have gone a good way towards equalling that of England by the end of the century. At present, however, we may be sure that emancipation would reduce the marine resources of England by one-fourth. Nor is it by any means certain that the immediate diminution of English sailors or shipping would stop here. It is, on the contrary, highly probable that, in the event of emancipation, the colonial marine would be enlarged, and that of England diminished, by the transfer to the former of a portion of the English vessels engaged in the trade with the Colonies; and from the very large proportion of English shipping em-

<sup>1</sup> It is true that in these returns the shipping of India, which country does not come under emancipationist theories, is included. The tonnage of that country and the Asiatic Colonies in 1866 amounted to 218,000 tons. But, allowing for subsequent increase, we think there can be no doubt that now the loss would be as above stated.

ployed in the colonial trade, such a loss might prove very serious. The proportion of British shipping thus employed at present we have not the means of ascertaining. But in 1861, the tonnage of British shipping entered in the United Kingdom from foreign ports was 5,400,000 tons, and cleared to them 5,200,000, whilst to the Colonies there were cleared 2,500,000 tons, and entered from them 2,300,000 tons. Thus it appears that in 1861 the colonial trade employed one-half as much British shipping as did the foreign trade, although the total amount of the former was only one-fourth that of the latter. Is it unlikely that the emancipated Colonies might desire to have some of the shipping transferred to themselves, or that they might enact navigation laws to secure it? And is it not almost certain that if they were to enact such laws they would secure such a transfer? What Englishman can regard a measure which would ensure an immediate, and render probable a future, weakening of the maritime strength of his country with complacency, when he remembers that England now imports from one-third to one-half of the breadstuffs consumed by her people? The fact that she requires to do so is alone sufficient to prove that maritime supremacy is to her a matter of life and death, for if the importation of this food could be prevented her people must *starve*; there is no other alternative. It is impossible to blink the fact that war without command of the seas brings starvation to England, as she is dependent on foreign countries for a large part of her supply of food, and the loss of maritime supremacy would render her unable to get it. No need have England's enemies to invade her shores, or land a single battalion on her coasts, to conquer her. If they can only blockade her ports their work is done, and England lies prostrate at their feet. She must yield to their demands or see her people without the means of support-

ing life. An uneasy consciousness of the possibility of this catastrophe, and of the fact that a maritime war would, in any case, so much disarrange the complicated machinery by which British commerce is kept in motion as to leave millions of Englishmen starving, is the real cause of that nervous fear of war which seems to rule both British people and statesmen with absolute sway, and which has reduced her influence in the councils of Europe to that of a second-rate Power—if, indeed, it now stands so high. To have the ocean covered with hostile cruisers could not fail seriously to derange her commerce. This event is always a heavy disaster to any nation; but to England, at the present time, it might be a death-blow, since the whole framework of her society has become interwoven with foreign commerce. In other countries commerce is, generally, the exchange of the surplus produce of their own soil, raw or manufactured, for that of other nations. It thus partakes principally of the character of a purchase of luxuries, leaving the nation possessed within itself of all the necessities of life. But with English commerce this is not the case. England exports little of her own produce in a raw state, but a great deal of manufactured goods. And she exchanges her exports not only for products peculiar to other countries, but also for the food with which many of her people are fed, and for the raw material which, after manufacturing, she exports. An interruption of her commerce would, consequently, leave her not only without the luxuries which she imports, but, by hindering the importation of raw material for manufacturing purposes, one portion of the community without the means of earning a living; and, by stopping the importation of breadstuffs, another portion without food at any price. These calamities would, in themselves, be pretty severe; but when to them we add the influence which the distress of

the suffering people would exercise on others dependent on their expenditure for support; the influence which the distress of all might exercise on public credit, and the manner in which almost the entire realised wealth of England is dependent on public credit, the prospect becomes perfectly appalling. England may strive to blind herself to the fact that it is a dread of these calamities, and a consequent national bankruptcy, which leads her to desire peace so ardently, and to view any prospect of war with a degree of nervous apprehension that is well understood by foreigners; but that such is the case is none the less true. But the more dangerous to England is war, the greater need is there that she should be prepared for it. To be prepared it is necessary to be possessed of warlike resources. Emancipation would instantly lessen by one-fourth, and ultimately by a great deal more, her resources for maintaining that maritime supremacy the loss of which would probably involve her in absolute ruin, since without it she could, in time of war, neither carry on her trade with foreign nations, import for her people the necessaries of life, nor keep hostile battalions away from her shores, and a failure to effect these things would expose her to the risk of a derangement of the framework of society in England.

This consideration alone should, we think, suffice to prove the impolicy of a disruption of the Empire. But besides the fact that emancipation would weaken England's resources for waging a maritime war, there is a very strong probability that it might tend to involve her in war with her resources thus weakened. The Colonies are now held up as being a fruitful source of diplomatic difficulties. They may be so, but what security is there that new difficulties of a like character might not follow on emancipation? The emancipationist seems to consider the Colonies as each affording a ready *casus belli* to any

Power which may desire it, and as forming so many points of weakness in war. We have endeavoured to prove that, even in the case of the Colony most open to these charges, there is something to be said on the other side of the question; whilst we do not think that a single difficulty has arisen concerning any other of the Colonies during the present century. But granting us to be wrong and emancipationists right, would emancipation mend the matter? Supposing it to be accomplished, and the Colonies independent states, what security has England that they would remain so, and give her no further trouble? Mr. Smith contends that the colonial empire is useless to England, but he does not say that under no circumstances can a colonial empire prove advantageous to its possessor. On the contrary, he tells us that 'in ancient times empire was empire. Rome exacted force and revenue from her colonies; Spain exacted revenue.' All quite true, but not the whole truth, for even more than these has the ruling power generally exacted from its colonies. Their governments furnished places for its statesmen, their mines and revenues filled its coffers, their inhabitants frequently fought its battles, and their commerce was always arranged in subordination to its interests. Has it never occurred to men of the emancipationist stamp that if England were to abandon her Colonies they might fall under such a rule as this? We suspect that it has not, and that at first they would hoot the idea, saying that such things might have been dreaded in other times but not in ours, that men are too enlightened to act in such a manner now-a-days, and that 'the age of conquests is past.' But, unfortunately, the stubborn logic of facts proves that these theories are incorrect. The man who first declared the age of conquests to have departed, himself renewed them, and has not wanted followers, as

he has found to his cost. His attempt on Mexico was very much such a case as we have supposed, and its failure can be ascribed only to the fact that the States, after having conquered the Southern Confederacy, stood, flushed with victory, and with a mighty army and navy, ready to enforce the 'Monroe doctrine.' How would England like to see her ancient Colonies falling under the sway of political or commercial rivals, and being ruled for their selfish purposes? Is it not evident that such an event would not only cripple English commerce most seriously, but also increase the naval power of her rivals to such an extent as might enable them to destroy it, and with it almost the existence of England? And what security is there that if the Colonies were emancipated this result would not ensue? Can we suppose that French ambition has been destroyed by the campaign of 1870, or that anxiety to escape from her present degradation will not tend to increase it? Has not Spain given forth signs that her people are recovering their ancient energies? Are not the nations arising in Italy and Germany likely to prove formidable naval powers; and is not the latter, in consequence of the great emigration from its shores, likely to covet a colonial empire? Are not our Yankee neighbours strong, energetic, and ambitious, and ready to hold a people in bondage if they believe it to be conducive to their own interests? And is it impossible that even Australasian Colonies might turn to them for protection? Is it possible that any one of the Colonies could, single-handed, resist successfully an attack from such Powers? and are not Australian gold-fields, West Indian soil and commerce, and Canadian territory, bone and muscle likely to prove tempting objects of pursuit to those who would use them for their own benefit? How would England like to see them turned against herself, and what security has she that they would not

be so turned? If it be said that England would not permit the conquest of any of the emancipated Colonies, the answer is that 'prevention is better than cure,' and that she is likely to find their defence easier whilst they form a part of her empire than it would be when they were independent states.

If it be replied that the 'spirit of the age' affords protection against any attempt at conquest, we would inquire, in the style of Frederick the Great, 'How many battalions can he bring into the field?' and what state will treat a violation of the spirit of this doubtful character as a *casus belli*? Tried by this test we fear that the protection derivable from the 'spirit of the age' vanishes into thin air. But it may be said that, although the 'spirit of the age' cannot array battalions, it can prevent their being arrayed, and that this is the security which it offers. A very good security it would be if one could only be sure that it were in existence and would so continue. But what is the 'spirit of the age' on this point? We very much fear that it is the spirit of war and conquest, especially against weak Powers. Ever since 1848, when Europe had recovered from the lethargy caused by the Napoleonic wars, we have had wars in plenty, and every one of them has been induced by the most unblushing aggression. Witness Russia against Turkey, France against Austria, the series of intrigues by which Cavour annexed Naples and the Legations to Sardinia, Germany against Denmark, Prussia and Italy against Austria, France against Prussia, and the terrible reprisal. If this be not enough, we point to America, where one-half of Mexico has been annexed by the States, and the remainder of it was conquered by France; and to the war waged against the Southern Confederacy in defiance of the principle declared by the States to be a self-evident truth—that the sole right of government is derived from



the consent of the governed. Moreover, in all these cases, neutrals have manifested a decided disinclination to interfere unless their own interests were directly involved, as England well remembers in the case of Denmark, though she could go to war with China for a boat worth 80%. We, therefore, hold that the 'spirit of the age' is more likely to induce aggression on the emancipated Colonies than to afford any guarantee against it. Is England prepared to face the risk? Is she determined, in the event of an attack on any of her offspring, to refrain from extending her arm in their defence? If not, let her hold on to the Colonies, as she can assuredly aid them much more easily and effectually when united to them than when separated from them.

The question of the dependence of the prosperity of the colonial trade on the continuance of the political connection has been already considered. If we have succeeded in establishing the correctness of our view of the case, it of course forms a most important argument against emancipation. But behind this there lies another question, which is, how far it is safe for England to rely on being able to retain that commercial supremacy in virtue of which she is able to permit the unrestricted importation of foreign manufactured goods; and whether, if she should need to return to her old colonial policy, it would not be well for her to have Colonies to which it could be applied. That such a contingency is possible is beyond doubt. For, without entering on the question of the balance of trade, it is undeniable that to import goods without being able to pay for them by exports is impossible, and a nation can find a sale for its exports only so long as it can furnish them as cheaply as others in the same market. England now exports manufactured goods cheaper than other nations; but is she sure of being able to continue to do so? and if her ability to do so

should fail, could she continue to practise a free trade policy? We think not. In young countries like the Colonies, having boundless unoccupied lands on which their people can readily find homes, and where there is plenty of work for all, free trade is always practicable, because, having within themselves all the necessities of life, they can, at a pinch, dispense with imported luxuries; but in thickly peopled countries like England, free trade, or unrestricted importation, is possible under peculiar circumstances only. England now imports breadstuffs and raw material for manufacturing purposes, and pays for them by exporting manufactured goods. This is done on the principle that to 'buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest' is the true way to wealth for nations no less than for individuals. *But supposing that foreign markets should become the cheapest for manufactured goods as well as for breadstuffs, how would the case then stand?* Supposing that Belgium could supply hardware, France cotton goods, and Germany woollen goods cheaper than they could be manufactured in England, would it suit her then to abandon the manufacture of these goods and follow the policy of 'buying in the cheapest market and selling in the dearest' *by importing manufactured goods as well as breadstuffs?* Whatever reply some enthusiastic free-trader may make, it is certain that this could not be done. The agricultural community might, indeed, prefer to buy cheap foreign, rather than dear English, goods, and be willing to export their produce in payment, but they certainly could not be allowed to do so. All the grain which they raise, and a great deal more, is consumed in England, consequently if any of it were to be exported in the absence of foreign receipts, a large part of the consumers would be involved in starvation, and the manufacturing population thrown out of employment,

from the loss of both foreign and home markets. Therefore, in the event of foreign markets becoming cheaper than those of England for manufactured goods, England would be forced to abandon free trade and close her ports against foreign manufactures, or else see her people not only without the means of purchasing food but also without food to purchase. But even a less improvement in the arts of manufacturing on the part of foreigners than that requisite to enable them to undersell English manufactures at home would suffice to destroy free trade in England. Let them improve only so much as to be able to dispense with English imports, and free trade is ruined. For although they might be willing to export to England the goods which she now imports from them, and she willing to receive their exports, she would be unable to do so, because to buy anything we must be able to pay for it; and if foreigners could buy cheaper at home those goods which they now import from England, they would not buy from her; and England, having lost the means of paying for the goods which she now imports from foreigners, would be unable to obtain them. In either of these cases the only manner in which England could procure a supply of those goods which are essential to her existence—breadstuffs and raw material for manufacturing purposes—would be by entering into treaties with other countries, granting them an advantage in her markets on condition of receiving a like advantage in their own. This she might do with the Colonies and with them only, since it is only young countries that can import their manufactured goods and yet find employment for all their people, and because their extent and the variety of their produce would enable them to supply the diversified goods which she would require. This possibility of England being obliged to abandon free trade and return to her old commercial policy constitutes,

we believe, a valid and practical argument in favour of the retention of the Colonies.

It may, perhaps, be replied that the argument would be valid and practical if there were any prospect of such a contingency arising; but as there is none, it is worthless. We shall not enter into a controversy on the greater or less probability of the contingency, but we may remark that, as British commerce has not extended itself since 1866 at the rate at which it was formerly growing, and as the manufacturing interest has, in some cases, begun to call for protection against foreign competition, there seem to be reasonable grounds for fearing that English commercial supremacy may already be in danger. Besides this, there is no doubt that the natural course of events for a nation which has begun manufacturing is to go on copying from its rivals until it overtakes them, and manufacturers all over the civilised world have been copying those of England for at least a quarter of a century, so the contingency is not impossible, it may be, not improbable. Along with this it should be remembered that in almost every civilised age some one nation has enjoyed a commercial supremacy, and that it has always proved to be a fleeting possession. It is well, therefore, for England to keep the possibility of its fleeting from her in view, and to retain in her hands the means of securing a trade which would always leave her a great commercial Power; more especially as we know not yet whether the signs of the times do not indicate that it has begun to slip from her, and are still ignorant of the changes which the gold discoveries, by the influence which they are exerting on prices, may work in the commerce of the world.

It should be remembered that the arguments in reference to the dependence of the prosperity of the colonial trade on the continuance of the political connection are

altogether unaffected by the correctness, or incorrectness, of our views on this latter point. The two should never become mixed in anybody's thoughts. It may be good policy for England to retain her Colonies as a precaution against the loss of her commercial supremacy, so that in case she might cease to be able to compete with the world for their custom, or to meet the foreigner in his own market, she would have at hand the means of reverting to her old system of colonial monopoly with differential duties on colonial products; and it may be good policy for England to retain her Colonies, though sure of remaining the first commercial Power in the world, because her trade with them as colonies might be more prosperous than it would be if they were to become independent states. Both points we believe to form important arguments against the emancipationist policy; but neither is, in any way, dependent on the other.

There is now a large and almost annually-increasing amount of British capital invested in colonial securities, the safety of which might be seriously affected by emancipation. The latest estimate, that of Mr. Dudley Baxter, states the debts of British America at 20,920,000*l.*, and those of Australasia at 35,744,000*l.* If to these we add the debts of the West Indies, South Africa, and Mauritius, we shall have a total of about 60,000,000*l.*, nearly all of which is held by parties resident in the United Kingdom. Nor does the amount invested end here. Colonial railways have been, and are being, in nearly every instance by the money of British shareholders, aided by grants from the local Governments; and there are, also, very many miscellaneous joint-stock enterprises peculiar to the Colonies, in which large sums are locked up. We shall certainly not exaggerate by estimating the amount of these latter securities at 40,000,000*l.*, making a total of 100,000,000*l.* due by the

Colonies to British investors. We do not, for a moment, mean even so much as to hint that the emancipated Colonies might think of adopting a policy of repudiation ; but we do mean to say that the safety of these investments would be much lessened by the establishment of colonial independence. The value of any, and every, stock security is dependent on the maintenance of order within and safety without on the part of the country from which it is held. It is by no means certain that these conditions would be fulfilled by the new nations. War abroad, and civil strife at home, are certainly amongst the possible sequences of emancipation. Nations involved in either of these pursuits do not pay much regard to the claims of foreign creditors, for the simple reason that they cannot. We may feel pretty sure that in the event of any of the Colonies becoming thus involved, English securities would quickly become worth little more than the paper on which they were written. But even a less amount of disorder than the above would suffice to endanger their safety. The Erie scandal has not yet been forgotten in England. It is the fruit of a social and governmental organisation similar to that which, under the most favourable circumstances, would be induced by emancipation. Would England like to see similar results follow? If not, let her retain her hold on the Colonies. Whilst she does so, there is not much danger of invasion from abroad, and there is none of disorder within. Her influence supplies precisely the conservative force which is needed to prevent young communities rushing headlong into a career of democratic innovation which cannot fail to result disastrously ; and if any injustice should be done to the investors, they have always open an appeal to the House of Lords, which tribunal they can safely rely on to rectify it. To adopt emancipation is to expose every penny now, or hereafter to be,

invested in the securities of the emancipated countries to the chance of the rule of an unbridled democracy producing a reign of external peace, and internal order, justice, and purity. To retain them is to provide guarantees against the threatened danger and the means of redress in case of its occurrence. And whether we consider the large amounts already involved, or the splendid field for the employment of British capital and enterprise likely to be afforded by the Colonies in the future, there can be no question whatever as to the expediency of securing the former, and keeping the latter open, by maintaining the integrity of the Empire.

Granting the *prestige* of glory which England derives from her colonial empire to be a 'juggle,' &c., the *prestige* of infamy which the abandonment of it would entail on her would be a stern reality. Britain cannot tell other nations that she is afraid of them, and suppose that they will continue to respect her will. To abandon outlying provinces because it is feared that their possession may induce complications with their neighbours is, in effect, to proclaim this statement most distinctly; and the natural deduction from it is that England will yield anything if only pressed hard enough. Does it suit her that such an impression should go abroad? Can she doubt that if it does the pressure will be applied? Does she not present any point for aggression; and does the history of our time seem to say that the passion for national aggrandisement, or even for warlike renown, is either extinct or likely to become so? If not, can it be anything short of absolute madness to tell the world that she prefers abandoning half a continent to facing the chances of meeting a nation in search of one or both of these things? However conducive peace may be to her prosperity, it will never do to act meanly in the pursuit of its maintenance? War never was averted by running

away from it. England may practise non-intervention to the extreme point to which it can be pushed; she may abandon Colonies to get clear of bellicose neighbours; she may forsake her allies and leave them to be swallowed up by their foes; her statesmen may 'hope that we shall never be involved in a war with America or any other nation;' but all this unmeasured craving after peace will not save her from having to appeal to the sword some time, and oftentimes, until we have a new dispensation, seeing that war is one of the consequences of the Fall, and will endure as long as any other of them. Therefore, instead of adopting the whimpering notes of cosmopolitans and emancipationists, let her rather brace her nerves to their old vigour, if they have ever really relaxed, and stand ready to meet difficulties and dangers with the same spirit which brought her through the most tremendous contests of modern times victorious in arms and unscathed in honour. The spirit which led to the declaration that 'unless mercy were shown to the people of God, the English guns should be heard in the Castle of St. Angelo,' and which enabled her unflinchingly to confront the might of Napoleon the Great with all Europe at his feet, will sit on her much more gracefully than that which means for 'peace at any price, and cheap at that;' and will, assuredly, do quite as much towards keeping the world quiet as an advertisement to the effect that England prefers abandoning an empire to risking a war. Let her infuse into the Colonies the spirit of those whose deeds are recorded in her history, and she need not to fear either for them or for herself. Let her yield to the cravens who tell her to forget her historic glories, and she invites the world to insult her, and may feel tolerably sure that it will accept the invitation. *Prestige* is not a juggle. It is an influence which enables its possessor to effect by a word what requires force without it; and which often



trebles the effective power of a given amount of force, as has been well exemplified on the plains of Hindostan. 'It is the imagination which governs the world,' said one on whom was showered 'the pomp and prodigality of Heaven' more abundantly than on any other man of our era. This imagination is—or at least has been—swayed by England; and, if she will rise to the grand destiny opening before her, may continue to be her property. Let her forsake her colonial empire from a principle of fear, and she will cease to sway it for ever, and come to mourn her loss in tears of blood!

To those of our readers who may be of opinion that we failed to disprove the advantages promised from emancipation we offer these considerations of its disadvantages in the shape of a weakening of England's naval supremacy through the loss of sailors, shipping, and harbours; the diplomatic difficulties which might ensue from the creation of a number of weak Powers offering a ready prey to aggressive nations or ambitious potentates; the lamentable position which England without her Colonies would occupy if compelled to abandon free trade; the danger to which her investments might be exposed in young, weak, and democratic communities confronted with the world; and, more important than all, the ill-fame which would be gained by retreating in the face of a foe. We admit that some saving of expenditure would be effected by emancipation, but think that we have proved the pecuniary loss in commerce likely to be much greater than that of the saving in taxation; and if to this we add the above naval, military, economic, and moral considerations, it seems to us that, even on the present terms of union, England would find an enormous balance against emancipation. We do not, however, believe that the Empire can be maintained on that basis. The circumstances of Fatherland and Colonies alike render it im-

possible. They must draw nearer to one another or separate. Our reasons for holding this opinion we shall explain further on, and when so doing shall present the question of emancipation in altogether a new light. England—thanks to that glorious modern discovery in political science, the ‘let alone’ policy—has allowed matters to ‘drift’ into a position which makes it impossible for her to derive from her Colonies one-tenth of the advantages which she might have derived, or may still derive, from them. We have admitted that some advantage would be gained by pursuing an emancipationist policy consistently. But we scruple not to say that all the motives for emancipation may be destroyed, all the present advantages of the connection maintained, and many new ones added to them, by the adoption of a new and nobler colonial policy than any yet pursued by our rulers; that England may gain soldiers for her army, sailors for her navy, money for her revenue, and commerce for her merchants, from the Colonies; and may find in their boundless extent happy homes for those of her people who live at home in misery, and whose existence is probably sapping the foundations of society, and, possibly, preparing for it an awful downfall. Moreover, we say that these gains in revenue, armaments, and commerce would grow with the growth of the Colonies; and that, in consequence, the British Empire would, ere twenty years, be the mightiest State on the face of the earth, without whose permission not a gun should be fired in anger in the world. And all this, we add, can be done, not by degrading the Colonies, but by exalting them. If we are right in thinking that these ends can be achieved, who then will advise emancipation?

## CHAPTER IV.

## THE SITUATION AND THE REMEDY.

WHEN examining the emancipationist theories, we came to the conclusion that it would be better for England to retain her Colonies, even under that which we must now call the *late* colonial policy, than to 'emancipate' them; but added, that we did not attempt to shut our eyes to the fact that matters could not long remain in their present condition, and that to conserve the Empire some change had become inevitable. Our reasons for entertaining this opinion, and the changes which we think requisite to place Fatherland and Colonies on fair terms towards each other, as well as to render their connection permanently beneficial to both parties, we shall now endeavour to explain.

Foremost amongst our reasons for believing some change in the relations of England and her Colonies to be inevitable is the fact that the connection between the several countries constituting the British Empire is much less intimate than that by which federal democracies are united, and bids fair to be still further weakened. The members of the Gladstone Administration seem fully to share in the views of those who look on the weakening of the colonial tie as a cause for congratulation. They have reduced colonial garrisons to an extent altogether

unexampled; left not a British soldier in Ontario or Quebec; settled that even 'the Gibraltar of North America' shall be left ungarrisoned, and that the entire English force in the Dominion shall consist of 1,500 men at Halifax. They have, also, pursued the same policy elsewhere, and this so recklessly that New Zealand was within a hair's breadth of being abandoned to Maori savages. Should this course of action be definitely adopted as the basis of England's colonial policy, a disruption of the Empire can scarcely fail to ensue. This has already been very clearly perceived in some of the Colonies. The Royal Commission, consisting of Australian statesmen, appointed in 1870 to consider the expediency of forming these Colonies into a Confederation, says in its report:—'The British Colonies from which British troops have been withdrawn present the unprecedented phenomenon of responsibility without either any corresponding authority or any corresponding protection. They are as liable to all the hazards of war as the United Kingdom, but they can influence the commencement or continuance of war no more than they can control the movements of the solar system, and they have no certain assurance of that aid against an enemy at war with the United Kingdom upon which integral portions of the Empire can confidently reckon. This is a relation so wanting in mutuality that it cannot be safely regarded as permanent, and it becomes necessary to consider how it may become so modified as to afford greater security for permanence.' The commissioners evidently see the goal towards which English policy is tending; but, with desperate loyalty to British nationality and institutions, strive to blind themselves to the fact that separation must follow unless a change be made. That such is the case, however, none who calmly survey the situation can doubt. The above simple statement clearly proves that, in the

instance cited, none of the bonds of national unity exist. Under such circumstances it is absurd to suppose that the name can long survive, or that the Colonies will continue to wish it to survive; and this because, as is above indicated, it brings them all the responsibilities and none of the benefits of union. The garrisoning of the Colonies was almost the last existing feature in England's colonial policy which gave her any influence in their councils or over their people. Should the troops be permanently withdrawn, and the cost of providing armaments thrown exclusively on the colonists, they will quickly insist on raising and using their own forces as they may prefer. 'Nothing for nothing!' will be the popular cry at the polls. If England will not keep one military system for the whole Empire on foot, it is very improbable that the Colonies will care to leave the control of their foreign relations in her hands, or to run the risk of being involved in wars undertaken, it may be, solely from considerations affecting the interests of the United Kingdom. Still less likely is it that they will allow her interests any consideration in the adjustment of their commercial policy. And should they act in this manner, it is to be feared not only that the emancipationist programme would quickly become popular in England, but that the mutual recriminations which would ensue might lead to the separation being effected on rather unfriendly terms. Indeed, to suppose that the policy which we are criticising can have been adopted with any other design than that of serving as an initiatory step towards emancipation seems absurd. If the Colonies are to be defended, and are expected to aid in providing the requisite armaments, it is evident that means should be taken to have the colonial forces organised on a permanent footing, and a system leading to united action between the Colonial and Imperial Governments arranged. To leave the Colonies ungarrisoned is, unquestionably, to facilitate attacks on them; hence

to follow this 'let alone' policy, whilst intending to bring the strength of the Empire to their aid, in case of war, is simply to run all the risk of the danger deprecated by emancipationists, and at the same time to take the fewest possible precautions against its occurrence. We will not insult any men who have been Her Majesty's ministers by even insinuating that they could ever have supposed that such a policy could be other than temporary; and, therefore, assume that when they initiated it, they intended it as a first step in emancipation. They have since declared that they do not desire a disruption of the Empire; but to prevent it they must alter their course. Whatever else may last, the present colonial policy will not: it must be retraced or a further advance made. It reduces the benefits of union to the *minimum* and raises its evils to the *maximum*. Emancipation would bring some benefits to both sides; but, like all half-measures, the Gladstone policy brings none to either. The United Kingdom may still be involved in war on a colonial question; and as the Colonies are left in a state calculated to encourage the aggressor, and increasingly free to quarrel on their own account, the risk is not lessened, if it be not increased; whilst they are still liable to be plunged into war for an object of English policy, not only without any voice in the matter, but, also, without the protection of British red-coats. Thus one party loses all the benefits of empire without escaping any of its responsibilities; and the other loses all the benefits which may be derived from an alliance with a mighty Power without gaining those of nationality. This will not do. The experience of all nations unites to prove that perfect identity of policy in military and diplomatic services is essential to national unity. The tendency of English policy of late years has been to change unity into division. The result, should this course be persisted in, cannot be a matter of doubt. Nations separated by the ocean can

remain in willing union only so long as they gain some advantage from their unity. This none can gain under a policy which labours to make every detail of national life a matter for the sole consideration of each country separately, and discourages any attempt to consider their interests in common. Even 'the bond of affection' becomes but a slight tie when people are pursuing different ends in different countries; especially as this exclusive pursuit of local ends not only tends to weaken existing ties, but also to create new objects of affection, to which those of other days, when they come in contact, will be sacrificed. Disruption cannot fail to ensue from the present colonial policy; and this for the simple reason that it retains on both sides all the evils of union whilst conferring none, or scarcely any, of the benefits of emancipation or nationality.

But irrespective of any question of colonial policy, the circumstances of the Colonies are such as must shortly render some change in their relations with the Fatherland a matter of necessity to both. Their inhabited bounds are extending so rapidly that in a few years some of them will be transformed into mighty nations. For England to furnish, single-handed, the men and money necessary for the defence of such territories would probably be an impossibility, even were she inclined to do so. To guard a frontier stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific; to watch over a fifth part of the world in Australasia; to garrison a large corner of the African continent, and very many of the West Indian islands, besides numerous outlying stations and India, would be a heavy task. To fulfil it would probably tax her martial resources pretty severely, even did she receive tribute from the subject countries; and to attempt it in the absence of a direct reimbursement of expenses would be a policy of at least doubtful expediency. But even

were she willing to remain in her former position, it is by no means probable that she would be able to do so. As the Colonies advance towards maturity, they will feel the same desire to wield the prerogatives of nationality that youth does to exercise those of manhood. This desire will be intensified by the fact that they have already acquired perfect local independence; and that with their growth diplomatic affairs will become of increasing importance to their interests. The foreign relations of small communities, such as were most of the Colonies in the first half of this century, are unimportant. They have not sufficient communication with foreigners to render their interests much involved in diplomacy, except when their independence is directly threatened, in which case they can only yield, or seek shelter under the wings of a protecting Power. With their growth, all this is altered. They are able to make some defence of their independence, and are inclined to do so—at least, we are pretty sure that such would be the inclination of British hearts. Their interests become extended, and liable to be affected by the action of their neighbours. The conduct of their foreign relations thus becomes increasingly difficult, and as its importance increases in their eyes, they are less likely to consent to that abandonment of all concern in its adjustment which is the primary condition of the colonial relationship. That the British dependencies will not long remain *Colonies* may be confidently predicted, from the fact that the course of civilisation will shortly render the maintenance of that relationship with the Fatherland impossible, by swelling the burden beyond her power to bear, and necessitating an amount of submission beyond that which they will be inclined to render. Emancipationists have, it must be admitted, the merit of perceiving this fact, and of offering a solution of the problem by means of the destruction of



its subject. Such a solution is never very satisfactory, and where the subject is the source of benefits, it is decidedly the reverse. The connection has already yielded much good to both Fatherland and Colonies, but nothing like so much as it may be made to yield, if each will only consent to accept the new relation to the other which their altered circumstances require. Their position calls for an application of the principles enunciated by Lord Macaulay, in his remarks on the Irish woollen manufactures controversy. He tells us distinctly that 'there cannot really be more than one supreme power in a society. If, therefore, a time comes at which the mother-country finds it expedient altogether to abdicate her paramount authority over a colony, one of two courses ought to be taken. There ought to be complete incorporation, if such incorporation be possible. If not, there ought to be complete separation. Very few propositions in politics can be so perfectly demonstrated as this, that parliamentary government cannot be carried on by two really equal and independent parliaments in one empire.'<sup>1</sup> The remedy which we desire to see adopted is complete incorporation—though not, perhaps, in the sense understood by Lord Macaulay. If the Empire is to remain united, the Colonies must consent to assume the burdens and responsibilities of maturity, and the Fatherland to share with them its sovereign rights and privileges. There can no longer be any inequality between them. Equal privileges and equal burdens must be the basis of their future connection. England's only difficulty with the Colonies lies in the fact that they act as a charge on her revenue and armaments; the Colonies' only difficulty with England is the fact that she monopolises all the prerogatives incidental to nationality, and

<sup>1</sup> *History of England*, chap. xxiii.

thus leaves them in an inferior position, exposed to dangers which they may have had no share in creating, and unable to bring imperial resources to the defence of their own peculiar interests. The application of the FEDERAL SYSTEM to the framework of the Imperial Government would at once eliminate from the relationship all the evils deprecated, and embrace within it all the benefits sought, on either side. The establishment of a FEDERATION OF THE EMPIRE on the basis of *equality of taxation for Federal expenditure* would immediately, or within a very short time, bring to the English coffers contributions sufficient to pay every charge to which the Colonies now subject them; and would, consequently, enable the Imperial Government to organise a connected military system for the whole Empire, which would unquestionably leave every member of it a source of strength to the rest—both of which advantages, it must be remembered, would increase at a rate of compound interest. It would place the Colonies in possession of all the prerogatives of nationality, and thus enable them to bring the whole strength of the Empire to the defence of their interests against foreign Powers. It would open to colonial talent a career of unexampled splendour; and, by lifting the Colonies to an equality with England, leave the mass of the colonial population nothing whatever to gain by a severance of the connection with the Mother-country. These benefits comprise all that the imperialist seeks to gain from the maintenance of the Empire, or the the emancipationist from its disruption. Hence Federation would confer on both Fatherland and Colonies all the advantages of separation and connection simultaneously.

Here it is necessary to explain what it is we have in view when we advocate the establishment of a Federation of the Empire. The basis of any Federation is a perma-

ment offensive and defensive alliance between several countries, in which all their military resources are thrown into a common stock for the purpose of preserving peace at home and of increasing their martial power abroad.

This union necessitates the creation of some ruling power, usually styled the Federal Government, which shall enforce its terms over all the members of the Federation. As the several countries are to be one before foreigners, the Federal Government must have control of diplomacy. As their alliance is offensive and defensive, it must possess the power of raising, equipping, keeping on foot, and controlling military and naval forces. As these require to be paid, it must possess a revenue, to raise which it must enjoy, directly or indirectly, the right of taxation. As taxation can scarcely fail to interfere with commerce, and as a Federation is one nation externally, the Federal Government must be allowed to regulate trade. And so closely connected with trade are the monetary system and the post-office, that it has generally been found requisite to place these also under the control of the Federal Government. The exact limit of its prerogative is, however, a matter of detail. Any authority enjoying the power of making peace and war, with its accessories, for several countries which possess Governments empowered to regulate their internal affairs, is, in effect, a Federal Government.

If these principles are correct, it follows that the ruling powers of the United Kingdom already constitute, to some extent, a Federal Government, and the countries comprising the British Empire a Federation. Questions of peace and war are decided by the Imperial Government. The conduct of diplomacy is in its hands, the only exception ever made being, we believe, the permission accorded to Canada to decide for itself on the reciprocity treaty. The army and navy are raised,

ruled, and paid solely by the same power. The discharge of these functions comprises most of the duties of a Federal Government; and in them the Colonies have no share. But they have, on the other hand, local Governments which conduct the administration of their internal affairs, just as in a Federation is done by the State Governments. Here we have almost the whole framework of a Federal Government already in existence. All that is needed to convert the Empire into a Federation is to place its several members on terms of equality. To effect this, there are necessary only the following measures :--

I. That the Colonies should be left in possession of the system of local self-government at present enjoyed by them. And that means should be taken to secure the same privilege to the United Kingdom.

II. That the revenue required to meet the expenditure of the Federal Government should be raised on a uniform rate of taxation, though not necessarily on a uniform system, over the whole of the Empire, and that the inhabitants of every part of it should be equally liable to military and naval service.

III. That a Federal Legislature, consisting of two chambers, should be formed, the Lower House to consist of representatives returned on one uniform system by the British Islands and the Colonies, and that provision should be made for colonial representation in the Upper House also.

IV. That the Federal Legislature should succeed to all the prerogatives now enjoyed by the Imperial Parliament, excepting only those granted to the body, or bodies, appointed to legislate for the local government of the British Islands; and should also enjoy the right of taxation all over the Federation.

It will be granted, we presume, that were these

measures accomplished, a Federal union between England and her Colonies, on terms of equality, would be established. Whether they are capable of accomplishment has next to be considered.

At this point emancipationists meet us with the most uncompromising resistance. Some refuse even to discuss a scheme which they regard as an absurdity. Against it Mr. John Stuart Mill and Mr. Goldwin Smith have argued with a force peculiarly their own. We reproduce their arguments here in order that we may give our opponents a fair hearing, and lay both sides of the case before our readers. Mr. Smith's language is as follows:—

‘The scheme of giving the Colonies representatives in our Parliament may be said to have been generally abandoned. Independently of the obstacles arising from distance, from the difference of the franchise in the several countries, and from the hopeless difficulty of settling the proportion between the numbers of the English and the colonial members, there is a decisive objection arising from the fact that the Colonies have now Parliaments of their own. Such a piece of political machinery as a set of Parliaments, one of which would be at once national and federal, while all the rest were national only, would scarcely find an advocate even among the defenders of Imperial unity at all costs.

‘The other scheme is a vast federation. It is almost enough to say that if there is a federation there must be a federal Government, and that this federal Government must be made, in the matters belonging to its jurisdiction, supreme over all the national Governments, including the British Crown. We need not discuss in detail the possibility or expediency of summoning from the ends of the earth people who could not be convoked in less than six months to decide whether England should go to war upon some question solely affecting herself, and not ad-

mitting, perhaps, of an hour's delay. The German Confederation has been cited as an example of the federal union proposed. In the German Confederation, the Diet, in the matters belonging to it, is supreme over all national Governments, and the Germans on the Danube are not three months' sail from the Germans on the Rhine. Do not these schemes of "Universal Empire," and a Universal State of which we and our antipodes are to be citizens, spring from an exaggerated estimate of the moral grandeur to be derived from enormous political combinations. A political unity is not a moral unity, nor will moral grandeur be gained by stretching it until it bursts. If people want a grand moral unity, they must seek it in the moral and intellectual spheres. Religion knows no impediment of distance. The dominions of science are divided by no sea. To restore, or to pave the way to restore, the unity of long-divided Christendom may seem the most chimerical of all aspirations; yet, perhaps, it may be less chimerical than the project of founding a world-wide State.<sup>1</sup> The recklessness of Mr. Smith's style is well displayed throughout the above quotation; but never, probably, was it better manifested than in his assertion that such a federal Government as proposed 'must be made, in matters belonging to its jurisdiction, supreme over all the national Governments, *including the British Crown.*' As the British Crown is supreme head of the Empire, it is difficult to see how its rights would lapse on the formation of a federal Legislature representing different parts of its dominions, or how its relationship to all would be affected by a change in the relationship of the several parts to each other. We notice this point here, because we shall not have an opportunity of doing so elsewhere.

Mr. Mill is rather more temperate in tone than—but

<sup>1</sup> *The Empire*, pp. 85. 86.

his views are substantially identical with those of—Mr. Smith. He criticises the scheme of a federal union of the Empire as follows:—

‘With this view it has been proposed by some that the Colonies should return representatives to the British Parliament; and by others that the powers of our own as well as of their Parliaments should be confined to internal policy, and that there should be another representative body for foreign and Imperial concerns, in which last the dependencies of Great Britain should be represented in the same manner and with the same completeness as Great Britain itself.

‘On this system there would be a perfectly equal federation between the Mother-country and her Colonies, then no longer dependencies. The feelings of equity, and conception of public morality, from which these suggestions emanate, are worthy of all praise; but the suggestions themselves are so inconsistent with rational principles of government that it is doubtful if they have been seriously accepted as a possibility by any reasonable thinker. Countries separated by half the globe do not present the natural conditions for being under one Government, or even members of one federation. If they had sufficiently the same interests, they have not, and never can have, a sufficient habit of taking counsel together. They are not part of the same public; they do not discuss and deliberate in the same arena, but apart, and have only a most imperfect knowledge of what passes in the minds of one another. They neither know each other’s objects nor have confidence in each other’s principles of conduct. Let any Englishman ask himself how he should like his destinies to depend on an assembly of which one-third was British-American, and another third South-African and Australian. Yet to this it must come if there were anything like fair or equal representa-

tion ; and would not every one feel that the representatives of Canada and Australia, even in matters of an Imperial character, could not know or feel any sufficient concern for the interests, opinions, or wishes of English, Irish, and Scotch? Even for strictly federative purposes, the conditions do not exist which we have seen to be essential to a federation. England is sufficient for her own protection without the Colonies ; and would be in a much stronger as well as more dignified position if separated from them than when reduced to be a single member of an American, African, and Australian confederation. Over and above the commerce which she might equally enjoy after separation, England derives little advantage, except in *prestige*, from her dependencies ; and the little she does derive is quite outweighed by the expense they cost her, and the dissemination they necessitate of her naval and military force, which, in case of war or any real apprehension of it, requires to be double or treble what would be needed for the defence of this country alone.<sup>1</sup> The arguments of these gentlemen are, in fact, based on the theories that any attempt to form a Federation of the Empire would be useless, as the Federal Government could not discharge its functions if created ; that it would be hopeless, as the difficulties in detail are insuperable ; and that it would be inexpedient, as the practical influence of the Empire would be pernicious. In other words they tell us that the scheme is at once absurd, impracticable, and impolitic. We are content to join issue with them on each of these propositions. In so doing we shall not confine ourselves merely to the arguments used in the above quotations, but shall carefully consider every difficulty that seems to us to be in the way. We ask of our readers a patient and impartial hearing.

<sup>1</sup> *Representative Government*, p. 132.



## CHAPTER V.

## PHYSICAL DIFFICULTIES.

THE first argument usually urged against any scheme for the establishment of an Imperial Federation is, that the want of geographical unity in the Empire, and the distances by which the several countries which it is proposed to unite are divided from one another, increase the difficulty of communication to such an extent that it would be impossible for any central authority to discharge the duties of even a Federal Government for all of them. The argument is one which must be met. Unless it can be proved that the legislative and executive duties usually assigned to a Federal Government may be fulfilled for the whole of the Empire by authorities located in London, there is clearly no use whatever in considering either the means by which the necessary framework of government might be created or any detail of the scheme effected. Before adopting any piece of machinery it is necessary to be sure that it will prove competent to accomplish the work for which it is designed.

The argument against Federation on the ground of physical difficulties is asserted by emancipationists in the most uncompromising terms. Mr. Mill tells us that 'countries separated by half the globe do not present the natural conditions for being under one Government, or even members of one Federation.' Our reply is that experience contradicts this statement. In the cases of

the Roman, Russian, and Spanish Empires, countries thus divided have remained under one Government for centuries; and, in the latter case, bad as was the old Government, the substitutes do not seem to be any improvement on it. Still more decisively is this theory confuted by the fact that the very countries now in question have been, and are, under one Government; and by the fact which we have already noticed, and which is admitted by Mr. Mill himself, that 'the ruling powers of the United Kingdom already constitute, to some extent, a Federal Government, and the countries comprising the British Empire a Federation.'<sup>1</sup> The Imperial Government has the exclusive control of diplomacy, and of questions of peace and war, in its hands. It garrisons every part of the Empire, and, until lately, supplied all the armaments needed for its defence. It appoints the head of the local Government in every Colony, and through him can, when it pleases, exercise a very considerable influence on even local legislation.

Experience proves, beyond the power of dispute, that the Imperial Government can exercise these prerogatives efficiently, successfully, and to the satisfaction of the Colonists, all over the Empire. But these include all the *administrative* duties of a Federal Government, with the single exception of that of raising a revenue. To obtain the grant of this revenue, however, it would be requisite that the Executive Government should be able to assemble, whenever needed, the Legislature empowered to grant it, which would consist of representatives from both the British Islands and the Colonies; and that, the grant once made, the Government should be able to levy it. Could the Federal Government assemble the Federal Legislature, and levy the federal revenues as needed, there

<sup>1</sup> *Representative Government* (people's edition), p. 132.

can be no doubt of its ability to discharge all its other duties, for they either have been discharged by the Imperial Government in times past or are being discharged by it to-day. Let this truth be carefully borne in mind, and many of the mountainous difficulties of imagination will quickly subside into molehills of fact.

It is maintained, however, that to assemble such a Legislature would be an impossibility, in consequence of the vast distances by which the several parts of the Empire are separated from one another. Mr. Smith says:—‘We need not discuss in detail the possibility or expediency of summoning from the ends of the earth people who could not be convoked in less than six months to decide whether England should go to war upon some question solely affecting herself, and not admitting, perhaps, of an hour’s delay.’ Were the facts correctly represented by Mr. Smith, we should agree with him. But here he finds it convenient to forget, or ignore, circumstances which clash with his theories. He seems to think that the world is to-day in the same state as it was in former generations. Does not this—horror of horrors!—seem to indicate that he is imbued with something of the spirit of an impracticable Tory? The difficulty of assembling the Legislature is always much exaggerated. Fifty years ago, there might have been some force in the plea that its accomplishment was impossible; but such a position cannot be maintained to-day. Distance, for purposes of communication, has been annihilated by the electric telegraph, and, for locomotion, reduced about three-fourths by steam. At the beginning of the present century it required almost a week to send a summons for the convocation of Parliament from the seat of government to the remoter parts of the United Kingdom, and another week for the representatives of these parts to reach London. Now, the summons could be sent to the

furthest limits of the Empire instantaneously; consequently, the only delay would be that of travelling from the Colonies to the legislative halls. What length of time would this journey consume? At present the run between Ireland and Quebec is made week after week in nine or ten days, and mails and passengers from London are delivered in Toronto within eleven, and *vice versâ*; and, on the completion of the Intercolonial Railroad, it will be possible to save another day by fixing the Canadian port of departure at Halifax. Thus it seems that Canada is practically as near London to-day as was Caithness or Donegal at the beginning of the century. In the case of Australia, mails are now delivered in London within seven weeks. There is no doubt that New Zealand can be reached by Panama in the same time, and it seems probable that, by using first-class vessels, some few days more may be saved. As these latter points are the most distant from England of all parts of the Empire, the time consumed in travelling from them to the seat of government would determine the period within which the Federal Legislature could be convoked; and, judging from the facts before us, we should say that the time necessary for its convocation would be nearer six weeks than the six *months* alleged by Mr. Smith to be the shortest time in which that process could be effected. Is this too long to admit of the countries so divided being united in one federation? Should anybody reply in the affirmative we would remind him that, prior to the completion of the Pacific Railway, Oregon was practically almost as far from Washington as Australia or New Zealand is from London to-day; and that even the completion of that great work has not reduced the time necessary for passing between the two points to much less than that in which a voyage from Canada to England can now be accomplished. It takes seven days

to travel by rail from New York or Washington to San Francisco, and three and a half more to reach Portland, Oregon, by steamer. The Pacific Railway has been opened for only a few months. Prior to its opening California had been for nearly twenty years a member of the Union, although during these twenty years the most expeditious route to that State was by steamer to Aspinwall, thence across the Isthmus to Panama, and thence again by steamer to San Francisco. The accomplishment of this journey required twenty-four days, and three more were needed to reach Oregon. Here we see that countries two-thirds as far, in point of time, from Washington as Australia need be from London, have been for nearly a quarter of a century loyal members of a democratic Federation; and that even to-day they are no nearer to the seat of government than Canada is to Downing Street. Is not this fact a sufficient answer to those who assert that the distances which divide the British Empire render the maintenance of its integrity or the assemblage of a Pan-Britannic Parliament an impossibility? Twenty-eight days' travel has been proved to be consistent with the integrity of the democratic American Union, and the assemblage of its Congress. Why, then, should forty or even forty-five days' travel be inconsistent with like results in the case of a Federation in which the conservative ties, both moral and constitutional, would be much stronger than they are or can be in the States? Experience has proved, in the case of the British Islands, that distance, measured in hours of travel, as great as that which now divides England and Canada, does not constitute any obstacle to the efficient working of a *legislative* union. Why, then, should it be declared to form an insuperable obstacle in the way of working the lighter machinery of a *federal* union? And when, in the United States, countries practically as distant from the seat of

government as some of the remoter Colonies are from England have been actually united in a federal union, why may not other countries similarly divided also be united within similar bonds? That some countries separated by such distances can exist in the same Federation is being proved every day. Why, then, may not others? The distance to be travelled would not hinder the punctual meeting of the Legislature if the members should have fair notice of the time of meeting. This they could have, on ordinary occasions, were the plan pursued at Washington—that of meeting at the same date every year—adopted. Were this done they would know the time at which they would be wanted, and could be punctually at their posts. Multiplication of lines of ocean telegraphs and fast steamers, with the adoption of short routes, are all that is needed to bring the remotest parts of the Empire as near each other as were Washington and San Francisco during the last twenty years.

It may, perhaps, be granted that this reasoning is correct in reference to 'ordinary occasions,' but alleged that it will not hold good when applied to extraordinary circumstances. It is urged, as we have seen, that nations are liable to certain political crises, such as those created by diplomatic difficulties, in which even such a diminished delay as would be necessary under present circumstances could not be borne. We will admit this view of the case to be correct, but we think that the objection is not fatal, and that the difficulty can be overcome. Let colonial members be allowed to vote by proxy, and let them be permitted at the end of each session to elect certain members who should remain in England during the recess holding their proxies, and Parliament could be assembled as quickly as it is to-day, and the Colonies as truly represented in it as if every one of their representatives were present. Nay, it is probable that they would be

still more efficiently represented, as the proxies would certainly be entrusted to the leading men of every party, who would thus have greater influence than if they had to lead their more stupid followers into the path which would be clear to their brighter intellects. There could not be any difficulty about finding a sufficiency of colonial representatives willing to undertake this duty, especially if it were accompanied, as it ought to be, by a small extra indemnity. In the fact that by availing ourselves of the resources of modern science we can bring the most distant Colonies almost as near London as were the Pacific States to Washington prior to the construction of the Pacific Railway, is to be found pretty positive proof that the time required to reach the seat of government from the Colonies would not be greater than is consistent with the punctual meeting of a Legislature on ordinary occasions; and in our proposal for colonial proxy-voting is, we think, to be found the means of rendering possible, on extraordinary occasions, as quick an assemblage of a Legislature, in which all parts of the Empire would be represented, as of the Imperial Parliament to-day.

But supposing that we are right in thus assuming that the Federal Legislature, or its equivalent, could be assembled whenever needed, it has to be proved that its legislation could be promptly executed. We have before seen that all the functions of a Federal Government, save that of raising a revenue, are already discharged by the Imperial Executive. That the proposed Federal Government could fulfil this duty also, we will now proceed to show. The difficulties in the way were pretty well stated by the *Times*, when, in an article published some time in January 1870, it argued as follows:—

‘ There can be no real political unity without financial unity, and there can be no financial unity without geographical unity. Australia and the Cape, the East Indies


and the Canadian Dominion, are too widely sundered from each other and from us, too various in their products and resources, to be embraced in one budget, and to be charged in common with a single system of military and naval armaments. The man must be a visionary indeed who hopes one day to hear Mr. Lowe deal with the estimates and the revenues of the United Kingdom and its forty colonies in a Pan-Britannic Parliament. Yet between this and the local independence which now prevails we see no middle way.'

In case of the establishment of a Federation of the Empire, such as we propose, there would certainly be no middle way. If 'taxation without representation' would be tyranny to the Colonies, representation without taxation would be tyranny to the British Islands. In case of Federation being adopted, justice requires that all the countries represented in the Federal Legislature should contribute in equal proportion to the federal expenditure. This would necessitate a federal budget; and the *Times* says that the man who expects to see such a phenomenon is a visionary indeed. We are sufficiently visionary to believe that it may be seen, if our statesmen and people will but rouse themselves to the most glorious enterprise ever presented to the ambition of nations or rulers.


The first point in proving the possibility of framing a budget for the Empire united in one Federation is to discover the amount which it would be requisite to raise. Here we shall find aid in a survey of the expenditure of the United Kingdom.

The following statement from the *Year Book* for 1869, p. 246, exhibits the official account of the expenditure in the financial year ending on March 31, 1868, in which year its amount was considerably above the annual average of the decade:—






# IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3)



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	£	s.	d.
CHARGES ON DEBT . . . . .	26,571,750	1	9
CHARGES ON CONSOLIDATED FUND:			
	£	s.	d.
Civil list . . . . .	405,721	5	0
Annuities and pensions . . . . .	286,839	1	10
Salaries and allowances . . . . .	143,419	8	0
Diplomatic salaries and pensions . . . . .	174,053	1	4
Courts of justice . . . . .	672,559	13	8
Miscellaneous . . . . .	211,305	13	7
	1,893,898	3	5
SUPPLY SERVICES:			
Army . . . . .	15,418,581	17	1
Navy . . . . .	11,168,949	0	9
Abyssinian expedition . . . . .	2,000,000	0	0
Miscellaneous civil services . . . . .	8,491,341	11	7
Salaries and superannuations of customs and inland revenue . . . . .	2,481,152	0	2
Ditto of post office . . . . .	2,402,051	9	2
Packet service . . . . .	808,517	13	8
	42,770,593	12	5
Total ordinary expenditure . . . . .	71,236,241	17	7
Expenses of fortifications provided for by money raised per Act 28 & 29 Vic. c. 61 . . . . .	530,000	0	0
Total . . . . .	71,766,241	17	7

The Government of the United Kingdom is national, which form of administration embraces the duties—and, consequently, the expenditure—which, in a Federation, appertain to both the Local and Federal authorities. To ascertain the probable expenditure of the Federation, it is therefore necessary to distinguish the charges which, under the proposed *régime*, each of these Governments would have to meet. This can be done by classifying them accordingly as they are expended in meeting the expenses of duties which it would rest with Federal or Local authorities to discharge.

There are three of these items which would, unquestionably, fall on the Local Government. As the several colonial debts would remain charges on the countries

which had contracted them, so the English national debt should remain a charge on the British Islands exclusively, and be met by their Local Government. As the duties of the local, or state authorities in every Federation are confined almost exclusively to the conduct of the civil government of the countries under their sway, the items for the courts of justice and miscellaneous civil services would also devolve on it. These items collectively amount to 35,735,651*l.* 7*s.* 0*d.* sterling. It is probable that other items might be found properly chargeable to the Local Government; but as we do not wish to understate the possible expenditure of the Federal Government, we are content to take only those concerning which there can be no doubt. Then deducting the above sum of 35,735,651*l.* 7*s.* 0*d.* from 71,766,241*l.* 17*s.* 7*d.*, we have 36,030,590*l.* 10*s.* 7*d.* as the amount of the Imperial expenditure for the year 1867-8, which would, under Federation, have fallen to the lot of the Federal Government to discharge. But as there are 2,000,000*l.* of 'extraordinary expenditure' included in the above sum, and what we seek to discover is the probable amount of the ordinary expenditure, this amount may also be deducted, making it appear that about 34,000,000*l.* would have sufficed to meet the ordinary expenditure of a Federal Government of the British Empire in 1867-8. It may be thought that the union of the Colonies with the British Islands under one and the same authority could not fail to cause an increase in the above expenditure. If it did so the increase would be very insignificant. The quantity of armaments necessary for the defence of the Empire against foreign foes could not be affected by a change in the political relations of its several parts towards each other. Under the above expenditure all portions of the Empire were garrisoned by land and guarded by sea; for which reason we have taken the

year 1867-8 instead of either of the subsequent years, in which these garrisons were withdrawn and the expenditure reduced, as our standard. In some cases the Colonies themselves spend money on armaments, which, under Federation, would fall as a burden on the Federal Government. It must be observed, however, that this transfer would reduce the colonial local expenditure by the same amount that it would increase that of the Federal Government. There would, indeed, be a new item of expenditure in the cost of collecting the Federal revenue in the Colonies; but as the above items for collection of customs and excise duties cover the cost of gathering-in a revenue much larger than that which the Federal Government would ordinarily require to raise, we think that the sums above allowed for collection of the revenue could not fail to prove sufficient. There would, probably, be some increase in the charges for packet service; and, also, in those of legislation. But to meet all these we presume it will be admitted that the sum of 2,000,000*l.* would be adequate. We are content, in order that we may be on the safe side, to increase the above estimate by this sum, and think it must be admitted that we are safe in assuming that the ordinary expenditure of the Federal Government would not exceed 36,000,000*l.* annually, which sum is a little over one-half of that expended by the Federal Government of the United States.

Next there looms up the question of 'Ways and Means.' It is alleged that to form a system of finance for the whole Empire is utterly impossible. The ground of this assertion is, we suppose, to be found in the fact of its being composed of so many countries, and embracing such dissimilar industries. It comprises lands in a frigid zone and in the tropics; countries peopled thickly and scantily; communities devoted to agricultural, and to

manufacturing, pursuits, and moved by the contending interests of producers and consumers. To form a system of taxation which would deal justly with all these interests is indeed likely to prove rather a difficult task, but we do not think that the difficulty would be insuperable.

In forming an equitable system of taxation for the Federation, the first step requisite would be to fix a definite proportion of the Federal expenditure for which each of its members would be liable. This is not necessary in confederations in which the revenue can be raised on one *uniform system* throughout; but as it would clearly be impossible to establish such a scheme of taxation for the British Empire, an actual proportion to be paid by each member would need to be definitely fixed, in order to guard against inequality of taxation ensuing from dissimilarity in finance. In fixing it, the prior establishment of some uniform *basis* of taxation would be indispensable. We assume that none will refuse to admit *property* to be the most equitable basis of taxation. Hence it follows that the proportion to be paid by each country should be identical with that borne by the property held by its inhabitants, or within its bounds, to that held in the whole of the Federation. We think, however, that it would be well, for some time at least, to leave personal property out of sight in adjusting the proportions, and to assess each country for the same proportion of Federal expenditure as that borne by the real property held in it, to that held in the whole of the Federation, as thus only would colonial contributions suffice to cover colonial expenses. As these proportions would be in a state of perpetual variation, it would be essential to have the wealth of the Empire carefully ascertained at each census, and the proportion of each country periodically adjusted according to the return. Were this

done, an abundant security would be provided against any member of the Federation being subjected to any more than its fair share of taxation.

In this manner we would propose to fix that proportion of the expenditure of the Federation which should be borne by each of its members. Before considering the manner in which the colonial contributions might be levied, it may be well to cast a glance at their probable amount. To work out the problem in detail it would be requisite to have statistics showing the wealth of the United Kingdom, and of every Colony which it would be proposed to comprehend in the Federation, and thence to assess each member's share of the expenditure. This we cannot do, as we do not possess the statistics; but we think that we have sufficient information to arrive at some approach to a solution.

The province of Ontario, late Upper Canada, is certainly by far the most wealthy portion of British America, and probably as wealthy as any other of the Colonies, though it is possible that some parts of Australia may be slightly ahead of it. According to the assessment rolls of 1869, the gross value of real property in Ontario in that year was 240,358,000 dollars, or in round numbers about 50,000,000*l.* sterling. It is true that this assessment is always far below the actual value of the property assessed. After careful inquiry we have come to the conclusion that an addition of about 75 per cent. is needed to show its true value; but in order to be on the safe side we will add 100 per cent., and assume the gross value of the real property of Ontario to be 100,000,000*l.* sterling. We have next to see what proportion this sum bears to the gross value of the real property of the United Kingdom.

The annual value of the real property of the British Islands has been shown in a parliamentary return issued in the session of 1864, and quoted in the *Statesman's*

*Year Book* for 1869, to have been as follows in the years indicated :—

	1857	1862
	£	£
England . . .	103,496,253	120,069,963
Scotland . . .	12,582,749	15,128,538
Ireland . . .	11,915,286	13,400,516
Total . . .	127,994,288	148,599,017

We have here an increase of over 16 per cent. in five years. We presume, therefore, that it will not be deemed unfair if we assume that a like increase has been effected in the ensuing *six* years. This would give an increase of 23,775,847*l.* 10*s.* 4*d.*, which added to the above sum would make the annual value of the real property in the United Kingdom in the year 1869 about 172,374,894*l.*<sup>1</sup> Its gross value at 33½ years' purchase would amount to 5,745,829,800*l.*, or a little over fifty-seven times the wealth of Ontario, which would consequently have to furnish to the Federal revenue a contribution amounting to one fifty-seventh part of that furnished by the United Kingdom. How much money this would be we cannot say, in the absence of statistics showing the relative valuation of the United Kingdom and all the Colonies. But, taking it on a less favourable basis, and assuming that Ontario would have to furnish one fifty-seventh part of the whole of the Federal expenditure, estimated at 36,000,000*l.* per annum, we find that the amount of its annual assessment would be 631,403*l.* 10*s.* 2*d.* sterling. Its population at the census of 1871 was returned at 1,620,000, so that this sum would amount to about 7*s.* 9*d.* per head. As Ontario is

<sup>1</sup> That this estimate is not excessive has been proved by the returns laid before the House of Commons by Mr. Goschen, which, according to a careful digest in the *Economist* of April 8, 1871, show the value of real property in England and Wales to have been 143,872,000*l.* in 1868.



probably as rich in real property as any other of the Colonies—it is certainly much richer than any other British American Colony—we think that we shall not err in favour of them if we assume that its rate of 7*s.* 9*d.* per head would form the average rate of Colonial contribution to the Federal revenue at present.

The 'Ways and Means' by which this sum could be raised have next to be indicated. Happily the task is not very difficult to accomplish. Whilst treating of the nature of the Federal form of government we said: 'As taxation can scarcely fail to interfere with commerce, and as a Federation is one nation externally, the Federal Government must be allowed to regulate trade; or, in other words, it must have control of the customs duties.' It is clear that in the event of union, the colonial contribution to the federal expenditure could readily be raised from these duties. Let it be allowed to form a first charge on them, and the problem of 'Ways and Means' is at once solved. The customs amount to a much smaller proportion of the revenue of Canada than of any other of the Colonies; but even there they would furnish nearly double as much money as would be required. The customs revenue of the Dominion in the last three years amounted to 8,578,380 dollars in 1868, to 8,272,879 dollars in 1869, and to 9,334,212 dollars in 1870, being equal on an average to about 8,728,490 dollars. Its total population, according to the census of 1871, is 3,484,924, on which number the customs would amount to 2·50 dollars, or about 10*s.* 5*d.* per head. Hence it appears that, in the least favourable instance which can be chosen, the customs alone would yield almost fifty per cent. over the amount needed at 7*s.* 9*d.* per head. But as it is unquestionably true that Ontario is much more wealthy than any one of the other British American provinces, it is nearly certain that the rate of assessment

for all of them would be at least one shilling below this figure, in which case about one-half of the customs revenue would suffice to meet the demands of the Federal Exchequer. As to the other Colonies, we appeal to the following statement compiled from *Statistical Tables relating to the Colonial and other possessions of the United Kingdom* (Part XI.), showing the customs revenue of the Colonies for the year 1865, and their population at the latest dates received prior to the above return :—

	Customs Revenue	Population
	£	
Canada . . .	1,169,574	2,881,862
New Brunswick . . .	114,626	252,047
Nova Scotia . . .	209,578	330,857
Prince Edward . . .	17,000	84,386
Newfoundland . . .	91,045	122,638
British Columbia . . .	73,110	13,671
Vancouver . . .	5,871	6,000
West Indies . . .	661,094	1,231,967
New South Wales . . .	636,102	411,388
Victoria . . .	1,192,257	626,639
South Australia . . .	240,184	156,605
West " . . .	38,771	20,260
Tasmania . . .	119,461	95,201
New Zealand . . .	730,037	201,712
Queensland . . .	195,541	87,775
Mauritius . . .	153,912	322,517
Natal . . .	42,166	168,580
Cape . . .	275,559	267,096
St. Helena . . .	14,626	6,860
Total . . .	5,980,514	7,288,061

<sup>1</sup> Estimated : import and excise duties are stated at 84,093*l*. Under West Indies we have included Honduras and Bermuda.

Here we see that the population of the above Colonies six years ago was 7,288,061 and their customs revenue 5,980,514*l*. or about 16*s*. 4*d*. per head. It may very fairly be assumed that in 1870 the population had advanced to 8,000,000, and the customs to 7,000,000*l*., which

would leave a revenue of 17*s.* 6*d.* per head, or more than double the amount for which they would be assessed for Federal revenue, assuming that the rate for Ontario would form a fair average for the whole of the Colonies. To quiet colonial fears in reference to such an increase of taxation as this sum represents, we would remark that we shall, hereafter, show that by savings in the local expenditure, consequent on Federation, the actual increase could be reduced, in all cases, very considerably, and in some nearly one-half.

It may be remarked, however, that, even granting all our views on this subject to be correct, there remains a practical obstacle in the way of their realisation in the fact that to place the customs duties under the control of the Federal Legislature would be to leave the regulation of the entire commercial policy of every member of the Federation at its disposal; and that, although the Colonies might be willing to pay the amounts for which they would severally be assessed, it is very unlikely that they would be content to have their trade regulated by an assembly in which the representation of the British Islands would so largely outnumber their own. We think that this view of the case would be likely to prove correct; but we are also of opinion that a reconciliation of the contending claims could be effected.

It is self-evident that to establish a uniform tariff for the whole Federation would be an impossibility, as the staple exports of one portion of it are the staple imports of another. The fact of each wanting the goods which others can supply, is one of the leading arguments in favour of maintaining the integrity of the Empire, since by it each is secured a supply of those goods which it requires to buy and a safe market for those which it has to sell. In order that these advantages may continue to exist, it is essential that no other than 'revenue tariffs' should

be levied in any part of the Federation. But if provision were made to hinder the infringement of this rule, it would not be essential—since the tariffs could not be uniform—that the enactment of them should be in the hands of the Federal Legislature exclusively; and were the Local Legislatures allowed to enact their own tariffs, no dispute as to financial policy could arise, as each would be able, within certain definite limits, to choose its own policy. We would therefore propose that in the Act of Union a clause should be inserted, fixing a *maximum* rate of duty, never to be exceeded by any member of the Federation, on goods the product of any other part of it; and would provide a safeguard against it being exceeded by another clause enacting that the levy of a higher rate of duty by any custom-house official should constitute a misdemeanour, and subject him to instant dismissal, with, or without, other pains and penalties, as might seem expedient. And in order to prevent capricious variations in financial policy, we would require the Local Legislatures at each re-assessment of the Federation to fix their tariffs for the ensuing ten years, subject to the condition that if at any time in the interval it were desired to effect an alteration, this might be done by petition to the Federal Legislature and the passage of a bill by it in accordance with the prayer of the petition—but thus only.<sup>1</sup>

To sum up: we propose that the Federal Legislature

<sup>1</sup> As it would be desirable to have free trade established between colonial groups, such as British America, the West Indies, Australia, and South Africa, it would be necessary to have all the Local Legislatures or authorities of the different provinces in each of these groups meet in congress to fix the tariff at each period of re-adjustment, and to have the balance of customs distributed on the Zollverein system—though we think that property would form a fairer basis of distribution than population. The fact that excise duties would unquestionably be needed to complete the contributions of the British Islands, and, in time of war, might be needed in the Colonies,

should enjoy unlimited right of taxation; but that, in order to prevent it overtaxing any member of the Federation, each should be liable only for a definite proportion of the Federal expenditure, and that this proportion should be re-adjusted after the decennially recurring census; that the Federal revenue should be collected by officers of the Federal Government; that the revenue should, in the first instance, be raised from the customs duties of the several members of the Federation; that wherever these should prove more than sufficient to meet the amount assessed, the balance should be paid to the Local Government, and that wherever this should prove insufficient, the deficit should be made up by such other taxes as the Federal Legislature should see fit to impose; and in order to prevent the commercial interests of one province being sacrificed to those of another, each should, under certain limits, be allowed to arrange its own tariff. We confess that we are visionary enough 'to believe that, under these conditions, a Chancellor of the Exchequer would be able to deal with the [Federal] estimates and revenues of the United Kingdom and its forty Colonies in a Pan-Britannic Parliament.' Not only do we think that he could 'deal with them,' but also that he could deal with them satisfactorily. No member of the Federation could be over-taxed without the fact becoming at

renders it a fair subject for consideration whether it might not be well to place the *collection* of the entire indirect taxation of the Empire, whether imposed by Local or Federal authorities, in the hands of Federal officials, and to make the Federal revenue a first charge on all of it, indifferently; also it might be considered whether, in case of Federation being adopted, it might not be possible to allow the Local Legislatures to fix the ways and means of both Local and Federal revenue, leaving the Federal Legislature empowered to provide ways and means only in case the Local Legislature should fail to do so. These, however, are all matters of detail, which, along with many more, would require the careful thought of the first statesmen of the Empire. It is our part to prove that the difficulties *may* be overcome, but not to say which is the best means of meeting them.

once apparent. No difficulty about ways and means could arise, as the one source of revenue which we have indicated would suffice to pay the colonial proportion, even were the amount which it seems likely to reach doubled, and in the British Islands the same resources would be open under Federation as at present. No obstacle would have to be overcome in reconciling conflicting sectional interests, as each would be left free to settle its own commercial policy within definite limits agreed to by all. And the distance which separates the several countries would not be any impediment to their financial union, as the Finance Minister in London could, by means of the electric wire, converse at pleasure with his subordinates all over the Empire; and would thus, in fact, be nearer to New Zealand than his predecessors were to places only a day's journey from head-quarters.

Such are our reasons for believing that the want of geographical unity, and the long distances by which the several parts of the British Empire are divided, are not inconsistent either with the assemblage of a Federal Legislature as quickly as would be needed, or with the levy of a common revenue for the discharge of Federal expenditure. We have before endeavoured to show that every function of a Federal Government, save these two, is, or has been, fulfilled for the whole Empire by the Government of the United Kingdom—which view we have seen is endorsed by one of the ablest opponents of Federation. Hence it follows that if these, also, can be discharged, the capacity of a Federal Government of the Empire to accomplish all the duties incidental to its office is demonstrated.

## CHAPTER VI.

## CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTIES.

IN the preceding chapter we have endeavoured to show that if the machinery of a Federal Government for the Empire were created, it would be competent to fulfil all the duties which are usually assigned to such Governments. Until the arguments by which we arrived at this conclusion have been refuted, any further opposition to Federation, as being an impracticable project, must be based on constitutional and administrative difficulties, similar in kind to those which are to be encountered in the formation and administration of any representative Government, though we are willing to admit that in this case they would be likely to prove greater in degree.

Assuming it to have been proved that the conditions of existence are to be found, the possibility of creating and maintaining the proposed Federation have yet to be demonstrated. We therefore proceed to consider the nature of the governmental machinery which would be required to call the Federation into being, and the manner in which the difficulties in the way of its formation may be overcome.

The first point, of course, would be the establishment of a Federal Legislature—a Parliament in which the British Islands and the Colonies should be alike represented on terms of equality.

Here it is necessary, before going any further, to define

the sense in which we use the term 'Colonies,' as the Empire includes many outlying provinces which do not properly come under that appellation. Foremost among these is India, and next are fortresses—such as Gibraltar and Malta—and commercial stations—such as Hong Kong. By the term Colonies we mean countries in which all, or a very considerable portion, of the population, consists of a British or European stock; or, to descend to particulars, British America, Australasia, South Africa, and the West Indies, with perhaps Mauritius, and hereafter such other lands within the Empire as may be colonised by emigration from Great Britain. To these and to the British Islands representation in the Federal Legislature would have to be confined: all other parts of the Empire would require to remain in their present position of dependencies, from their incompetency to fulfil the conditions on which the Federation would be based.

The constitution of the Federal Legislature would be a matter of the very highest importance. On it the success or failure of the new Empire would, to a very great extent, depend. For its establishment there are two courses open: the Colonies might be allowed representation in the Imperial Parliament as at present constituted; or an absolutely new Federal Legislature might be created, whilst the Imperial Parliament should become the local legislature of the British Islands, either remaining in its present shape or being divided into three legislatures, accordingly as it might be determined to have one or three Local Governments for England, Ireland, and Scotland.

On the former of these schemes Mr. Smith has exerted himself to pour a large volume of contempt. 'Such a piece of political machinery,' says he, 'as a set of Parliaments, one of which would be at once national and federal, while all the rest would be national only, would scarcely



find an advocate, even among the defenders of Imperial unity at all costs.' We shall, however, examine the merits of this scheme, notwithstanding Mr. Smith's contemptuous dismissal of it. The Imperial Parliament already fulfils almost all the duties which in every Federation devolve on the Federal Legislature; and is legally competent to legislate for any, and every, part of the Empire. The less violent the nature of political changes by which a desired result is obtained, the better it is for all parties. It may therefore be well to inquire if a Federal Legislature could be created by allowing colonial representatives seats in the Imperial Parliament. We must premise, however, that this is not to be taken as indicative of a personal preference for that course.

The difficulty in the way of this plan lies in the fact that whilst the Imperial Parliament discharges the duties of a federal legislature, it unites with them, as every national legislature must do, those which, in a Federation, are discharged by the local legislatures. It would evidently be unfair to the United Kingdom to allow representatives elected in Canada or Australia to vote on matters affecting the people of the British Islands exclusively, whilst their representatives would be destitute of any corresponding influence over the internal government of the Colonies. We believe, however, that this difficulty might be overcome, and a Federation established with a 'set of Parliaments, one of which would be national and federal, whilst all the rest would be national only.' The manner in which we believe this to be capable of accomplishment is by a classification of the prerogatives of the Imperial Parliament as a federal and national legislature, and having its duties in each capacity discharged in different sessions.

This classification having been effected, the body now

known as the Imperial Parliament might meet to legislate on the subjects defined as belonging to the internal government of the British Islands. This legislation having been finished, the colonial representatives might be admitted to their seats, and a second session opened for legislation on matters defined as belonging to the Federal Government of the Empire. At present the representatives of the United Kingdom discharge the duties of both a federal and local legislature every session. If these duties were distinguished and discharged at different times in the manner proposed, there would be nothing to hinder the Colonies enjoying representation in a Federal Legislature, and the United Kingdom retaining the exclusive control of its own local affairs, without the formation of any legislative power at present unknown to the constitution; though in the Executive Government a slight change would be needed.

One sovereign and one ministry now discharge the duties of both a Federal and Local Executive Government. But with the Imperial Parliament acting in two separate characters, they could not continue to do so. Ministers, indeed, would not find any increased difficulty in the discharge of the same duties which they have to fulfil to-day. But ministerial responsibility is now-a-days the corner-stone of the British constitution, and as the Federal Legislature might declare its want of confidence in a ministry sustained by the Local, and *vice versâ*, it would be requisite to have two ministries—one for the Federal, and the other for the Local Government. Each, of course, would be responsible only to that legislature of which it acted as the Executive, and to the Crown acting as head of both Local and Federal Executives. We should not think it requisite to impose any check on the members of either ministry sitting in both legislatures. In Canada there are Dominion ministers who sit in the

Local Parliament, and Local Ministers who sit in the House of Commons, and the results have been to increase the legislative capacity of both, and to augment identity of feeling between them.

By these means we think that the Imperial Parliament might be made to fulfil the functions of both a Federal and a Local Legislature without conferring on the United Kingdom any unjust control over the local rights of the Colonies, or on the Colonies any influence whatever over the internal affairs of the British Islands. There is a good deal to be said in favour of this course. England has happily been always disposed to look with disfavour on any violent changes, and felt a desire to adapt old institutions to the fulfilment of new duties. The above policy would be in consonance with this feeling. The old Parliament of England would remain intact, no new assembly would displace it from the lofty height which it has so long occupied, nor would it be thrust down into any inferior position, as would necessarily follow were it confined to the single duty of legislating for the affairs of the British Islands. It would thus leave England somewhat more in possession of her original supremacy in the Empire than would be the case were a legislature entirely new to be created; and, colonist though we be, we can truly say that we would not grudge it to her ourselves, nor do we think that our fellow-colonists would disagree with our feeling in the matter. But, besides thus soothing English pride, colonial representation in the Imperial Parliament would secure the great advantage of rendering any collision between the Federal authorities and the Local Government of the most important member of the confederation almost impossible. Such collisions are the peculiar danger of federal institutions. But when the same men would act in both capacities in the United Kingdom, it is pretty certain that the two Governments

could not fail to act in harmony. The fact of their so doing would tend both to check throughout the Empire the rise of jealous feeling on either side, and to provide a corrective for any small portion of it that might be developed. England would thus be placed in the position of the conservative power of the Empire. It is a post for which she is eminently qualified; and it is one which it is desirable to have filled by some member in any federation. But, in case England had formally to descend from her present position, and take her place with the Colonies in a new legislature, it is by no means clear that she would be by any means the most loyal member of the Union, whilst the chances of collision between her Government and that of the Empire might be increased.

These would be very considerable advantages, but they would be accompanied by some very heavy disadvantages. It is possible that, were the Imperial Parliament increased by the addition of the colonial representatives, it would become a body too unwieldy for effective action. Were the Colonies represented in the same proportion as the British Islands now are, they would, probably, start with from 80 to 100 members; and there can be little doubt that an assembly consisting of 750 members is likely to be too numerous for efficient action. Then the labours of the English, Irish, and Scotch members would be seriously augmented, as they would have two budgets to pass, and two ministries to watch, instead of one of each, as at present. There seems to be no doubt that their duties are already too heavy to be efficiently discharged; and that were this plan of accomplishing Federation adopted, it would be absolutely indispensable to establish some means of relieving them, from the 'private bills' which now consume a large part of their labours. Neither is the formation of a new body to fulfil the duties of a Federal Legislature without arguments

to recommend it on its own merits. The machinery of government would then be more simple than in case the members of the Imperial Parliament were to act in two distinct capacities. It would afford the Local Governments of the British Islands less opportunity of encroaching on the prerogatives of the Federal authority than they would enjoy when the same men who would be responsible for any encroachment would form a majority of the body whose prerogatives would be infringed. It would render the labours of the English, Irish, and Scotch representatives lighter than they would be under the other scheme. It would afford an opening for obscure talent to find its way into political life. It would place the Colonies more on terms of equality with the Fatherland. It would facilitate the formation of a legislature according to the latest discoveries in political science, and with a single eye to the especial duties which it would be called on to perform, which would be, as we shall show hereafter, a matter of considerable importance, especially in reference to the Upper House; and, besides this, it would render possible the establishment of separate Local Governments for England, Ireland, and Scotland, which we are strongly inclined to think would be likely to prove a decided advantage to each of them, and, perhaps, to the whole Federation.

Our principal reason for holding this opinion is that we very much doubt the possibility of maintaining, under present circumstances, the union with Ireland by any other means than the indefinite suspension of liberty in that country. None who have any knowledge of Ireland will deny that the cry for 'repeal' is one that finds an echo in every Celtic heart. Nor can it be denied that the Liberal policy towards Ireland has been one long series of failures. Catholic emancipation; the reduction of the Protestant episcopate; the abolition of tithes; the

Maynooth grant ; free trade ; the Orange Processions Act ; the disestablishment of the Protestant Church ; the Land Bill, and the handing over the patronage of Ireland so completely to the Romanists that, at one time, ten of the twelve judges were Catholics,—all these, and many more measures of a similar spirit have successively been held up as unfailing remedies for ‘the Irish difficulty.’ If at any time they could have produced a good effect it would have been at present. For along with them came social changes which destroyed many of the most crying evils prevalent in Ireland. Emigration cleared away a large part, if not all, of the surplus population, and increased the rate of wages probably 400 to 500 per cent. The Encumbered Estates Court swept out of existence a race of bankrupt landlords and bloodsucking middlemen, and induced some influx of English capital. It was all in vain. Increased prosperity, social equality, and political supremacy did not render the Celtic Romanists of the present day less ready to become Fenians than were their fathers and grandfathers to become United Irishmen. Still from all went up the cry—

’Tis little I care for emancipation,  
 ’Tis little I care for such laws as that ;  
 What I ask is to see old Erin a nation,  
 And myself with a shamrock in my hat.

With the experience of the effect of forty years’ concessions before her, England destroyed in 1869 the institution which had ever formed a rallying-point for her supporters, and affection for which had prevented them from allying themselves with their Catholic countrymen in their cry for repeal. Will they do so any longer ? It is rather too soon to speak with confidence, but the signs and tokens seem to indicate that they will not. Neither rich Protestants nor Irish landlords have now any cause to fear the advent of a repeal of the Union. Should

Catholics and Protestants unite in the agitation to gain it what could England do? One thing she certainly could not do, and that is resist it successfully whilst maintaining political liberty in Ireland. Neither do we believe that she either could, or would, rule Ireland permanently by the sword. Yet the history of the two countries from 1782 to the Union has proved pretty conclusively that the existence of two sovereign legislatures in one empire is an impossibility. If this be so, a repeal of the Union is clearly impracticable under present circumstances. But it is equally clear that, in the event of a Federation of the Empire, it would be practicable to make Ireland one of the members of the Union, and to grant her a local legislature for the discharge of the same duties as would belong to similar legislatures in other parts of the Empire. There could be no legal or constitutional difficulty in this course, for the question which it would involve would be that of the number of states or provinces into which the Empire should be divided; and, so far as the exercise of the *legal* powers of the Irish Legislature was concerned there would be no more danger of a collision with the Federal Government arising therefrom than must exist in any, and every, federation. The fact that Ireland is, in reality, inhabited by two races who hate or have hated each other about as intensely as it is possible for people to do without flying at each other's throats renders us somewhat doubtful whether they could safely be entrusted with even the limited powers of local self-government. But when we remember that this, or a full and complete separation from English connection, has been the desire at the root of all the Irish agitations of the last century; and when we see that almost all really active causes of discord between the two local races have now been removed, we have no hesitation in saying that we think the risk should be run. It is, we believe, the

only measure that can ever render Ireland a really loyal member of the Empire.<sup>1</sup>

But, besides these facts in regard to Ireland, there are reasons in favour of local legislatures in the case of both England and Scotland. The feeling of Ireland is directly antagonistic to that of England, and, although friendship is maintained with Scotland, the feelings of the two countries are by no means identical, and it seems probable that, in reference to local matters, each would be better able to judge for itself than could any united legislature. Nor is this all; the process of centralization of the national energies at the capital which has produced such alarming results in the case of France is at work also in the United Kingdom. Of course, we do not for a moment suppose that it is on anything like the same scale; or, so long as the framework of society remains as it is, can be. But we think that the *intellectual strength* of the country is becoming centralized to an alarming degree. The press at the present day is not so much the *fourth* as the *first* estate of the realm. The influence of that portion of it located in London is probably, or almost certainly, greater than that of the residue all over the British Islands. The fact is not one to be regarded with complacency, as it tends to render this mighty thought-ruling machine more liable to be swayed by cliques, parties, and philosophical theories than would be the case were it scattered more widely over the land. We are aware that there are many counteracting influences at work; but still think that it would not be amiss to have other

<sup>1</sup> The above was written before the movement in favour of 'Irish Federalism' had got into shape, and before we had seen Mr. Butt's pamphlet on the subject. We need scarcely say that the subsequent spread of the movement—verifying, as it does, some of the above speculations—and the arguments adduced by Mr. Butt, have strengthened our convictions in favour of the above policy.



centres of political activity, such as would be furnished by the creation of local governments, brought into existence.

Thus it seems that there are many considerations in favour of each of these courses. Our own feeling is in favour of the latter; both because we should anticipate much good from the formation of local legislatures in each of the three kingdoms, and because we fear that under the former the labours of English, Irish, and Scotch representatives would be too severe for any men to discharge efficiently. But, whilst discussing the principles on which the Federal Legislature might be formed, we must not forget that the possibility of forming such a legislature at all is vehemently denied. Mr. Smith has indicated 'the difference of franchise, and the *hopeless* difficulty of settling the proportion between the English and Colonial members,' as amongst the obstacles. As to the former of these it has been solved by the Reform Bill of 1866. The franchise in England is now as low as it is in most of the Colonies, so that that difficulty has disappeared since the gentleman wrote. Independently of this, however, it may be remarked that, were a new legislature created, it could fix a new and uniform rate of qualification at its pleasure. As to the difficulty of settling the *proportion* of English and Colonial representatives, it does not seem to us to be very formidable. The rapid growth of the Colonies would, of course, render necessary the adoption of a basis under which periodical readjustments could be made at different intervals, as is done in the United States. Such a basis could be found in either population or taxation. Our own belief is that neither of them would alone serve for an equitable basis, but that such a basis might be found in a combination of the two. If population were to be ignored in the distribution of taxation, it would clearly be unjust to make it supreme in the adjust-

ment of representation. To do so would be to arrange burdens according to the system of *relative* equality, and privileges according to that of *absolute* equality. It is true that modern democracy always insists on such a distribution of privileges and burdens; but it is clear that the equality which imposes on one man the payment of a sum of money perhaps one hundred times as great as that which it imposes on another, is fundamentally different from the equality which makes the power of each man to influence his neighbours, or the State, precisely the same. The injustice of such a system when applied to communities will be recognised by many who refuse to admit it to be inequitable towards individuals; consequently we should never think of proposing that each country should be represented in the Federal Legislature proportionately to its population, and taxed proportionately to its property. Neither do we think that the basis of representation and taxation should be absolutely identical. Some natural instinct always seems to hinder the parties on either side carrying their principles to their logical results. Men who announce as the first article of their political creed the sovereignty of the people and the infallibility of the majority, yet seek in an Upper House a check on the free exercise of the popular will; and men who declaim loudly concerning the rights of property are never found to maintain that political influence should increase in the same ratio as do contributions to the revenue. We would act in the same way. We think that one half of the members of the Federal Legislature should be distributed according to the population, and the other half according to the taxation of the several countries therein represented; and that a readjustment should take place at the completion of the decennially-recurring census. At all events, in some such basis means could be found of overcoming the 'hopeless diffi-

culty of settling the proportion between the English and the Colonial members ;' but, for reasons hereafter to be explained, we do not think that the first basis should be regarded as unalterable.

It may be urged, however, that, even were the relative representation of the British Islands and the Colonies satisfactorily adjusted, it would be impossible for colonists to find amongst themselves a sufficient number of men duly qualified to act as their representatives. The Colonies, it may be argued, are destitute of anything like a landed aristocracy, or a body of men possessing realised wealth ; and, in the absence of such classes, none could be found who could afford to surrender so much of their time as would be consumed in travelling to and from the seat of government and in there discharging the duties of legislators. It is perfectly true that the Colonies could not supply men who could afford to undertake the discharge of these duties without remuneration for their services, or an indemnity for expenses. But let such an indemnity be granted to the members of the legislature, and the difficulty would at once vanish. We are aware that a strong feeling against paying legislators exists in England. But it may fairly be doubted whether the feeling is well founded. It is thought, we believe, that to grant any remuneration to the representatives would be to open the legislature to demagogues. It might, possibly, lead to that result in England, where Parliament is practically closed to any save men of wealth ; but it would simultaneously provide safeguards against their power to do mischief in the opening which it would afford to men of talent and education, who now in the periodical press furnish many of the thoughts of statesmen, to offer their views on the floor of the House, and bring their powers to the elucidation of political problems in the arena where the course of action in reference to them

must at last be decided. None can doubt that such men would be much more useful in the legislature than in their present sphere ; or that the class disposed to send demagogues to Parliament would listen to them much more confidingly, and respectfully, than they would to members of the class which they look upon as their oppressors. The want of such politicians—men who, prior to the passage of the first Reform Bill, used to be returned by the nomination boroughs—has been felt ever since 1832 ; and, unless the House of Commons is permanently to deteriorate, some means of introducing them into it must be found. The payment of members would probably furnish one means of attaining this *desideratum*. So long as the intellectual calibre of the House is kept at a high mark, the demagogue, even if he should find his way into it, would, when there, be powerless to effect any mischief ; whilst his power would increase precisely in the same degree as the intellect of the House declined. It is very doubtful whether the landed and moneyed aristocracy of England can alone furnish as large an amount of talent as is requisite to maintain the intellect of the House at a proper pitch ; and, therefore, even were there no question of colonial representation in the way, it might be well to adopt the indemnification of members in order to reopen the House to indigent talent and learning. But should this view not be thought correct, an indemnity, say 500*l.* or 600*l.*, might be granted to colonial members exclusively, in consideration of the fact that, in the discharge of their duties as members of Parliament, they would be forced to make much greater sacrifices than would the English members. We will not suppose that anybody can be so foolish as to imagine that the requisite amount of talent would not be forthcoming in the Colonies. All who know the Colonial Legislatures must be aware that it exists in plenty. It follows that an adoption of the in-

demnity system would at once render it available for the Federal Legislature.

There remains to be solved the problem of providing the means of furnishing a colonial representation in the Upper House. This, it will probably be said, is insoluble, from the absence of anything like an hereditary aristocracy in nearly all the Colonies. The difficulty, nevertheless, is chiefly imaginary. An hereditary aristocracy is not essential to the formation of a second chamber; nor does its existence preclude the construction of it on a non-hereditary basis. Neither equity, nor policy, requires that the Upper House of the Federal Legislature should be of an hereditary character. The right to one privilege does not convey a right to another still greater. When the union with Scotland was effected, the fact that Scotch peers formed the Upper House of the Scotch Legislature was not held sufficient to entitle all of them to seats in the House of Lords. They were instead allowed to elect a certain number of the body to represent them in that House. In like manner, on the union with Ireland, the Irish peers were not admitted bodily to the Upper House, but were allowed a representation in it. We should propose to follow the precedent set on each of these occasions, only acting more mildly towards the peerage than was done in either instance. The peers of Ireland and Scotland were utterly dispossessed of the right previously enjoyed by them of forming the Upper House of the Legislature in their respective countries. This right might, and should, be left intact in the present instance; and the Upper House of the Local Legislatures in England, Ireland, and Scotland be made to consist of the hereditary peerage of each country. The members of these bodies are unquestionably the fittest persons who can be found to fill that position; and, if custom can create a right, they are undoubtedly in possession of it to this

extent. But as the right to a seat in the Local Legislatures of Scotland and Ireland was not considered a sufficient title to anything more than representation in the more important Legislature of the United Kingdom, neither do we think that the right to a seat in the Upper House of the United Kingdom forms a title to anything more than representation in the body which would constitute the still more important Legislature of the United Empire. We would, therefore, in addition to leaving the peers in possession of their hereditary rights in the Local Legislatures, allow them to elect, from their own ranks, a certain proportion of the second chamber of the Federal Legislature. This slight concession on the part of the English peers is all that is requisite to pave the way for the formation of the Upper House of the Federal Legislature on a non-hereditary basis. That once done, all colonial difficulties are at an end, nor are there wanting important considerations in favour of the change on its own merits.

It is not any hostility to an hereditary chamber or a landed aristocracy which leads us to this conclusion. We approve of the bestowal of hereditary honours on the ground that, as the fruit of the lives and labours of great men extends to an indefinite future, so should the rewards of them. As to a landed aristocracy, we believe that, when patriotically inclined, it forms probably the most valuable element for the construction of a representative Government, as is proved on almost every page of the history of England. But none, in view of that history, can contend that the existence of an hereditary chamber is essential to its utilisation; or that the power of the Upper House is necessarily increased by seats in it being hereditary instead of for life only. We fear, on the contrary, that the exclusively aristocratic character of the House of Lords is tending to reduce its influence to

a point inconsistent with a due fulfilment of the objects for which such a body exists; and it is chiefly for this reason that we should desire to see the second chamber of the Federal Legislature formed on a somewhat different basis.

There cannot be any doubt that for the last forty years the House of Lords has been passing bills which were distasteful to a large majority of the members; and that, since 1866, it has agreed to measures which were conscientiously disapproved of by almost all of them. Now, whether the Lords were right or wrong in these opinions, it is equally clear that a body which is afraid, on account of the circumstances under which it exists, to act accordingly as it believes to be for the good of the commonwealth, is not likely to conduce much to the national benefit. If it is wrong in disapproving of the measures which it unwillingly adopts, it acts as a bar to the triumph of Truth, and furnishes permanent sources of ill-will in the community. If it is right in believing them to be pernicious, it fails in the discharge of the very first duty for which it exists, and allows error to gain sway in the hope that, by so doing, it may escape unpleasant consequences to itself. This state of affairs must always be mischievous. No prerogative should ever be entrusted to men, unless it is intended that they should use it whenever they believe it to be for the permanent interest of the trustees to do so. The great object for which a second chamber exists is to furnish an answer to the question, What is truth? It should, therefore, be constructed in such a manner that its members will neither prejudice the case, nor, having once reached an intellectual conviction, hesitate to maintain it. We fear that the House of Lords does not at present fulfil these requisites. It must be admitted, we think, that many of its members inherit their political theories; and that

many more, who have personally thought them out, sacrifice convictions in a manner which, did they sit in the Commons, they would consider to be highly unbecoming. We are well aware that it is a generous and patriotic desire to avoid anything like a dead-lock which induces them to act in this manner. But, even in the United Kingdom, a time must come when this course of action will reach an end, and something be demanded that the Lords will refuse to grant; and in the proposed Federation it would not work at all. In such an Empire the Upper House would be a much more important element of the Legislature than it is in the United Kingdom at present; and it would be essential to form its constitution in such a manner as to make it emphatically a 'chamber of statesmen.'

It seems to us that the course most likely to lead to the formation of a chamber embodying this and the various other qualifications needed in the Upper House of the Federal Legislature, would be to open different means of access to it. We would suggest that one proportion—we will not say how much—of the House should be elective; that a second proportion should consist of men who had filled certain offices in the State, as is proposed by Mr. Mill in his hypothetical scheme for a second chamber in England;<sup>1</sup> that a third proportion should

<sup>1</sup> 'Were the place vacant in England for such a senate (and I need scarcely say that this is a mere hypothesis), it might be composed of some such elements as the following. All who were or had been members of the Legislative Commission described in a former chapter, and which I regard as an indispensable ingredient in any well-constituted popular Government: all who were or had been chief justices, or heads of any of the superior courts of law or equity: all who had for five years filled the office of puisne judge: all who had for two years filled any cabinet office; but these should also be eligible to the House of Commons, and, if elected members of it, their peerage or senatorial office should be held in suspense. The condition of time is needed to prevent persons being named cabinet ministers merely to give them a seat in the senate; and the period of two



consist of members to be appointed by the Crown unconditionally; and that a few hereditary seats might, perhaps, be sprinkled in with advantage, to keep alive the principle. The elective members we would have chosen, in the Colonies, by both branches of the Colonial Legislatures, and in the British Islands, by the Upper Houses only, in order to leave untouched the hereditary rights of the peerage. It would of course be requisite to allot a certain number of these representatives to each province, and this number, for reasons hereafter to be explained, we do not think should vary; and it might also be needful to exact, in the case of the colonial members, certain qualifications of residence and property, and to grant them, as well as their brethren in the Lower House, an indemnity. Seats, of course, should be held for life; but whether a seat should carry with it a title is a question on

years is suggested, that the same term which qualifies them for a pension might entitle them to a senatorship: all who had filled the office of commander-in-chief; and all who, having commanded an army or a fleet, had been thanked by Parliament for military or naval successes: all who had held during ten years first-class diplomatic appointments: all who had been Governors-General of India or British America, and all who had held for ten years any colonial governorships. The permanent Civil Service should also be represented; all should be senators who had filled during ten years the important offices of Under-Secretary to the Treasury, permanent Under-Secretary of State, or any others equally high and responsible. If along with the persons thus qualified by practical experience in the administration of public affairs any representation of the speculative classes were to be included—a thing in itself desirable—it would be worth consideration whether certain professorships in certain national institutions, after a tenure of a few years, might confer a seat in the senate. Mere scientific and literary eminence are too indefinite and disputable; they imply a power of selection, whereas the other appointments speak for themselves; if the writings by which reputation has been gained are unconnected with politics they are no evidence of the special qualities required, whilst if political they would enable successive ministries to deluge the House with party tools.—*Representative Government*, chap. xiii. [We see nothing wanting here save some special representation of the interests of Christian morality.]

which we need not here enter, as it is not of a very practical character where titles are a recognised part of the institutions of the Empire. We believe that such a body as we have sketched could not fail to prove as great a blessing to the British Empire as is the Senate to the United States. The members personally qualified would bring to it the highest statesmanlike experience of the day; through the Crown-nominated members obscure or unpopular talent and ballast could be introduced; by nominees of the Local Legislatures, some of the 'spirit of the age' would find its way into a place where it is often wanted; and we need only point to the history of the United States Senate to prove that these bodies generally choose to be represented by the best talent available. The peerage would be fairly influential in it, and by means of a few hereditary seats, the historic names of the Empire could be kept in that place of honour which is their right. In such an assembly all sides of every question would be sure to find advocates of the very highest ability, in which case it could not fail to discharge its duties fearlessly and efficiently, and by the sheer force of genius to command respect for its decisions. But should this scheme not be approved of, there is a simpler means of settlement available. Peerages for life are, in the opinion of many eminent lawyers, already constitutional. At all events, a bill could be passed legalising them, and the Crown could then call to the House of Lords a sufficient number, or a definite proportion, of colonial life peers. The other mode of settlement, however, we believe to be much more likely to prove beneficial to all parties.

Such is the manner in which we think it possible to overcome the constitutional difficulties in the way of the formation of a Federal Legislature for the Empire. As to the possibility of creating such a body, and the necessity

for so doing if it is desired to maintain the integrity of the Empire, we have no doubt whatever. But when considering the details of such a measure, we feel painfully the difficulties of a task which would tax severely the intellects of the foremost statesmen of our age and country. In the language of Dr. Arnold on Church Reform, we would say: 'As to the manner of carrying these principles into effect, I am far from proposing anything with equal confidence. Nor am I anxious about any particular measure which I may have ventured to recommend, if anything can be suggested by others which may effect the same great object more completely.' For this reason it is that we have not hesitated in any case, where two courses seemed available, to indicate both, leaving their relative merits for further discussion. We know that, in having attempted so much as we have done, we have acted in opposition to the views of an able advocate of an Imperial Federation<sup>1</sup> who condemns attempts 'to limn out in detail the form of a British Federal system,' and alleges that 'at present it is for the federalist simply to show his doctrine to be reasonable, his suggestions to be *primâ facie* practical, his system to be desirable, and to demonstrate that it deserves to be made the subject of united conference and negotiation.' We fully endorse the views enunciated in the latter quotation, but do not see how it is possible to prove the scheme to be either reasonable, practicable, or desirable, otherwise than by refuting the arguments put forth against it as unreasonable, impracticable, and undesirable, to effect which an explanation of the manner in which obstacles may be conquered is essential.

There remains more objection, of a constitutional character, which may possibly be urged against Federation. It

<sup>1</sup> The author of 'Ginx's Baby,' in the *Contemporary Review* for April.

arises from the need of making appeals to the people by means of a dissolution of Parliament, and a general election when the Executive and the House of Commons are at variance. It may be argued that, even supposing the whole framework of a Federal Government erected, it would be impossible to carry out such appeals within a reasonable space of time, in which case there would remain no means of carrying on the Queen's government by bringing the executive and legislative authorities into unison. It is quite certain that such appeals are a necessity of the constitution as at present administered; and also that to complete the process in the proposed Federation would require about six months. The delay, however, seems to us more likely to be beneficial than pernicious. The questions on which these direct appeals are made are almost always those of internal policy. It is, consequently, probable that such appeals would be less numerous under a federal than under a national government. But we will not insist on this point. The only evil which would ensue from the lengthened time consumed in making the appeal would be that a defeated ministry could remain in office some three or four months longer than at present. This evil, we think, would be very light; and much more than compensated by the increased probability of obtaining an equitable and intelligent response, which would be induced by the electors having had time to weigh the merits of the case. It has been well observed by Sir Henry Bulwer that 'Reason predominates at the end of every crisis, but has her voice drowned at the commencement;' and by Sir A. Alison that 'Public opinion is almost always wrong in the outset, but almost always right in the end; and the reason is that in the former case it is formed by the unthinking many, and in the latter by the thinking few.' These observations are true in reference to all times;

but are emphatically so in regard to our own era; because never before could thought be utilised so rapidly as it can now through the press. But rapidly as it can be utilised, it is still impossible for it to gain sway during the few weeks now consumed in making an appeal to the people; and the consequence is that erroneous decisions are frequently returned and rash measures adopted, the full meaning of which is not realised. This danger would be much lessened by the increased time afforded for a discussion of the merits of the points at issue; and when we remember the enormous importance of arriving at the truth in such cases, it seems to us that the minor evil of delay is one which might be very cheerfully borne, in consideration of the safeguard afforded by it against the greater evil of the ascendancy of falsehood.

There is also another important constitutional question which would be raised by the establishment of an Imperial Federation. It is whether, under this system of government, it would be requisite to establish a Supreme Court, similar to that of the United States, to act as arbiter between the several authorities of the Empire, or whether Parliament could remain as at present practically omnipotent in the sphere of government. The subject would deserve more careful consideration, probably, than any other involved in the scheme; but as it does not touch the *possibility* of the establishment of such a polity as we advocate, we shall not here enter on the consideration of it.

Having thus endeavoured to prove that it is practicable to overcome the alleged difficulties in the way of the formation and working of the machinery of a Federal Government of the Empire, we have next to examine the probability of such machinery proving stable if erected.

## CHAPTER VII.

## PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES.

MORE important, and more deserving of careful attention, than any of the obstacles in the way of Federation which we have yet considered is that branch of the subject which now rises before us. We have no doubt whatever that, in the event of a Federal Government of the Empire being established, it would prove fully equal to the discharge of its duties, despite the absence of geographical unity in the countries under its sway. Equally are we convinced that the constitutional difficulties in the way of the formation of such a Government could be overcome; and if our readers are not of the same opinion, we can attribute the fact only to our own bad advocacy of a good cause. But we are well aware that every word which we have written might be perfectly unimpeachable, and yet the scheme which we advocate completely impracticable. It is clear that there is nothing in the physical conformation of the United States, or of England, to render impossible the rule of an absolute monarch in the former instance, or that of a democratic republic in the latter; and it is also evident that a popular party possessed of a majority in the legislature of either country might effect a revolution initiating the new system in it. But how long would the new form of government continue in existence, under present circumstances, in either case? Would it contain in itself the elements of stability? This is the vital

point in any, and every, scheme affecting the political interests of nations. It is evident that despotism would not 'work' in the States, nor democracy in England, as the conditions under which either may prove beneficial are wanting. Governmental constitutions must everywhere be adapted to the wants of the people to be governed. No nation will tolerate a form of government which it dislikes, if there be any reasonable chance of overthrowing it; and no form of representative government, at all events, can long exist unless the great majority of the people are satisfied that it conduces to their benefit. There was no doubt of the ability of the Federal Government of the United States to fulfil all its functions; the manner in which it exercised its prerogatives was the cause which led to secession, and a fierce civil war, which have probably sown the seeds of dissolution in the American Union. The discontent at its course of action was induced by the existence of hostile feelings and interests in different parts of the Union, rendering it possible to secure the loyalty of one section only at the cost of the disloyalty of another. Wherever such hostility of interest or of feeling exists, there it is useless to attempt to form a Federation. Free nations will remain united politically only so long as they are united in heart. Are, then, the feelings and interests of the several parts of the British Empire which we have proposed to unite in one great Federation, sufficiently in unison to render it probable that, if such a scheme of government as we have sketched were established, they would accept its results harmoniously? Would the enforcement of the terms of union on all be likely to induce discontent with union on the part of any? Unless favourable answers can be returned to these questions, physical and constitutional difficulties may be annihi-

lated, and still any attempt to form a Federation of the Empire utterly useless.

In considering these questions, it may be well, in the first instance, to turn from details to principles; to examine the conditions requisite for the success of the Federal form of government; then to inquire whether they are to be found in the countries to which it is proposed to apply it; and finally to consider the probability of being able to overcome the difficulties peculiar to the present case. The 'circumstances under which a Federal Union is desirable' have been set forth so clearly by Mr. Freeman in his *History of Federal Governments*, that we think we shall be most likely to arrive at a correct conclusion on the abstract question by endeavouring to apply his principles to the case before us. Mr. Freeman writes of Federalism as follows:—

'It is a system eminently suited for some circumstances, eminently unsuited for others. Federalism is in its place whenever it appears in the form of closer union. Europeans, accustomed to a system of large consolidated States, are apt to look upon Federalism as a system of disunion, and therefore of weakness. To a Greek of the third century B.C., to an American in 1787 it presented itself as a system of union and therefore of strength. The alternative was not closer union but wider separation. A kingdom of Peloponnesos or of America was an absurdity too great to be thought of. A single consolidated republic was almost equally out of the question. The real question was, Shall these cities, these states, remain utterly isolated, perhaps hostile to one another, at most united by an inefficient and precarious alliance?—or shall they, while retaining full internal independence, be fused into one nation as regards all dealings with other Powers? Looked at in this light, the Federal system is emphatically a system of union and of that strength



which follows upon union. The Federal connection is in its place wherever the several members to be united are fitted for that species of union and for no other. It requires a sufficient degree of community in origin or feeling or interest, to allow the several members to work together up to a certain point. It requires that there should not be that perfect degree of community, or rather identity, which allows the several members to be fused together for all purposes. Where there is no community at all, Federalism is inappropriate; the cities, or states, had better remain wholly independent. Where community rises into identity, Federalism is equally inappropriate; the cities or states had better sink into mere counties of a kingdom or consolidated republic, and take their chance of the advantages or disadvantages of large states. But in the intermediate set of circumstances, the circumstances of Peloponnesos struggling against Macedonia, of Switzerland struggling against Austria, of the Netherlands struggling against Spain, of the American colonies struggling against England, Federalism is the true solvent. It gives as much of union as the members need, and not more than they need. . . . Wherever either closer union or more entire separation is desirable, Federalism is out of place. It is out of place if it attempts either to break asunder what is already more closely united, or to unite what is wholly incapable of union. Its mission is to unite to a certain extent what is capable of a certain amount of union and no more. It is an intermediate point between two extremes, capable of being either despised as a compromise or of being extolled as the golden mean.<sup>1</sup>

The circumstances of England and her Colonies seem to answer almost exactly to those in which Mr. Freeman declares Federalism to be in its place. It would there unite

<sup>1</sup> *History of Federal Governments*, pp. 108-110.

'in closer union' than at present countries to which the alternative is, not a still more intimate union, but 'wider separation.' As in the cases of Peloponnesos and America, a consolidated republic is 'an absurdity too great to be thought of,' and the real choice lies between 'utter isolation' and 'unity as regards all dealings with other Powers,' accompanied by 'full internal independence.' We have fuller proof than existed in the case of Peloponnesos or America that 'the several members to be united are fitted for that species of union and for no other,' in the facts that they have for a long time constituted a harmonious modified Federation, and that a system of government under which certain members were deprived of 'full internal independence' has been tried and failed. Their history proves indisputably that there is 'a sufficient degree of community in origin or feeling or interest [or rather in origin, feeling, and interest] to allow the several members to work together up to a certain point;' and it is equally indisputable that they cannot be 'fused together for all purposes.' The members are not, indeed, struggling for national independence against foreign foes, as in the cases mentioned; but the Colonies are, one and all, incapable of maintaining their independence single-handed; and the growth of mighty empires on every side of England renders it essential to her safety to be able to keep pace with their growth, which can be done only by utilising the resources of her growing empires beyond the sea. For these purposes a Federal union would give 'as much of union as the members need, and not more than they need.' It is affirmed that, 'wherever either closer union or more entire separation is desirable, Federalism is out of place.' In the present instance it is certain that closer union is not desirable; and, if our arguments be correct, neither is entire separation; consequently we may conclude that Federalism would *not* be 'out of place.

And if it be a correct statement that 'ITS MISSION IS TO UNITE TO A CERTAIN EXTENT WHAT IS 'CAPABLE OF A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF UNION AND NO MORE,' can there be the shadow of a doubt that it is exactly the remedy needed to-day by the British Empire, inasmuch as its history proves incontestably that its members are capable of a certain amount of union and no more? Almost every one of Mr. Freeman's theories as to the 'circumstances under which a Federal union is desirable' finds its counterpart in the present relations of England and her Colonies. Hence, if that gentleman be correct, the Empire is admirably suited to constitute a Federation such as we propose should be formed.

Another great thinker, however, has enunciated his views on this subject. Mr. Mill, in his work on *Representative Government*, has devoted a chapter to the Federal form of it; and in it he carefully inquires into the qualifications calculated to fit different countries for becoming members of a Federation. We will not say that we endorse all he says; but as we do not wish to shrink from meeting 'the whole truth' wherever it may be found, we shall endeavour to apply his principles to the case before us. The first requisite for a Federation is, according to Mr. Mill, the existence of a large amount of mutual sympathy amongst its members:—

'To render a Federation advisable, several conditions are necessary. The first is that there should be a sufficient amount of mutual sympathy among the populations. The Federation binds them always to fight on the same side; and if they have such feelings towards one another, or such diversity towards their neighbours, that they would generally prefer to fight on opposite sides, the Federal tie is neither likely to be of long duration, nor to be well observed whilst it subsists. The sympathies available for the purpose are those of race, language, and

religion, and, above all, of political institutions, as conducing most to a feeling of identity of political interest. When a few free states, separately insufficient for their own defence, are hemmed in on all sides by military or feudal monarchs, who hate and despise freedom even in a neighbour, those states have no chance of preserving liberty and its blessings but by a Federal union. The common interest arising from this cause, has, in Switzerland, for several centuries, been found adequate to maintain efficiently the federal bond, in spite not only of diversity of religion, when religion was the grand source of political enmity throughout Europe, but also in spite of great weakness in the constitution of the Federation itself. In America, where all the conditions for the maintenance of union existed at the highest point, with the sole drawback of difference of institutions in the single, but most important, article of slavery, this one difference has gone so far in alienating from each other's sympathies the two divisions of the Union that the maintenance or disruption of a tie of so much value to them both depends upon the issue of an obstinate civil war.'

We are content to endorse the whole of the above extract, and to undertake to prove that such 'an amount of mutual sympathy' as is therein described exists between the several members of the Empire which it is proposed to unite. In proof of the existence of such sympathy we point to the existence of the Empire under present conditions of union. For the senior member of a firm to inform the junior partners that they can leave whenever they please, is a course not very likely to strengthen their affection or respect for him: sympathetic feelings will, in such a case, continue to exist rather in spite of his conduct than in consequence of it. Yet what other conduct than the above has the ruling party in England been pursuing towards the Colonies for the last twenty-five years?

Ever since the adoption of free trade an ostentatious repetition of the statement that they could have their independence whenever they wished, has been dinned in their ears ; Canada, in fact, has been all but told to ' get out.' But what is the reply of one and all ? At the present day how stands the case ? Canada has been, and is, wooed by Yankee annexationists ; insulted by English emancipationists ; told that, in the event of war, her lands and cities must be the battle-ground of England and America ; enjoys a foretaste of such a lot in being exposed to Fenian raids ; sees British troops withdrawn even whilst these ruffians sit in council on projects of attack ; hears that she must bear the cost of erecting fortresses and of raising a provincial force to garrison them, and provide for her own defence in a war which may arise in consequence of quarrels in which she has not any direct concern ; and this whilst her influence avails not the weight of a straw in favour of either war or peace. Yet does she flinch ? New Zealand is exposed to the inroads of raging savages ; and troops, alone able to defend her people, have been ordered to be withdrawn whilst they were being massacred. Cape Colony is told that it will soon be left in a like position to New Zéaland, and that against a race whose prowess has been significantly displayed in times past. The West Indies stand almost ruined by English legislation during the last forty years. And *all* find those matters on which their very life depends settled for them, without appeal, by English ministers, intent above all things on conciliating a majority of the House of Commons, and are left in the position of inferiority necessarily incident to Colonies ; yet what signs of disloyalty are to be seen ? The reality, or the prospect, of troubles from Maories, Kaffirs, Negroes, Fenians, Yankees, subordination and possible ruin, are calmly faced ; and from one and all is heard the steady asseveration of love : " For

better for worse ; for richer for poorer ; in sickness or in health, till death do us part " will we stand to old England ! ' Or, in the language lately used by a New Brunswick minister : ' Though she slay us, yet will we trust her. ' Surely when, under a system of government which induces so many of these disturbing causes, such a burning spirit of loyalty to the Fatherland can exist, it would not be lessened under another system whereby many of them would be removed ?

If any of our readers should doubt that this would be the case, we advise him to pay a short visit to ' this Canada of ours, ' and see for himself the almost romantic love and admiration for everything British that therein exists, and which we doubt not is, from similar causes, developed in other Colonies. It can never be otherwise in any of them until such a quarrel as was waged with the United States has transpired. To the colonist his Fatherland is classic ground. The man who has exchanged it for a new land looks back with a sort of happy melancholy on the scenes of his childhood, and feels for them much of the holy reverence with which we recall reminiscences of a beloved parent in the grave. The native colonist has his ears fed from infancy with accounts of the glories of the old land beyond the sea, and of the greatness of the sovereign who rules over it and over him. He passes to the village school and drinks in the *History of England* with greedy appetite ; finds his bosom swell with that exquisite joy which every ardent youth experiences on learning the glories of his Fatherland ; but in the present instance, that land being at a distance, has cast over it, to his eyes, a ' dim religious light ' which makes those glories appear more exquisitely beautiful, and thus renders them still more heart-entrancing, than in ordinary cases. He grows to manhood, and learns that all the liberties which he enjoys he inherits from Britain ; that the conservation of

his national freedom mainly depends on the alliance with her ; that much of the garments in which he is clothed, of the tools with which he works, and, more important than all, of the books which he reads, have been derived from the same source ; besides which, he sees that the development of the land he inhabits must be effected mainly by the importation of British labour and capital. Thus, veneration for the past, pride in the present, and hope for the future, all combine to turn his heart towards the Fatherland with feelings akin to those with which a Roman of old looked on the City of the Seven Hills, and to make him boast his British citizenship with as much pride as ever any man felt on being able to say : '*Civis Romanus sum!*' One point, at all events, is certain ; and that is, that should an adequate amount of sympathy be wanting, the deficiency will not be found in the Colonies. On the other hand late events, and the reception which an emancipationist policy has met with in the United Kingdom, seem to indicate that something of the same sacred flame which glowed in the breast of the immortal Chatham when in his dying moments he prayed that if Britain must fall she might at least fall with honour, still warms the hearts of the great-grandsons of those who heard him. When that spirit has become extinct the sympathy requisite to keep the Empire united will be wanting—but not until then.

Mr. Mill goes on to say :—

'A second condition of the stability of a Federal Government is that the separate states should not be so powerful as to be able to rely for protection against foreign encroachment on their individual strength. If they are, they will be apt to think that they do not gain, by union with others, the equivalent of what they sacrifice in their own liberty of action ; and consequently, whenever the policy of the Confederation in things reserved

to its cognizance is different from that which any one of its members would separately pursue, the internal and sectional breach will, through absence of sufficient anxiety to preserve the union, be in danger of going so far as to dissolve it.'

We will grant these theories, also, to be correct. In the case of the Colonies it is clear that the condition is fulfilled. There is not one of them that could 'rely for protection against foreign encroachment on its own individual strength.' A consciousness of this fact is one of the causes which to-day render them so intensely desirous as they are to maintain the connection, and the motive would exist as strongly after Federation as at present. It may be said that the contrary is the case as regards England—that she could not only maintain her independence alone, but much more easily when alone than whilst united to the Colonies; and that a consciousness of this 'fact' is what renders some of her people anxious to end the connection. This, also, may be correct. But if we have succeeded in proving that England would be a direct loser by emancipation—of which proposition it is certain that she would have to be convinced before agreeing to adopt the Union proposed—such a feeling could not continue under the new *régime*, even did the military relations remain on their former footing; and much less could this feeling last were the martial resources of the growing Colonies utilized and brought to increase the common fund, as we propose should be done. We shall show, hereafter, that by this means the martial strength of England would be enormously increased, which fact would render her probably as anxious as other members to maintain the connection on account of the increased strength which would be derived therefrom. Hence we conclude that Mr. Mill's second condition would be fulfilled in the present instance.



The next, and concluding, condition which Mr. Mill declares to be essential to a Federation is stated as follows :—

‘ A third condition, not less important than the two others, is that there be not a very marked inequality of strength among the several contracting states. They cannot, indeed, be exactly equal in resources: in all Federations there will be a gradation of power among the members; some will be more populous, rich, and civilised than others. There is a wide difference in population and wealth between New York and Rhode Island; between Berne and Zürich. The essential is that there should not be any one state so much more powerful than the rest as to be capable of vying in strength with many of them combined. If there be such a one, and only one, it will insist on being master of the joint deliberations; if there be two, they will be irresistible when they agree; and whenever they differ everything will be decided by a struggle for ascendancy between the rivals.’<sup>1</sup>

It must be admitted that this condition is not fulfilled in the case of England and her Colonies. The British Islands would be much more powerful than all the Colonies, and could for many years outvote them in the Federal Parliament. Their division into three states by the formation of separate local Governments for England, Ireland, and Scotland, as we have proposed, would bring the situation more into accordance with Mr. Mill's theory than if they formed only one state; though even England alone would probably return at first one-half the members of the Lower House. But let it not be inferred that Federation is impossible, in consequence of the non-existence of this one of Mr. Mill's conditions for a Federal Union. The danger which he indicates is that of one

<sup>1</sup> *Representative Government* (People's edition), pp. 124, 125.

state capable of vying with many, insisting on being master of the joint deliberations. Before this can be done, the people and representatives of that one state must be *united* against all the rest. But the interests and feelings of the inhabitants of England are so very various and conflicting that the formation of such a union seems to be almost beyond the reach of possibility, and is certainly beyond probability. Moreover, England is precisely the country which, from the character of its people, and of its legislators, would be least likely of all the members of the Federation to seek for an unfair advantage at the expense of the Empire. The single point on which it is possible that these moral influences might be overcome, is that of the acquisition of commercial ascendancy; and that is exactly the point on which it is most improbable that the representatives of her rural, manufacturing, and mercantile interests could unite. Besides this, such a union would be almost useless; if, according to the scheme which we have sketched, the arrangement of the *details* of the commercial policy of the several members of the Federation were left to be settled by the local legislatures, and its grand *principles* fixed once for all on the initiation of the Union. On other matters there would be scarcely any temptation for England to unite against the rest of the Empire; and on this one it is scarcely possible that such a union could be either effected or effective. But in considering the position which England would occupy in the proposed Federation, that occupied by the Colonies in the Empire of to-day should not be forgotten. They now possess *no influence whatever* in reference to the subjects which would fall under the action of the Federal Government. Under a Federation of the Empire they would enjoy a considerable amount of influence immediately, and more with the lapse of years. If they are loyal to England at present, when she monopolises all the

prerogatives of the Federal Government, would they be less loyal if she, ceasing to do so, should admit them to a share in the loftiest sphere of government, to all the honours of her time-honoured Parliament and of the Ministerial benches, to the glories of the army and navy, and to the viceroyalties of mighty kingdoms? If the influence of England over the destinies of the Empire to-day is not too great to be consistent with its voluntary and loyal union, could it be too great if diminished, as it necessarily would be, under Federation?

The results of an application of Mr. Mill's principles to the case before us may not be so encouraging as those which followed from the similar operation with those of Mr. Freeman; but we are, nevertheless, of opinion that nearly all the conditions which he declares to be requisite to render a Federation advisable are to be found in it; and that counteracting influences may be relied on as substitutes for the little that may be wanting. We are aware that Mr. Mill takes a different view of the case; but his arguments to prove that these conditions are wanting are based on emancipationist theories, and of course fall with them; other difficulties which he suggests we shall consider further on. Meanwhile we think it may fairly be assumed that the circumstances of the British Empire approach very closely to those under which these gentlemen affirm an application of Federalism to be practicable and desirable. The circumstances which would tend to hinder the administration of the government of the Empire according to the proposed system have next to be considered.

1. When inquiring into the possibility of a Federal Government fulfilling its duties to the Empire, we quoted Mr. Mill's opinions on the feasibility of a Federation of its parts, but omitted to analyze any other portion of them than that which related to the point immediately under

review. The statements then left unnoticed must now be examined. Mr. Mill says of England and her Colonies: 'If they had sufficiently the same interests, they have not, and never can have, a sufficient habit of taking counsel together. They are no part of the same public; they do not discuss and deliberate in the same arena, but apart, and have only an imperfect knowledge of what passes in the minds of one another. They neither know each other's objects, nor have confidence in each other's principles of conduct.' We are willing to admit that a difficulty might be found to exist here. But we think that it could within a very short time be overcome. The fact is that the disciple of 'progress' here shuts his eyes to the effects of progress. This is nothing more than is done by his brethren whenever progress seems likely to sap the foundations of any darling theory, so he must not be judged very severely; but the effect of his action is to lead to a false conclusion. Were communication now as tardy as it was at the beginning of this century, there could be no doubt of Mr. Mill's theories proving correct. It is different, however, when the proceedings of the Imperial Parliament are read in Canada, and will shortly be read in Australia, much sooner than at the former period they were read in Ireland, or even in Scotland. Already such news is greedily sought after, giving proof of an earnest interest in the affairs of the Fatherland; but how much more earnestly would it be sought after if there were sitting in London a legislature in which the Colonies were represented, and in the proceedings of which they were directly interested? That they have not already 'a sufficient habit of taking counsel together' is due, in a great measure, to the laborious efforts which have been made to disintegrate them. That they 'never can' have such a habit, we, who have seen columns of Canadian newspapers filled with English,

or European, intelligence of the previous day, must be permitted to doubt, nay, even to believe that they *can* acquire such a habit. The disposition for taking such counsel would be enlarged by the need of it which would be induced by union; and the means of supplying instantaneous communication are practically illimitable. The fuller and calmer counsel needed would be supplied by newspapers and periodicals, which could travel across the Atlantic in about ten days, and to or from the Antipodes in about six weeks. The higher class of periodical literature read in Canada already consists almost entirely of English magazines and reviews. Their circulation would certainly be extended in all the Colonies with the increased interest in much of their contents which would result from Federation. Finally, the meeting of the representatives of these different countries in the legislative halls, and their proceedings therein, would constitute an interchange of thought between them, and that the thoughts of their noblest men. We confess that we should not be very sorry to see such men left pretty free to act on their own judgment, and would rejoice if the condition of the Empire should tend to make our statesmen leaders of public opinion instead of its followers, and we admit that we believe they would become such. But, in the presence of such facilities of communication as we have seen would exist, it is just as unlikely that any representative could be led to sacrifice the interests of his constituents through ignorance, or that the feeling of any province regarding the various measures in progress could be mistaken, as is the case to-day with the members and constituencies of the United Kingdom. It is difficult to see what further 'taking of counsel' than that necessary to attain such a result would be needed; the interchange of this much would be secured by the co-existence of the want and the means of supplying it.

2. It may be said that the framework of society in the United Kingdom and in the Colonies is essentially different, being in the former case aristocratic and in the latter democratic; that this fact is likely to render the whole tendency of political thought diverse in each of these sections of the Empire, and that such diversity would be a standing menace to unity. We are content to admit that it might prove to be a difficulty in the way. Difference of institutions in any form is not calculated to induce that unity of national sentiment which in its fullest development constitutes patriotism. Denunciations of 'bloated aristocracies' might be likely to form a staple ingredient in the harangues of colonial demagogues, and assertions to the effect that the interests of the Empire were being sacrificed to those of a selfish oligarchy would, doubtless, not be wanting. But what more would such language be than that which is now, and long has been, heard almost daily in England itself without inducing any disturbance of the public peace or of the structure of society? There have always been another side of the case to be presented and a party to present it, and the same would be the case in the Colonies. The distance between the extreme wing of each party in England is quite as wide as that which exists between English Tories and Colonial Radicals. The latter are, it is probable, much more firmly attached to monarchical institutions than are their Advanced Liberal brethren in England. 'Distance lends enchantment to the view' of democracy in the one case, and of a sovereign in the other. And in the case of Colonial Tories, a near contact with democracy has, by forcing them to enter into controversy with it face to face, implanted a reason for the faith that is in them, often more clear and consistent than that of English Conservatives. Nor must it be supposed that colonial society is of a cast exclusively democratic.

In every country, society, if allowed peacefully to develop itself, must become increasingly aristocratic with the lapse of years, for the simple reason that as 'power begets power,' those who have inherited or accumulated property are constantly being placed in a more advantageous position for increasing it. The progress of civilization is the progress of inequalities. The wealth or knowledge of the 'labouring classes' may have been increased very much of late years, but that of the rich or learned has been augmented in a much greater proportion. These natural influences are making themselves felt in the Colonies, and will be felt still more in the future. Neither can it be said that that mad worship of 'equality' which is the leading characteristic of democracies, prevails in them. So long as honours are open to all, a colonist feels no jealousy at others than himself gaining them, and always seems pleased at the attainment of them by colonial statesmen from the Imperial Government. But the main point behind all these facts is that the framework of society in every part of the Empire would be a matter of local concern exclusively. Were the members of the Upper House of the Federal Legislature not hereditary legislators, it would be impossible for any man in the Empire to acquire power otherwise than on the same terms in every part of it. This being the case, and the laws of real property within the control of the local Government in each country, the facts that a different tenure of land, or greater or less equality of condition, prevailed in one part of the Federation than in another could never lead to controversy in the Federal Legislature; and so long as it failed to induce that, it would be as powerless to create ill-feeling between the several parts of the Empire as it is to-day. The Federation would form a league of nations united in sympathy by ties of language, race, religion, and historic glory; and in interest

by commercial and political considerations which would render their union conducive to the growth of their wealth and the conservation of their liberties. Under these circumstances, they could surely allow each member to set his own house in such order as he might prefer, without quarrelling in reference to details, when they would be united in a common love of those grand principles of liberty and order enunciated in the Great Charter.

3. The small proportion of colonial representation in the Federal Legislature at its inception, and its subsequent probable or possible increase, are alternately used as arguments against Federation. The former difficulty has come before us in the third of Mr. Mill's conditions; concerning the latter he seems desperately frightened. 'Let any Englishman,' he says, 'ask himself how he should like his destinies to depend on an assembly of which one-third was British-American, and another third South-African and Australian?' It may fairly be replied that these different fears, in a great measure, destroy one another. The Fatherland, profiting by the growth of its offspring, is not likely, in the face of their increasing power, either to wish or to strive to act unjustly towards them. The offspring, tenderly guarded in youth, and generously treated in maturity, are equally unlikely to feel any jealousy of the guardian to whom they have been indebted for civil liberty, local independence, and imperial nationality, and on whose protection they may still be dependent for the conservation of these blessings. Thus, interest, affection, and prudence would unite to prevent either side from pushing its powers to excess. Still less formidable does either danger appear when viewed in detail. It is true that at first the Colonies could not be entitled to over twenty per cent. of the representation. Still such a proportion is by no means insignificant. It is double that which Scotland



has possessed in the Imperial Parliament, and which has been found amply sufficient to ensure due attention to all the interests of that country. On questions in which the constitutional rights of any Colony were involved, there can be little doubt that the colonial representatives would vote together as one man; for the rights of all the Colonies being identical, to suffer any one of them to be oppressed would serve to establish a precedent against the remainder. As colonial interests are diversified, there might be less unity in the defence of them than of that of colonial rights. But even in this case it is pretty certain that a good deal of fellow-feeling would prevail, and lead colonists to act together, unless where their interests would directly clash. In the former case it is probable, if not positive, that a compact body of one-fifth or even one-sixth of the House would always find sufficient support to secure respect for the privileges guaranteed by the act of union. And in the event of a conflict of interests arising, a similar result would probably ensue from like causes, unless when the policy arraigned should appear favourable to colonial interests generally as well as to those of England, in which case it would not be desirable that the special interest assailed should prevail against them. With each member of the Federation regulating its own tariff, as we have proposed, the material interests with which the Federal Legislature would have to deal would be so few that there seems little danger of any conflict arising in reference to them; and on questions of peace and war there is no chance at all of England proving too bellicose for the Colonies, whilst they—with boundless lands uninhabited—are not likely to be affected with any lust of conquest. In no instance could the wishes of any province be neglected, or its interests sacrificed, without its being able to explain and defend its position to a statesmanlike audience. At

present, one portion of the Empire can and does legislate against the interests and wishes of the rest of it, without there being any remedy and scarcely any hearing for the parties aggrieved. Under this system the heart of the British people remains so sound that in the Colonies scarcely any, and in the British Islands comparatively few, desire dismemberment. Is it not, then, improbable that, under a system of government in which each country would be forced to consider the interests of others as well as its own, disturbing causes more powerful than those which have as yet proved insufficient to induce a disruption of the Empire would be introduced? A small colonial representation would suffice, because colonial rights and interests would be otherwise guarded against assault from the legislative majority, whilst that small proportion would steadily increase. In regard to Mr. Mill's bugbear of the ultimate effect of this increase in 'an assembly of which one-third was British-American, and another third South-African and Australian,' we would remark that the time when the representation of either of these countries would be equal to that of the British Islands lies so far off in the dim future that we may fairly be excused from regarding it as a practical point of debate in our day. It is pretty certain, however, that by the time such an event could occur, England would have little reason to fear any hostile combination, as the idiosyncrasies of different parts of the territories indicated would then be so well developed that Nova Scotia would have quite as little in common with British Columbia, or New Zealand with Queensland, as either with England. Furthermore, it is equally certain that, should the union last until such changes might occur, its existence could have been maintained only by the disappearance of all such local jealousies as are here hinted at. It may, therefore, fairly be presumed that if our descend-

ants could agree to live together for so long a period, they could also agree to some measure whereby the difficulty, should it arise, might be overcome. Nay, we are inclined to think that provision for meeting it might be made even in the act of union; and, as Mr. Mill's fears are likely to be echoed in England, we shall endeavour to explain the manner in which we think this could be done. It was this difficulty which we had in view when we said that we did not consider the first basis of representation should be regarded as unalterable.

The proposed Federation would constitute emphatically a league of nations, one in race, language, history, and feelings, and probably in interests, but divided from each other by such vast distances that any attempt to introduce *uniformity* of institutions amongst them would be sheer madness: to keep them always friends and allies is the great end which should be sought after in Federation. Under these circumstances the exact distribution of political power would be of much less consequence than in a territory geographically united. We are, therefore, of opinion that it would not be essential to the Colonies to insist on a permanently progressive increase in the proportion of their representatives, after their collective representation had become equal to that of the British Islands. We would propose to have it provided that, after that point had been reached, the proportion of representation should remain unaltered until the proportion of colonial taxation had become identical with that of their representation; and that thereafter representation and taxation should be apportioned on the same basis, according to which the only title to an increase of representation would consist in liability to the payment of an increased proportion of taxation; and, also, that a hint should then be taken from the United States, where representation in the two chambers is adjusted on different

principles, and arrangements made to leave the proportion of representation in the Upper House unaltered, save when a new province should be formed. By means of such measures it is probable that security could be had against the apprehended extinction of English influence, without interfering with the guarantees for colonial rights. For, in the event of the basis of representation being made to correspond with that of taxation, England would probably be able to hold her own with the Colonies after the time at which it would be established, since the greater part of them would then have ceased to be virgin soil. Or, at all events, the rate of Colonial increase would be so slow that the danger foreseen by Mr. Mill might be regarded as postponed *sine die*, even without the security against it afforded by the constitution of the Upper House. On the other hand, the Colonies would have gained, before the change in the basis of representation had been effected, an amount of influence fully sufficient to enforce attention to their rights and interests, and might, possibly, continue to add to it; whilst the composition of the Upper House, and the fact that many of its crown-appointed members would consist of men who had held colonial governorships, would impart to it enough of the judicial character to render any inequitable action on its part very improbable. Even different principles of action may be needed at different stages of a nation's history; and, by thus providing for them in the future, we think that the occurrence of the apprehended difficulties could be prevented.

4. It has been seen that the existence of a certain amount of sympathy amongst the populations to be united is essential to rendering advisable the formation of any federation, and we have endeavoured to prove the existence of such sympathy in the present case. But it may be replied that the sympathy now existing is a

consequence of the looseness of the connection which binds together the several members of the Empire, and that were an attempt made to unite them more closely by means of a common legislature, the increased interference with each other's affairs consequent thereon, would tend to destroy it. This objection is one that may be brought against any projected union, but it will always prove null and void when the advantages to be gained are in excess of the sacrifices demanded. Seldom, if ever, have the sacrifices required been so small as in the present instance. Federal unity would not interfere with local independence, and more than local independence no colony does, or ever can, enjoy. The United Kingdom possesses to-day—with a single exception—all the prerogatives which it would be necessary to confer upon the Federal Government. The change would consist in the fact that whereas the federal prerogatives are now wielded by only a part of the Empire, they would under a federation be wielded by all. But even then the Federal Legislature would have no more influence over the Colonies—save in the imposition of the regulated share of taxation—than the Imperial Parliament has always exercised. The local Governments would be almost as strong as ever they were; whilst the Colonies would, in addition to former rights, enjoy the privilege of a voice in imperial affairs. One new cause of dispute in the shape of taxation would, indeed, be introduced; but along with it would come a corrective, in the shape of representation.

To this it may be replied that the disturbing force would be more powerful than the corrective. We admit that the influence of money has never been better described than in the happy term 'almighty dollar,' and that in the Colonies the love of money is pretty strong and widely diffused. But we assume that, should a Federation of the Empire be formed, it would be done only after

the assent of the Colonies had been obtained, and we think that, if they were to enter into it with their eyes open to the increase of taxation, they would be prepared to abide by their bargain. That they would voluntarily accept it we are led to believe from the fact that Federation would involve a smaller increase of taxation than would separation, and that when forced—as both England and they soon must be—to choose between these alternatives, they would choose the least onerous, even if there were not many other considerations to recommend it. In this, as in every other case in this world, that which we have to accept is not absolute good but comparative superiority : some objection will appear to everything. The best course is that which promises the greatest amount of advantage at the cost of the smallest amount of sacrifice. If it can be shown that, in the case before us, Federation is the course which answers to this description, it is evident that it should be adopted. We are not afraid to attempt to prove that it would bring to both Fatherland and Colonies all the benefits of connection and separation simultaneously, and this at the cost of smaller sacrifices to either side than would inevitably be induced by separation. Should these benefits follow, as we assert they would, the fact of their so doing would constitute the most powerful element possible in the stability of the system which had induced them. A flood of loyal admiration would be created by which any such difficulties as those arising from want of taking counsel, slight diversities of landed tenure, differences of representation, or a slight increase of taxation to some of the members, would be crushed out of existence. If Federation should prove to be beneficial, it could not fail to be stable. We are thus led to the last stage of our subject, viz., whether, supposing Federation to be practicable, it promises sufficient advantages to render its adoption expedient ?

## CHAPTER VIII.

## FEDERATION v. COLONIAL INDEPENDENCE.

THE last stage of our inquiry has now been reached. We have examined the proposed emancipationist policy, and given our reasons for pronouncing it to be essentially pernicious. Admitting, at the same time, that the relations between the mother-country and her Colonies cannot long remain on their present footing, we have propounded a scheme in which we believe that a practical solution of the colonial question may be found. It remains to prove that this solution would be a good one: a practicable solution of a difficulty is one thing, a politic solution is another. Granting that a Federation of the Empire could be established, would it be for the advantage of the parties concerned to adopt it in preference to separation? This, we think, is the fair statement of the question. It is not Federation in the abstract which we have to consider, but Federation as compared with a disruption of the Empire. We need not here repeat our reasons for believing one or other of these measures to be inevitable; we think that very few will dispute the point. In fact, as Lord Bury has well pointed out in the concluding chapter of his *Exodus of the Western Nations*, the separation is already, *de facto*, concluded. We are happy, however, to be able to add that, as it has not been concluded by law, there is yet time to retrace unfortunate

steps, and re-establish the union on a new and lasting basis.

To arrive at a fair conclusion on the relative merits of Federation and separation, it is necessary to survey the question from an English and a Colonial standpoint, as advantages to one of these parties might be obtained at the cost of disadvantages to the other. We shall first consider the colonial side of the case, and in so doing shall confine our observations to a comparison of the increased responsibilities which either independence or Federation would necessarily involve, and eschew, as far as possible, any expression of opinion on details, as a knowledge of the local affairs of each Colony would be requisite to the formation of a correct judgment on them.

The spectacle of Colonies being informed that they can become independent at pleasure, and yet refusing the boon, is almost unique in the history of the world. It is undoubtedly due to the fact that the governmental, social, and commercial peculiarities of England, for the last fifty years, have been such as have led her to confer on the Colonies an amount of freedom from control on the part of the supreme Government almost unexampled; and, as is now appearing, inconsistent with permanent union. A desire to escape from oppression and tyranny on the part of the parent state, is the motive which has usually led colonies to desire nationality. But, in the present instance, this motive has no existence. No colonist even attempts to charge the Fatherland with any act of oppression. For any local evils the Colonies have only themselves to blame, seeing that their local independence is much greater than that of the States of the American Union, and for the same reason the remedy for any evils which may exist is in their own hands. The only charge which is ever made against the connection with England



is that by it they may be involved in wars in which they have no interest; but, as it certainly preserves them from other wars in which they would have a very great interest—as we shall prove hereafter—we have no hesitation in saying that the Colonies have no reason to desire independence as a means of escape from experienced evils,—indeed, we feel confident that ninety-nine per cent. of our fellow-colonists are of the same opinion.

It is possible, however, that some of them may reply that they would cease to be of this opinion if the terms of union were modified according to the basis which we have sketched for a Federation of the Empire, as that measure would interfere with their local independence, and impose on them burdens from which they are now free. We must again remind such parties that unmixed good is to be found nowhere upon earth, and that the loftiest political height which we ever can reach is that state in which the good most preponderates over the evil. Separation would certainly secure local independence from the danger of infringement to which it might be exposed under Federation; but for this security a very heavy price would have to be paid, in the shape of a sacrifice of all the benefits of connection; and before consenting to its payment, it is at least necessary to be sure that the apprehended danger to local independence is a reality.

There seems to us to be no reasonable ground for such apprehension. The union of the Empire would be federal in all its characteristics. Under it certain prerogatives would be granted to each member of the Federation, and would be much more firmly secured than are those enjoyed by the Colonies at the present day, as they would have representatives in the Federal Legislature ready to repel any attempt to infringe them, whilst to-day the

Imperial Parliament is legally supreme, and the Colonies are absolutely unrepresented in it. Federation would provide the legal security against aggression which is now wanting. As to the prerogatives to be possessed by the Colonial Governments, the only points in which any curtailment of those now enjoyed would be needed are the control of local armaments, but lately *forced* upon them, and the imposition of a *maximum* rate of customs, with an inhibition to alter their tariffs save at each decennial adjustment of the assessment of the Empire. It is plain that the former of these curtailments could not, in any way, interfere with local independence, and that the latter would still leave each of the great divisions of the Empire free to arrange its own commercial policy—an amount of independence far in excess of that enjoyed by the States of the American Union. Yet the guarantees against federal oppression would not end here. An unjust distribution of the burdens of taxation, either upon sections or classes, is the form most frequently assumed by the legal injustice in which oppression is usually veiled under representative government. The evil is almost always irremediable when the control of the legislature has been acquired by any class or section. But, in the present instance, a most effective security against any such legislative tyranny would form part of the basis of Federation. Neither in the amount of taxation, nor in the manner of raising it, could the Federal Legislature favour any one member, section, or class of the Federation at the expense of another, even should it desire to do so. The liability of each member would be distinctly defined; hence none could have imposed on it a sum above its fair share. The choice of the ways and means of raising it would be in the hands of the local Governments; hence no form of local industry in one section could be sacrificed to benefit a different interest in

another. Property being thus guarded against injustice, no other form of federal oppression need be feared by any Colony, since the British Islands, if not all parts of the Empire, would be equally interested in opposing it. In considering this question, an inhabitant of the Colonies must remember that he would, under Federation, occupy a position altogether different from that which he holds as a colonist. He and his fellow-countrymen in the British Islands would stand on exactly the same footing—perfect equality would be established between them. And instead of the whole force of the United Kingdom being brought to the aid of the Federal Government, as was formerly the case, its inhabitants would have a common interest with those of the Colonies in forcing the Federal Government to keep within its constitutional limits. This tendency on their part, would, moreover, increase with the growth of colonial representation, with which would also increase the power of the Colonies to repel any infringement of their rights. It is agreed that the ‘composite state system,’ or that in which the federal authority acts directly on the inhabitants of the Federation, and not on the local Governments, is the only form of federal government which possesses the elements of stability. It is that which is established in Canada and in the States. Yet it is very improbable that, if Canada were to become independent, the prerogatives of the local Governments would be increased at the expense of those appertaining to the Government of the Dominion; and it is certain that no Canadian, West Indian, or Australasian would oppose annexation on the ground that the American constitution, legally administered, fails to grant a sufficient share of local independence to the States. Yet local independence under the Canadian form of Federation is less than that existing in the States, and that existing in the States is less than that

which would exist under the proposed terms of union. If local independence would be safe in the former cases, surely it would be safe in the latter, when special provision would be made against almost the only form of federal oppression which the Colonies would have any reason to fear from English selfishness or sectionalism. The fact is that, so long as these terms were observed, the amount of local independence would be much in excess of that ever enjoyed under any composite state government. It is impossible to provide constitutional securities against dangers arising from violations of the law; but the circumstances of the British Empire are such that any attempt to destroy local independence in it would be an absurdity too great to be entertained. The fact of its being physically impossible for any one legislature to attend to all the concerns of the Empire would alone form a strong guarantee against any illegal attempt being made to render the Federal Government, or the British Islands, absolute; though we think that few colonists would refuse to take the plighted faith of the 'old country' for this and a great deal more also. As to legal securities, we have seen that they would be much greater than could otherwise be attained.

The colonists, however, may reply that, even admitting local independence to be safe under Federation, a further objection to it is to be found in the increased taxation which it would induce. The objection is of a really practical character; but the mere fact that such an increase would follow on Federation does not carry with it a condemnation of the scheme. Independence would likewise induce increased expenditure and taxation, as the Colonies would then be forced to supply the armaments needed to maintain order against internal, and freedom against foreign, foes. Increased taxation being thus inevitable, they must, to judge fairly, compare the

increase which Federation and separation would each induce. We have no doubt of being able to satisfy any impartial inquirer that, in such a comparison, the balance would be in favour of Federation.

We have already seen that in the case of Ontario the probable increase would be only 7*s.* 9*d.* per head, and this although we omitted to take the wealth of any other part of the Empire than those of it and of the United Kingdom into account in estimating the assessment, and stated that the wealth of that province is indisputably much greater, proportionately, than that of any other part of British America. Allowing for these circumstances, there can be little chance of the rate for any other of the Colonies proving to be in excess of that for Ontario. We believe that, on the contrary, many of them would not have to pay nearly so much, but are content to let this pass, and, assuming 7*s.* 9*d.* per head as the average amount of federal taxation to which colonists would be liable, to compare it with the probable increase which would be induced by separation. Independence would bring to each Colony fresh charges, in the shape of expenditure necessary to maintain an army and navy, and diplomatic relations with the rest of the world. No nation has, in time of peace, ever reduced these charges to such a low point as have the United States. We may therefore fairly conclude that the Colonies could not escape at least as high a proportion of taxation for these purposes as the States have to bear.

According to the report of the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury for the year 1870, the expenditure of the War Department in the year ending June 30, 1870, was 57,655,675 dollars; that of the Navy Department 21,780,229 dollars; and that of the Diplomatic Service 1,490,776 dollars. We have here a total of 80,926,681 dollars, which sum divided by 38,555,000, the population

of the States in the same year, gives two dollars and ten cents, or 8*s.* 9*d.* sterling per head—an expenditure about 1*s.* per head greater than that which Federation would bring to Ontario. It is true that since the above year a reduction of expenditure has been effected by cutting down the army; but even after this the decrease is very slight. The ‘appropriations,’ or sums voted, for the financial year ending June 30, 1872, were 38,727,172 dollars for the army; 21,122,657 dollars for the Navy Department, and 1,529,134 for the Diplomatic Service, being a total of 61,378,963 dollars, or 6*s.* 7½*d.* per head. And the estimates for 1873 were 52,224,033 dollars for war, 20,586,498 for the navy, and 1,208,634 for diplomacy, making a total of 74,019,165 dollars, or 8*s.* sterling per head.

Hence it appears that, even if the emancipated Colonies could reduce their military, naval, and diplomatic expenditure to the same rate per head as that of the United States, they would have to pay, according to the returns of 1870, about 1*s.* per head more than the increase which would be induced by Federation; according to the appropriations for 1872, 1*s.* 1½*d.* less, and according to the estimates for 1873 about 3*d.* more. But it is perfectly certain that even if the lowest rate of expenditure should suffice for the States, it would not prove sufficient to keep on foot anything approaching to a force adequate to guard effectually the liberties of the new nationalities. Supplying troops to cost as much in the Colonies as they do in the States, which it is certain that they would, it is clear that the Colonies could, at the States’ rate of expenditure per head, raise only a force bearing the same proportion to the population which the American army bears to that of the Union. The population of the States in 1870 was 38,555,000; their army at the same time numbered 37,383 men, or one for every 1031 of the population.

Taking it, for the sake of round numbers, at one in 1,000, we find that the States' rate of expenditure would enable Canada, with a population slightly under 4,000,000, to raise at most an army of 4,000 men; Australasia, with a population under 2,000,000, one of not more than 2,000 men; the West Indies, with about 1,100,000, a regiment of 1,100 men; and South Africa, with 427,000 inhabitants, less than half a regiment. We do not think that even Canadian or Australasian Joseph Humes would dare to propose smaller standing armies than these, or fleets less than a tenth and twentieth part that of the States, if they had any intention whatever of eschewing a policy of non-resistance, or making any effort at all in defence of their national and political freedom. But to maintain even forces such as these would require an expenditure one-seventh greater than that which we have seen to be the heaviest rate of contribution likely to be induced by Federation.

This single fact is of course sufficient to prove that, in the matter of taxation, the balance is in favour of Federation and against independence. But this is not all. When examining the probable increase of taxation which would be induced by Federation, we said that we would thereafter show how the apparent increase of 7*s.* 9*d.* per head, would be largely reduced through the transfer of certain charges, now borne by the Colonial Governments, to the Federal exchequer. The Federal Government would have exclusive control of armaments; consequently colonial local revenues would be relieved from all charges for militia, volunteers, or naval forces. It would derive a revenue from the Colonies, and would have to defray the cost of its collection; and if the management of the Post Office should form one of its duties, it would have to meet all the charges of the packet service. In the financial year ending June 30, 1870, Canada expended

1,245,972 dollars on militia and defence, 343,308 dollars on ocean and river steam service, and 505,109 dollars in the collection of customs. These items amount collectively to 2,094,389 dollars; but, as about half the customs revenue would have sufficed to meet the charges of the Federal revenue, we deduct 252,554 dollars, being half the cost of their collection. This leaves a total of 1,841,834 dollars, or 380,544*l.* sterling, of annual expenditure from which Canada would be relieved by Federation. This sum, distributed over a population of 3,484,924, being that of the Dominion according to the census of 1871, would be equal to a reduction of about 2*s.* 7*d.* per head, and would bring down the increased taxation consequent on Federation from 7*s.* 9*d.* per head to about 5*s.* 2*d.* As we are not in possession of details of the expenditure of other Colonies on these services, we cannot say to what sum the saving would elsewhere amount. It is pretty certain, however, that the reduction consequent on the transfer of these items from the Colonial to the Federal Government, would tend to reduce the increase of taxation very considerably everywhere; nor can it be said that the transfer of these items would increase the Federal expenditure proportionately, so that the saving would not be real. We have, in calculating the probable amount of Federal expenditure, allowed 2,000,000*l.* to meet such increase as might result from the transfer of these items. The saving to the Colonies would consist in the fact that whilst they are now liable for the whole of these charges, they would, under Federation, be liable only for their proportion of them.

Savings on these items would be indubitable, and could scarcely fail to reduce the increase of taxation to about one-half that which would follow on independence with an expenditure at the same rate as that of the States. But it is by no means impossible that a still further reduc-



tion might be made. Should the Colonies consent to bear equal taxation with England for Federal expenditure, the Fatherland, we presume, would be inclined to help to render their burden as light as possible. This we think that she might do by simply lending them her name. Colonial debts generally bear 6 per cent. interest; none less than 5, save when guaranteed. England can borrow at 3 per cent., or, to be within the mark, we will say  $3\frac{1}{2}$ . Of course the Federal Government would be able to do the same. Were it to borrow money sufficient to discharge the colonial debts, pay them, and lend the money to the Colonies at the reduced rate of interest, the saving would, in some cases, not only suffice to pay the whole contribution to the Federal revenue, but also leave a handsome balance behind. Mr. Baxter, we have seen, estimates the debts of the Australasian Colonies at 35,744,000*l*. Much the greater part of it bears interest at 6 per cent. A saving of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on this rate would aggregate 893,600*l*. sterling per annum, being about 9*s*. per head, or far above the entire sum for which they would be liable to the Federal revenue. In the case of Canada there is a debt of 31,824,000 dollars, bearing interest at 5 per cent., payable in London; another of 34,289,000 dollars, at 6 per cent., also payable in London, and 7,479,300 dollars, at 6 per cent., payable in Canada. On the first of these debts a saving of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. would amount to 477,360 dollars; on the second, a saving of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. to 857,225 dollars; and on the third, a saving at the same rate, to 186,982 dollars, being a total saving of 1,521,567 dollars, or 314,373*l*. sterling, or about 1*s*. 9*d*. per head on the population of the Dominion, according to the census of 1871, which, deducted from 5*s*. 2*d*. per head—the rate to which we have seen that the increase would be reduced by the transfer of expenditure on militia, &c.—would reduce the increased taxation on Canada to about 3*s*. 5*d*. per head. In the

West Indies, owing to the small amount of the debts and the fact that many of them are already guaranteed, the saving would be small. But in South Africa, where, in 1868, the debt of Natal was 263,000*l.* at 6 per cent. ; that of the Cape 846,250*l.* at the same rate, and 255,400*l.* at 5 per cent., the saving would amount to 6,575*l.* for Natal, and 24,987*l.* for the Cape, or almost 1*s.* 6*d.* per head on their population of 425,476, as it was stated in the same year. Thus it appears that, if this measure could be adopted, the savings in local expenditure consequent on Federation would reduce the increase of taxation very largely in South Africa, to a very insignificant sum in British America, and cause, not an increase, but a decline of taxation in Australasia ; and that, leaving the payment of debts out of sight, the sure and certain reduction in local expenditure from the transfer of certain charges to the Federal Government, would render the balance of cheapness enormously in favour of Federation against independence, since we have seen that in the case of British America, the former would *at the worst* induce an increased taxation of only 5*s.* 2*d.* per head, and the latter one of 8*s.* 9*d.* So far as taxation is concerned, there can be no doubt that there is an overwhelming case in favour of Federation.<sup>1</sup>

But the relative amount of taxation is only one point in the comparison : the returns to be received in exchange for taxation are quite as important considerations as the sums which may have to be paid. Supposing the Colonies to be independent, and taxing themselves 8*s.* 9*d.* per head for armaments, &c., would this expenditure secure order against internal, and freedom against external, foes as effectually as would the lesser expenditure under Federation? We have no hesitation in saying that in the case of some of the Colonies a reign of terror might fairly be

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix.

expected to follow on separation; that in others it is certain that order and peace could not be secured; that, even in the countries best adapted for independence, their attainment would be at least doubtful; and that in none could there be gained, by any expenditure whatever, as good security for peace and prosperity as is now afforded by the alliance with the Fatherland.

The Colonies in which we should expect a reign of terror to follow on separation are the West Indies. Whatever may be the case in other Colonies, it is clear that these, at all events, are not fitted for independence. Their population consists of a minority of wealth and intelligence and of a majority of poverty and savage ignorance. Even the minority is not of a homogeneous character, and would not be likely to be able to agree on the form of government to be established, to say nothing of working it. Recent events have proved that the hostility of the black population to the whites is unabated by over thirty years of freedom, and that it is impracticable to work a representative government for local purposes. What, then, would ensue when, in addition to the task of local government, these Colonies had also thrown upon them the responsibilities of nationality? Might we not fairly expect to see the history of St. Domingo repeated, unless the States, or some other power, should step into the position from which England had shrunk?

In South Africa the danger of internal dissension would not be so great as in the West Indies; but even there materials for strife are not wanting. We have a population consisting of British, Dutch, German, and native races, differing in antecedents, manners, and language. Some of the natives are warlike, and have already given serious trouble to the colonists. Is it improbable that they might seize the opportunity afforded by the colonists

being left alone to assail them; or that a well-organised attack might bring much mischief and misery on the colonists? Or, supposing this danger surmounted, is it likely that the different elements of the population could combine harmoniously to work a national government such as would be required? or is it at all unlikely that some one of the political, or national, parties which would be engendered might look for aid to the parent stock in Europe and receive it?

In the case of Australasia the difficulties in the way of the establishment and working of an efficient Government are much less than in the previous instances; indeed, it may be said that there is a fair prospect of its being able to discharge its duties to the extent of maintaining order within. The population is almost entirely British in race, and intelligent in character. There are no neighbours either to foment internal disputes, or to stand waiting for a chance to destroy the new-born state. On the whole we are of opinion that Australasia constitutes the group of Colonies best fitted for independence. Yet it would be well for the inhabitants to remember that party spirit amongst them has run to a very high point, and that self-government has been by no means an unmixed success in each of the provinces, before making up their minds that they could all unite under one Government, and work together harmoniously in a wider field of action than the smaller one, which seems to tax their energies pretty severely at present.

Passing over the Pacific we reach British America, now united under one government from Halifax to Vancouver. The machinery of a national government is here already in existence, and England has retired as far from interference as is possible without utterly severing the connection. Nevertheless, we should not expect to see independence succeeded by a harmonious political

system. There would be several incongruous elements at work. The population consists of two races, professing two religions, each of which differences has formed the basis of fierce party disputes. Not long since, parties in Canada were for several years almost identical with sectional divisions; and it was simply the deadlock thus induced that led to a coalition which alone rendered possible the union of the provinces. Nor has that event destroyed sectionalism. The maritime provinces are still hostile to the union, and the same differences of race and religion which induced previous quarrels between Ontario and Quebec, are still in existence, and likely to produce similar results in future. Then the provinces on the Atlantic, in the north-west, and on the Pacific, are separated by immense tracts of wilderness. And all are close on the frontier of a subtle and ambitious neighbour, ready to seize any chance of extending its territory, and having in each of its citizens, when in contact with a foreigner, a political missionary, to proclaim its unexampled and unapproachable glories, and to promise a share in them to all who will enter into the 'glorious Union.' It is surely improbable, when sectionalism has been so strong under the colonial *régime* that extremists on one side have talked of 'looking to France,' and, on the other, of 'looking to Washington,' that it would disappear in the face of the new and more exciting controversies which would be induced by independence, or that a discontented province could resist the enticements of the syren deceiver. Yet, if either of these improbabilities should fail to occur, Canadian independence would soon cease to exist.

It may be inquired, however, what reason there can be to expect difficulties in the internal government of the emancipated Colonies when they are already in some cases in the full enjoyment of local self-government.

We reply that the influence of the Imperial Governor is in no case a dead letter, but frequently proves of the utmost importance in restraining the violence of local partyism; that the moral weight of English opinion, public and governmental, the fact that British troops are—or were formerly—at hand to enforce order, and the knowledge that the Imperial Parliament possesses the power to legislate for the Colonies, and in cases of extremity will not fail to do so, tends to keep all the elements of strife quiet. On the other hand, were all these influences withdrawn, every man would seek to do ‘that which was right in his own eyes;’ and when, even in presence of these influences, we have seen a sectional deadlock in Canada, two or three ministries in a session in Australia, and the deliberate abandonment of self-government in Jamaica, we might expect to see much more disastrous events in their absence.

The task of maintaining order within would, however, be only one part of the work devolving on the new nationalities. They would also have to maintain their national independence and political freedom against foreigners. It will, we doubt not, be replied by many parties in both the United Kingdom and the Colonies, that the task would be an easy one, as the only cause which could lead to these countries being involved in war is to be found in their connection with England. But this conclusion is most glaringly shortsighted. Its fallacy has been well exposed by Mr. Adderley, whose arguments are the more worthy of the attention of colonists from the fact that he is by no means a member of the emancipationist school. In his letter to Mr. Disraeli on ‘The Present Relations of England and her Colonies’ [1862], he asks very pertinently, ‘Does England now draw her Colonies, or her Colonies draw her, most into war? If England were a foreign power to them, in place

of being their shield against the interference of all foreign powers, they would soon learn how they might be more involved in war. They have, on the other hand, themselves the chief influence in Imperial implications in war. It is their being spread over all the world which brings us in contact at so many points with the sensibilities, jealousies, and cupidities of other nations, and makes war so wide a concern to us. Though the Irish temperament enters into but one-third of our national composition, we cannot help our skirts of empire being spread about the earth on which anyone may tread his challenge. What brought us to the verge of hostilities on the Maine boundary, or, more lately, on the Musquito shore, or at St. Juan's, or about the Newfoundland fisheries; or why are we now (1862) sending troops to Canada?'

We think everybody must admit that Mr. Adderley's position is very strong; and that English connection tends to avert war from the Colonies at least as much as to induce it. And in regard more particularly to Canada, the same idea was well put by Lord Palmerston, when, in his usual style of strong common sense, he said:—

'Suppose these provinces separated from this country—suppose them erected into a monarchy, a republic, or any other form of government. Are there not motives that might lead a strong neighbour to pick a quarrel with that smaller state, with a view to its annexation? (Hear, hear.) Is there nothing like territorial ambition pervading the policy of great military states? The example of the world should teach us that, as far as the danger of invasion and annexation is concerned, that danger would be increased to Canada by a separation from Great Britain, and when she is deprived of the protection that the military power and resources of this country may afford.' (Cheers.)

These arguments are unanswerable. It is impossible to consider them fairly and refuse to acknowledge that Lord Palmerston and Mr. Adderley have said quite enough to silence all colonial grumblers who refuse to see anything else than the single fact that they may be involved in war by a quarrel peculiar to England, and who seem to think that, once separated from her, a millennium of peace would dawn on them. It may be true that connection with an Empire having ramifications all over the world does tend to bring the Colonies into contact with powers to which they might, perhaps, otherwise be strangers, and thus escape any chance of collision with them. But, independent of the difficulty of attaining such isolation, and the disadvantages which could not fail to result therefrom, it must be remembered that foreigners are much more likely to defer to a mighty Empire than to a weak nationality; that, even granting the connection with England to bring to the Colonies a slightly increased risk of war, the aid of her fleets and armies brings them, surely and simultaneously, a great increase of the prospect of victory in the strife; that the danger of defeat is the only effectual preventive of aggression on the part of an ambitious power, and that separation would certainly increase the risk of aggression, as all the motives to induce it would remain undiminished, whilst the chances of success against a small nationality being enormously in excess of those against a mighty empire, the deterrent causes would be lessened. The certain increase in diplomatic influence and martial resources may thus be taken as balancing the very doubtful increase in the risk of war. For although the gain from victory in war may not always compensate for the loss of peace, defeat, such as that to which the Colonies would be exposed, would almost surely place them under the rule of a foreign state, and that means conquest and ruin,



which they should run any risk of war and spill their last drop of blood to avert.

There is, however, another point in connection with this part of our subject which must not be forgotten. Were the Colonies independent nations, it is pretty certain that the form of government adopted in nearly all cases would be democratic; since it is almost that already, and the tide has not yet turned sufficiently against it to enable them to get rid of its essential characteristic—a suffrage at once equal, and in effect almost universal. The chief increase of prerogatives which would accrue to the new Governments would be the right of making peace and war, and of controlling their own diplomacy. But this task is precisely that which a democracy is least capable of accomplishing. ‘As for myself,’ says De Tocqueville, ‘I have no hesitation in avowing my conviction that it is most especially in the conduct of foreign relations that democratic governments appear to me to be most decidedly inferior to governments carried on upon different principles. Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which a democracy possesses; and they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those qualities in which it is deficient. . . . A democracy is unable to regulate the details of an important undertaking, to persevere in a design, and to work out its execution in the presence of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy, and will not wait their consequences with patience. These are qualities which more especially belong to an individual or an aristocracy; and they are precisely the means by which an individual people attains a predominant position.’ The name of De Tocqueville may alone almost suffice to command assent to any of his unfavourable theories regarding the workings of democracy, for the event has nearly always justified them; and, at all events,

the Colonies should be careful before assuming these powers, which they would be least fitted to wield, when a failure to wield them aright might endanger both their national and political freedom.

These several considerations should, we think, convince any candid inquirer that the Colonies would be in at least as much danger of being involved in war if independent as if united to England, and this with much less power to resist aggression : which brings us back to the question of their ability to maintain their newly-acquired independence.

In the case of the West Indies and in that of South Africa, it must, we think, be admitted that such ability does not exist. The islands could be defended only by a power having the control of the sea, which they certainly could not have ; and South Africa would be utterly unable to place in line a force sufficient to resist successfully half a division of a European army.

It is more difficult to speak confidently of the prospects of Australasia than of those of the above countries. The population is homogeneous, and the country is isolated and out of the way of enemies, excepting the French settlement in New Caledonia, an exception, however, worthy of attention. It is a case in which a considerable amount of local knowledge is needed to authorise the utterance of any very decided opinion. Still the broad facts remain clear to all, that the population would be less than 2,000,000 ; that a part of it would be separated by the ocean from the centre of power and the seat of government, and the difficulty of defence thereby increased ; that, the greater part of the coast-line being uncolonised, it presents a tempting opportunity for any ambitious power to establish itself, without direct aggression, on the territories of the new nationality ; that, this once done, independence would be in a constant state of

peril; that to resist any military nation thus established would, with Australasian resources, be an impossibility; and that the circumstances of the country are such as would be likely to lead an ambitious potentate, or greedy people, to turn towards it as a most valuable prize. It may be, however, that Australasians would think more confidently than an outsider of their ability to maintain their independence; but we cannot help advising them to 'take counsel whether they be able with ten thousand to meet him who cometh against them with twenty.'

There remains the case of British America. That country has the advantage of possessing a population more than double that of Australasia; but it is of a less homogeneous character, and alongside the frontier lies a mighty country whose inhabitants every day declare, until by the sheer force of repetition they have come to believe, that it is their 'manifest destiny' to unite the whole of the North American continent under their sway. Before Canada can become independent, she must be able to present to the United States a front sufficiently strong to convince them that any attempt at conquest could result only in defeat.

It is possible that some English readers may deny the correctness of the preceding proposition, and affirm that were Canada separated from England, the States would cease to have any feeling against it, and that the interests and feelings of the two nations would become so identified that those interests and feelings would suffice to render war between them next to an impossibility. To this rehash of the Peace Society's twaddle we would reply by pointing to the Americans themselves—united by ramifications of commerce extending into every hole and corner of the land—united by the still stronger ties arising from that community of feeling produced by a common nationality, and the recollection of perils, difficulties, and

achievements shared in common, and whose energies had been directed almost entirely to pacific pursuits. If ever a people were interested in remaining at peace, and favourably situated for so doing, it was this. Yet we have seen them bursting these ties, and rushing mutually to arms, with an amount of hatred and ferocity almost unexampled. Is it possible that Canada and the States ever can feel as many, or as strong, inducements to maintain peace with one another as those which failed to preserve it in the Union? They form two separate nations. They inherit traditions of each other rather hostile than pacific. The States, as we see by their press, continue to view it as Canada's destiny to be absorbed by them. They now contain thousands of men experienced in arms. In face of all these facts, favourable to peace in one case, and unfavourable in the other, can we hope that, if separated from England, pacific interests would suffice to secure the new nation from being assailed by its neighbour?

Some obstinate optimists may, perhaps, reply in the affirmative, on the ground that the States would gain nothing by the annexation of Canada. The fact that the States are of a different opinion is a sufficient refutation of this theory, for men's actions are governed not by their actual, but by their supposed, interests. That the States believe the annexation of Canada likely to conduce to their benefit, and that they ardently desire it, has been proved decisively during the last six years. The reciprocity treaty, extolled as a glorious triumph of modern enlightenment, has been repealed; and this avowedly in the hope that the commercial distress thereby induced might lead Canada to seek a remedy in annexation. A crowd of British traitors have been allowed to form an immense organization throughout the length and breadth of the Union, and actually to make two hostile incursions into

Canada, without a single attempt being made by the Government to hinder them, or anything more than one voice in a thousand being raised in condemnation of their nefarious ruffianism. In repelling these raids many Canadians lost their lives; many more were disabled; heavy expenses were incurred, and commerce suffered severely. Yet, when England actually ventured to suggest, at the conference of 1871, that some reparation was due for these wrongs, an unmistakably clear refusal was given and accepted. Reparation was demanded for damages inflicted on American commerce by a ship which *escaped* from an English harbour, but was refused for those inflicted by a permanent organization, existing in the full light of day, and *proclaiming* its purpose to be the waging of war against a country with which the United States were at peace. And this in face of the fact that when, in 1864, a band of about fifty Southerners made a rush from Canada on the States, not only was it demanded that the men should be given up, but when, through a legal technicality, they escaped this fate, a howl of rage was heard all over the North; and not only had Canada to make reparation in hard cash for the injuries done, but to line the frontier with her volunteers to render impossible a repetition of the offence. Canada asked England to seek much less reparation and security than in a similar case she had been instructed to yield, and had yielded, to the States; but even this was distinctly refused, and Canada lives to-day not knowing when a third Fenian raid may bring death and destruction on her borders, those who are to be such loving neighbours in the future not so much as lifting a finger to avert it, and the vast majority of the American people bidding Fenianism go on and prosper.

If these facts be not enough to foreshadow pretty distinctly the feelings with which the States are likely to

regard Canada as an independent nation, we can go a little further. In face of a treaty which distinctly declared that they should not fish within three miles of any bay, creek, or headland, they asserted their right to fish *in* any bay provided it were more than six miles wide. The point, as usual, was yielded to them, and, as usual, they took something more and fished within three miles of the shore. Canada thereupon set to work to enforce the observance of the treaty, *according to the American interpretation*. Forthwith it appeared that the rights and dignities of the States were being shamefully violated, and a demand was made not only of free entrance to the great marine treasures of the maritime provinces, but for the 'free navigation of the St. Lawrence,' and this in face of the facts that American vessels were allowed to use the canals on the same terms as Canadian, and that Canadian vessels were not only excluded from American rivers and canals, but were not allowed to carry a cargo from one American lakeport to another. These proceedings certainly augur a most friendly disposition on the part of the States, and a disposition to let Canada go on her own way peaceably!

It is, moreover, altogether absurd to allege that the States would have no motive to lead them to desire the annexation of British America after it had been separated from England. There are other advantages to be gained by its annexation besides expelling England from the North American continent, and these are of no insignificant character. To annex British America would remove the only possible chance of any power finding a base of operations against the States' northern frontier, seeing that it would then stretch to the Arctic Ocean. This would be no small matter, for though they would not fear Canada as a foe, they might fear her as the ally of another power. With Canada in the Union they would

constitute the mightiest power in the world, and one against which it would be almost impossible for a foe to find a basis of operations. Besides this the expenditure of the Federal Government, including the sums spent in the redemption of the debt, is about ten dollars per head of the population, and without them would be about eight. Let British America be annexed, and its population taxed at the same rate, and the taxation would yield thirty-two millions of dollars in the one case, or forty millions in the other. It is certain, however, that the cost of its government to the States would not be over ten millions at the utmost; leaving a balance of from twenty-two to thirty millions of dollars, which would be so much clear gain to the Federal exchequer. These facts constitute pretty strong motives to lead the States to desire Canadian annexation; and if any other were wanting it would be found in their belief in the 'manifest destiny.' This belief has become so deeply imbedded in the heart of almost every American, that a conviction of the impossibility of realising it is the only thing which will hinder the nation from pursuing it. The late war was less against secession than to preserve the Union for the 'manifest destiny' to which it was believed to be tending. That the passion still burns as brightly as ever is demonstrated by the purchase of that lump of ice and snow known as Alaska, or Russian America, and by the efforts made by a large party in 1871 to carry the San Domingo scheme. Let Canada put herself in a position which would enable the Americans to carry out this leading idea of their political life, and she will not have long to wait for its accomplishment, even if there were no other motive to induce them to desire her annexation.

It is possible, however, that some may be found who will say that Canada could repel an invasion from the States and maintain her independence single-handed.

For such we have a short answer. The Southerners were about twice as numerous as Canadians would be. They were animated by a unity of sentiment which the latter will never feel whilst Canada is inhabited by two races, and by a patriotism which it would require years of nationality to engender in them for Canada separated from the old flag. They were led by men of genius, whom it is not probable that Canada could rival. They inhabited a country far more defensible than Canada, and yet they were conquered. How could Canadians succeed against the whole Union, when the Southerners, under so much more favourable circumstances, failed against half of it? Their fate is proof sufficient that, so long as the States remain united, a British American nationality is impossible, seeing its existence would depend on their forbearance. That forbearance there seems no reason to expect would be exercised; and, even if there were, we do not think that Canadians would choose to hold their independence on sufferance.

It is highly probable that, whilst perusing the above, some of our readers may have mentally inquired, Why, then, should not Canada solve all difficulties in her case by becoming annexed to the States? The answer is to be found in the fact that the States are labouring under such serious financial, political, and sectional difficulties that for Canada to adopt annexation would be simply equivalent to a merchant embarking his all in a crazy craft.

The financial history of the Union since the conclusion of the war has proved decisively that the expenses of the Federal Government cannot be reduced below 300,000,000 dollars, and that if the present policy of striving to discharge the debt as soon as possible should be adhered to, the annual expenditure must reach close on 400,000,000 dollars. The population of Canada and the States is



about 42,000,000. Annexation would, consequently, subject Canadians to taxation at the rate of about seven dollars per head per annum under the former rate of taxation, or about nine and a-half dollars under the latter. It is *possible* that the increase of taxation might not amount to these sums. But, granting that annexation would induce a saving in the local expenditure of the provinces; that no counterbalancing increase would be induced by the addition of Canada to the Union; that Canadians would consume less dutiable goods than Americans, and consequently would have less taxation to endure, the fact remains that an increase of only *one-half* of the lowest of the above rates of taxation would be almost *quadruple* that which we have seen might be expected to result from Federation.

The political system established in the States is producing most deplorable misgovernment, and promises to induce still worse results. Lord Macaulay said, in his letter to Mr. Randall, on that gentleman sending him a copy of his *Life of Jefferson*: 'I have long been convinced that a system of unmixed democracy must, in the end, destroy either liberty, or civilization, or both.' It seems probable that in the States it will lead to one of these goals, and by a much quicker route than that which Macaulay had in view. Unmixed democracy has there led to the country falling under the rule of an aristocracy of demagogues, consisting of the members of the several partisan conventions existing in every state, county, and township in the Union. Their sway is so absolute that without an endorsement from them no man need ever think of even offering himself to the electors as a candidate for any public position whatsoever; and they exact such disgraceful conditions in return for a 'nomination' that no honourable man will comply with them. Their rule has culminated in a partisan strife so furious, and a

system of corruption so widespread, that we find some of the foremost men in America seriously alarmed at the prospects of their country. Mr. Greeley admits that—‘By means of “log-rolling,” American statute-books are filled with acts which subserve no end but to fill the pockets of the few at the expense of the interests, or the rights, of the many.’<sup>1</sup> Mr. Fisher confesses that—‘A degree of corruption prevails disgraceful to the country and the age. Bribery is almost acknowledged as a part of legislation, whilst dishonest jobs and contracts so abound that they are regarded as things of course.’<sup>2</sup> And Mr. Seaman alleges that—‘Unless some remedy can be devised to correct the corrupt practices and evils which have grown up under our system of party organisations, nominating conventions and caucuses, and electing public officers, *there is great danger of such widespread corruption and distrust of all public officers and of legislation and the administration of law, that we shall sink into anarchy and a chronic state of revolution and civil war—as Mexico has done.*’<sup>3</sup>

It is now six years since the civil war was ended, but it is evident that the ‘Reconstruction of the Union’ is still incomplete. The heroes of the south are the traitors of the north, and *vice versâ*. In the Southern legislatures the majority of the members generally consists of freedmen, ignorant of the three R’s, and voting at the dictation of northern ‘carpet-baggers.’ Such is the state of feeling of the two sections towards each other that Congress in 1871 passed an act authorising the President to establish martial law in the Southern States, and that he has seen fit partially to exercise the power. For our

<sup>1</sup> *The American Conflict*, pp. 209, 210.

<sup>2</sup> *Trial of the Constitution*, p. 346.

<sup>3</sup> *The American System of Government*, p. 66.

purpose we need not attempt to prove that this act was needed; we only refer to it as proof positive of the enmity existing between the two sections. But still more significant is the following confession in the report of the Secretary of War, presented to Congress on its meeting in December 1871. He says: 'It has been absolutely necessary to retain about one-sixth of the army in those States of the south, east of the Mississippi, which were engaged in the war of the rebellion. Indisputable evidence establishes the fact, which is proven too by the experience of numerous sufferers, that an armed rebellion of regular organisation and strength now exists in parts of those States, and, so long as it exists, so long will it be necessary to aid the civil authorities with the armed force of the nation in putting down this second rebellion and in bringing its leaders to speedy punishment.'

We might go on to show that the love of wealth and physical enjoyment has obtained such mastery of the American mind as to sap the foundations of commercial morality and lead to the establishment of a system of cheating in trade, and to weaken the influence of the holiest feelings of our nature, by triumphing even over maternal love. But here we forbear. Sufficient evidence is probably to be found in the facts and confessions to which we have referred to prove that for Canada to adopt annexation would be nothing short of madness. The States are, in fact, in the stage of political development described by Washington in that portion of his farewell address where, after warning them that 'the alternate dominion of one faction over another is itself a most horrid despotism,' he goes on to say: 'But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries which result gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute power of a single individual; and sooner or

later the chief of some prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this despotism to the purposes of his own elevation on the ruins of public liberty.' The disruptive tendencies at present in force tend very much to increase this danger, and the annexation of Canada would aggravate rather than improve the situation. The presence of a possible foe on the northern frontier serves, more than anything else, to make the different sections, parties, and interests in the Union 'bear and forbear' towards one another. That danger once removed, they would feel free to give vent to their feelings. And just as the conquest of Canada in 1760 acted as the chief cause of the destruction of the connection between the Thirteen Colonies and England, by destroying the most powerful motive for its conservation, and leaving contrary influences free to act unchecked, so would its annexation act on the Union a century later. Annexation involves an instant realization of many of the prospective evils of independence.

We do not affect to despise the benefits of nationality. Under any other circumstances than the present for Colonies to refuse independence would be sheer madness; and even British colonists cannot forget that until a country has become a nation, or part of one, and has control of its own diplomacy, army, and navy, and is able to make war or peace at pleasure, it has not reached its full development. The possession of these powers acts on countries as does the assumption of manhood on individuals. As the youth sent forth on the world to 'sink or swim' on his own resources, becomes conscious of powers and responsibilities of which he was unconscious whilst leaning on another's arm, and has his energies aroused and his judgment sobered thereby, so do communities formed into nationalities find their energies stirred and their intelligence sharpened by the new field which is opened for their

exercise, and the necessity of acting in it. And as this development is a direct improvement of man's faculties—an end of both politics and religion—a greater benefit it is impossible to conceive than that which flows from the possession of a national autonomy. If we thought the British Colonies were ripe for nationality, and that its benefits could be obtained only by separation from England, we should say that it would be for their interest to seize the offered boon; but, as we do not believe either of these things, we think that they had better hold on to the Fatherland. For, although the exercise of these powers and privileges improves the character of a people which is able to use the powers aright, and to sustain the responsibilities by its own unaided resources, it is quite different when these qualifications are wanting: in that case nationality is as dangerous to its possessors as is a razor to a young child. Colonists may rest assured that, at present, independence would be much more likely to prove a curse than a blessing.

But Federation offers the means of securing all the benefits of nationality *minus* its evils. Were it effected the Colonist would find his title of *Civis Britannicus* as noble and as awe-inspiring as ever was that of *Civis Romanus*. His political inferiority would be ended. He would stand on a level with his countrymen at home. He would be represented in the same legislature with them, and his voice would form a real power in the decision of any, and every, question of Imperial interest. The loftiest honours in arms, politics, law, or diplomacy would be opened to his ambition, or as we hope would be the motive-power, to his patriotism. From all these he is *practically* excluded at present. But let an Imperial Federation be established, and colonists might fill the office of constitutional monarchs in countries as large as many European states; might be viceroys, for Imperial

purposes, over lands stretching across half a continent, or comprising one of the great divisions of the globe; or, sitting on the throne of the Great Mogul, might rule a population almost equal to that of all Europe! Nor would the summit be reached even here. All these are but subordinate officers. Above them are a Legislature and an Executive from which they must take their orders. More than ever would it be requisite in an Empire such as this to have the supreme office beyond the reach of dispute. But all below the Crown would be open to competition, nor could the Crown exercise any undue favouritism in the distribution of offices or honours. Colonists would be members of the Imperial Ministry, leading and guiding the affairs of this tremendous organization, before the glories of which even those of old Rome would pale; and should any of them stand first in the National Council, he could not fail to stand first in the Executive, filling even the proud place of Premier. Can imagination itself picture a career for patriotic ardour more glorious than that which would exist in the new Empire? Can the Christian moralist hope for a field of ambition more pure than that in which all honours could be won only by such deeds as would leave the winner, if not 'first in war, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen,' at least high in some one or more of these lines? Can the political philosopher show in what manner political organisation can be made of so much profit to the governed as in binding together in peace and unity so many different countries, supplying the deficiencies of one from the superfluities, or even excrescences, of another, and in securing to all that invaluable heritage of political freedom of which the foundation was laid on the field of Runnymede? And can the brightest dreams of colonial progress conjure up a vision of prosperity and glory to each isolated atom equal to that which would

ensue from the united efforts of the British race to develop its magnificent heritage of almost a fifth part of the earth, and to maintain its common historic glories stretching from Havelock to Alfred?



This language may, perhaps, be denounced as consisting of mere rhapsody. In view of such denunciation let us examine in detail the direct benefits which Federation would confer upon the Colonies. We have seen that possible colonial objections to it are balanced by still more weighty objections of the same nature to independence. It would induce increased taxation—though in the case of Australasia even this is doubtful—but independence would induce an increase at least double as great. It is barely possible that it might endanger local self-government; but independence would leave both national and political freedom in very serious danger. These circumstances alone should suffice to induce a choice of Federation in preference to independence, for ‘of two evils choose the least.’ But Federation would not be merely a choice of evils. One of the apprehended evils is, we do not hesitate to say, imaginary; and for the other very slight real evil, large benefits would be gained, which would repay it many times over.

1. Federation would ensure to the Colonies a continuance of that internal peace and liberty along with that security against foreign aggression and comparatively free commercial access to the rest of the Empire which they now enjoy. Without the former of these blessings there can exist no prosperity of any kind whatever. Neither commerce, arts, literature, politics, nor religion can flourish in a land where law and order are wanting, or where national rights cannot uncompromisingly be asserted against foreign foes. The alliance with the Fatherland secures both of these blessings. Colonists will probably admit that the latter of them would not be



very safe under independence, and we would exhort them not to feel confident that it would be otherwise with the former. Democratic republicanism is not favourable to internal peace. It has proved an unmitigated failure wherever it has been tried, save in the United States. Even there its success has not been by any means encouraging, nor are signs wanting, as we have already shown, that even in that land also it 'must destroy liberty, or civilisation, if not both.' These words are not ours. They are those of the great advocate of modern 'progress,' Lord Macaulay. Against disorders within, or subjugation from without, Federation offers a sure and certain guarantee; and as all the blessings of liberty and civilisation are dependent on the existence of some such security, it would be nothing short of madness to sacrifice it when once possessed. The gain from commercial intercourse with the rest of the Empire would be comparatively less valuable; but, with the impetus which might be given to such intercourse under the new *régime*, it could not fail to conduce very considerably to the material wealth of the Colonies.

2. Federation would place the Colonies in possession of 'sovereign rights,' with all their accompanying advantages. We have already stated our belief that without these no community can reach the full development of which it is capable. Their attainment constitutes the national majority. It is with nations as with men. As each year of growth renders a youth better fitted for his entrance on the rights of manhood, and the possession of these rights of increasing importance to his well-being, so does each step forwards in wealth, population, intelligence, liberty, or religion, render a community better qualified to exercise sovereign rights, and the possession of these rights more essential to its welfare. The foreign relations of a few hundred immigrants on a desert shore are simply





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*nil*, because they have neither means nor inclination to bring themselves into contact with the rest of the world, and they are too insignificant for it to notice them. But see the same land after the lapse of a century ! The wilderness has become a fruitful field, and the desert rejoices and blossoms as the rose. The few hundreds of poverty-stricken colonists have swelled into hundreds of thousands of wealthy citizens, gathering riches from the sea, the mine, the forest, and the field ; scattering the fruits of their industry over the world, bringing back into their own midst the luxuries of other climes, and presenting such a prize as has in every age served to excite most strongly the aggressive propensities of kings or nations. The desert island of San Juan was merely a speck on an unknown sea in 1846, but in 1872 it is a strategical point on which depends the safety of a considerable port, likely to expand into the commercial emporium of a mighty trade between China, Japan, the East Indies, and the northern half of the North American continent ; and, perhaps, with England also. Fenian raids into Ontario would have been of slight consequence fifty years ago, when there was little to destroy ; but to-day a rich garden invites the plunderer. A century since the wealth that lies hid in the ocean depths around Nova Scotia and New Brunswick was merely tapped by visitors, but now it has become the source from which thousands of families draw their daily bread. The boundary of Maine, or the possession of Oregon, may have seemed a light matter when the Ashburton treaty was concluded ; but the former concession has since necessitated the building of a railroad through an almost unproductive territory, whilst a profitable commercial route was open, and even then still leaves it dangerously exposed to a possible foe, and American acquisitions on the Pacific now constitute part of the great wheat-growing region of the

Union. Canadian trade was a small matter fifty years since; but now it has swollen to large proportions, and is daily swelling to still larger. It is the same elsewhere. What foe would have cared to attack the Australian convict-settlements at the beginning of the century? What enemy would forget Sydney or Melbourne to-day? Hence the increasing necessity of growing countries' obtaining possession of sovereign rights, and gaining a control over their relations with foreign powers. To obtain this *desideratum* by means of independence will not do in the present case, because prerogatives are useless without power to enforce them. But Federation would secure both power and prerogative. The united might of the British Empire would be such as no power would care to resist, or would be likely to resist successfully; and a due application of that might to the maintenance of colonial interests would be assured by means of colonial representation. Can any Canadian suppose that the long course of truckling to Yankee aggressiveness which has been pursued by England for over thirty years, would have been adopted had there been colonial members of the Imperial Parliament who understood, and felt an interest in, the various questions, to call ministers to account? Canada is now mourning over the Alabama treaty, and, though allowed to reject those clauses which immediately affect her own interests, dares not do so, knowing that she cannot maintain her rights unless backed by the power of the United Kingdom, and that this, under present circumstances, will not be accorded. It is the same to day as when, fifteen years ago, Mr. Howe, in discussing the Colonial Question, said: 'Your fisheries, if given away to-morrow, would scarcely provoke a discussion in the House of Commons; but place ten North Americans there, and no minister would dare to bring down a treaty by which they were sacri-

ficed.' The same language is still applicable to any, and every, colonial interest coming under the control of the Imperial Government. Ministers do not hesitate to sacrifice it if by so doing they can show a saving of a few thousand pounds in the estimates. If, perchance, there is somebody found to hint that the saving is being effected at the cost of fellow-countrymen, and that it may induce a much heavier loss hereafter, the unfortunate 'alarmist' is probably coughed down, for the simple reason that no part of the House has any interest in supporting him. But let it be known that such a man has one-fifth, or even one-tenth, of the members ready to back his views with their votes, and we should see leaders on both sides paying all deference to his wishes, if not striving to anticipate them. Colonial questions would no longer be looked upon as 'bores,' but would command the ready and sympathising attention of the first intellects and the strongest parties of the day; and the result would be that, instead of seeing New Zealand on the eve of being abandoned to Maori savages, Australia lying almost defenceless, and Canada compelled to yield control over her waters, and surrender to Yankee greed those fisheries which are the chief source of wealth to a large part of her people, we should see the whole force of the Empire employed to maintain colonial interests. Every year the importance to the Colonies of their foreign relations is likely to increase; and if they are wise they will seize on the opportunity of gaining both sovereign rights and the power to make them respected, which is offered in Federation. One of these is useless without the other; and they will never again have such a fair chance of combining them.

3. Federation would open to the Colonies that field for patriotic genius and ambition which must ever be either entirely absent or very ill-supplied in the colonial rela-

tionship. It is true that the growth of the Colonies, and the system of local self-government which has been established in so many of them, have done much to improve their condition in this respect, but their situation is still highly unsatisfactory. The colonist is restricted to the narrow bounds of his own province; and if the whole truth be told, partisan and democratic jealousy often render local honours by no means desirable. He is practically excluded from the army, navy, diplomacy, and all the higher honours of the Empire, and must remain so as long as the relationship continues on its present footing. But let Federation be established, and a mighty change would instantly ensue. Its first effect would be to open the doors of both Houses of Parliament to colonists, and from that one honour all others would quickly follow. We need not attempt to demonstrate this proposition, for we feel sure that nobody will dispute it. But we ask colonists to consider in what political condition would such a splendid career be opened to them as in the Federal Legislature, or in the service of an Empire on which the sun never sets? The gain to colonial genius would be immense; nor would the benefit be confined to men of talent: it would extend to the whole community. The opening of these new fields for genius would, through the necessity of colonial members being able to vie with men from Oxford, Cambridge, and Dublin, tend to induce increased attention to the higher branches of education, and to raise the educational standard generally throughout colonial society. This, again, would impart a higher tone to local politics, which would be assisted by the acquaintance with English political morals and ideas gained by representatives in the Federal Legislature, and scattered over the land by them on their return. The training which colonial politicians would receive in England would be calculated to fit them for

filling efficiently the duties of local ministers ; and as people are, at last, beginning to understand that the world before the French Revolution was not entirely astray in thinking that something more than the decisions of local and transient numerical majorities were necessary to rule a country efficiently, we need not argue that colonial communities would reap the benefit of improved local government from improvement in the qualifications of their rulers, in addition to having a noble field for the exercise of genius opened by Federation.

4. Federation would give the Colonies a history. It may be thought by some that this would be a very small advantage, but a little reflection would prove it to be a very large one. Historical recollections are probably the most powerful lever that can be found to lift each generation out of itself, and impart to the national mind some stability of feeling and definite political conviction. Without national convictions of some sort political unity is impossible, and to create these convictions a national history seems to be almost indispensable. In its absence the public mind finds nothing in the past on which it can feed, and as the future is necessarily a region of pure imagination, it is inevitably turned almost exclusively to the present for political food. The consequence is that the events of the passing time become elevated beyond their actual importance, and the public are led to believe that such times as those in which they live never before figured in their own or in any other land. Conceit and self-confidence are thereby instilled to a very dangerous extent. Laws, manners, policies, institutions and rulers, not having been hallowed by the hand of time, are all regarded as 'open questions' and exposed nearly unprotected to the rash assaults of the demagogue. The full effect of such a state of affairs is best illustrated by the cases of Spanish-America and France. Emancipa-

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tion in the former countries, and in the latter the Revolution of 1789, constituted a complete break with the past. After these events all things became new, but in becoming new they became also unsettled. Nobody had a living faith in anything as being beyond doubt just, true, or lovely. The consequence was that, nothing being respected, all fell to pieces. In both countries revolution seems to have become a chronic disease of the political system. Some of the influences by which these countries have been ruined have begun to show themselves in the United States and in the Colonies; but the latter being strongly influenced by British traditions, they have not obtained much sway there, and the States having something of a history have not yet fully yielded to them. But let these countries break with the past, and they will follow France or Spanish-America in the future. Living solely in the present is but, in other words, living solely to self, and this course will never work satisfactorily. Faith, hope, and charity can as little be dispensed with in politics as in any other walk of life. For infusing these virtues into that sphere of action there is probably no earthly means so efficacious as is a glorious history. Noble deeds cannot fail to induce respect for their authors and trust in their judgment: that is faith. The inheritance of a splendid and ancient property rouses a desire in the inheritors to prove themselves at least not inferior to their ancestors, by transmitting it unimpaired to future generations: that is hope. And an appreciation of the merits of the heritage cannot fail to induce love of it and gratitude towards those who established it, and that is charity. The effect is, in some measure at least, to impress statesmen and people with the mighty truth that 'No man liveth unto himself.' Each learns to respect other wills than his own, to consult not so much his personal profit as that of the *commonwealth*, and this not



merely for his own time but for so long as his country shall stand above the sea! It is this spirit alone that can hallow party-strife. In its absence the contests of parties first degenerate into a disgusting scramble for the lawful, and next for the unlawful, gains of office: a contest conducted first by votes, then by bribes, and finally by the sword. But under its influence party struggles approach as nearly as possible to an honest controversy between honest men as to the means whereby the welfare of their common country may best be promoted. To preserve, and still further to infuse, this spirit amongst the inhabitants of the Colonies it is only requisite that they should continue to be closely identified with their glorious ancestors in the Fatherland. Then they might proudly exclaim: 'We have classical associations and great names of our own which we can confidently oppose to the most splendid of ancient times. "Senate" has not to our ears a sound so venerable as "Parliament." We respect the Great Charter more than the laws of Solon. The Capitol and the Forum impress us with less awe than our own Westminster Hall and Westminster Abbey, the place where the great men of twenty generations have contended, the place where they sleep together! The list of warriors and statesmen by whom our constitution was founded or preserved, from De Montfort down to Fox, may well stand a comparison with the Fasti of Rome. The dying thanksgiving of Sidney is as noble as the libation which Thræsea poured to liberating Jove, and we think with far less pleasure of Cato tearing out his entrails than of Russell saying, as he turned away from his wife, that the bitterness of death was past.'<sup>1</sup> Federation would preserve this glorious inheritance to the Colonies, and as the possession of it would contribute more than anything else towards keeping public life pure, and es-

<sup>1</sup> Macaulay.

tablishing liberty on a sure foundation, the gain would be second to none derivable from the establishment of a Pan-Britannic Empire.

5. Rapid as have been the growth of colonial wealth, and the development of colonial resources in the past, the future progress of both would be enormously increased by Federation. The Colonies want only labour and capital to make them vie with the noblest countries in the world; and to find investments for labour and capital is the problem of the day in the United Kingdom. The Colonies can take all of both that it has to offer, and a great deal more, too, and return rich interest on the investment. For half-a-century past, foreign countries have profited by a rich stream of British emigration and capital, which, had it flowed into the Colonies, would have made them thrice as great as they are at present. The causes which have led to its taking this unnatural course are to be found in foreign *prestige* and colonial obscurity. A fair amount of knowledge of the resources of foreign fields of emigration has prevailed in England; concerning those of the Colonies comparatively nothing was known, and until lately gross ignorance on the matter existed. The discovery of Australian gold-fields, and the formation of the Canadian Dominion have done something to turn attention to these countries, but there is still very much room for improvement. Canada is yet popularly believed to be another Norway, instead of a land in which the vine flourishes in the open air, and the isothermal lines of which pass through France. A remedy for this ignorance is the first step towards turning English emigration to the Colonies; and such a remedy would be found in Federation. Every colonial member would constitute a living advertisement of the resources of his country; able to correct errors, supply information, or offer useful suggestions to all inclined either to emi-

grate thereto or invest capital therein. This steady supply of information would alone exercise a most important influence on the course of emigration; and, in connection with the new relations of the several parts of the Empire, could scarcely fail to increase its amount, and to turn it almost entirely into the Colonies. Under Federation the emigrant would continue to enjoy almost the same interest in, and be as closely connected with, the land of his birth as when living in it. Under these circumstances, emigration would lose the character of an act of expatriation in which it now appears. The emigrant would leave the Fatherland with the sweet thought that he would remain as dear to it, and it to him, as when dwelling within its bounds; and instead of feeling agonised as does one who deserts his country, a patriotic ardour would glow in his breast as he felt that he was going forth to extend its greatness and glory by winning bloodless conquests over the waste places of the earth. Thus, all the patriotic motives which now tend to check emigration would, under Federation, cease to exist, or else be turned to its encouragement. But great as would be the aid gained from this fact, still greater would be that gained from the prominence into which the Colonies would be thrown by Federation. Barnum set an elephant to plough a field, in order to make people *talk* about himself and his museum, in full confidence that if they should talk they would visit. The result proved that he was right. It always has been, and always will be, the same. Let the Colonies be kept constantly before the eyes of the English public, as they necessarily would be, under the new *régime*, and we should have eager inquirers into every detail of their circumstances, and thousands instead of hundreds rushing into them to find new homes, and finding them. The increased influx of capital would be even greater than that of labour, for the inquiry

would be most actively pursued by men of intelligence amongst the middle classes, crushed out at home by monster capitalists. A mixture of such men in the tide of immigration would be an immense moral and intellectual benefit to the Colonies, whilst their capital would probably double the productive power of labour. Nor would the benefit end here. Not three years would elapse before the revelations made, the interest excited, and the experience gained, would induce the establishment of a system of Government emigration providing free transit for those unable to pay their way. The result of these combined influences would be to throw into the shade all the marvels of colonial increase in the past, and to cause new communities to spring into life with almost magic rapidity. Not long should we have to wait to see the Britain of the South covered with homesteads akin to those in the Britain of the North; Australian products rivalling those of Spain and France, and perhaps those of the 'Cotton States' also; West Indian plantations, instead of being deserted, again as rich as in former days, and a chain of settlements extending across the North American continent, connected by an iron road, over which would be realised 'the north-west passage by land.' The enormous benefits gained by older settlements from such increase is too well known to colonists to render it needful for us to say a single word on the subject. If any colonist should still feel chary of consenting to a scheme by which taxation might possibly be increased to the extent of 5*s.* 2*d.* per head, we would ask him to compare the loss by taxation with the gain through the appreciation of property, which could not fail to follow on the increased influx of labour and capital, and say if it would not thereby be repaid tenfold?

We are thus led to conclude that colonial independence is, at present, an impossibility; but that all the

benefits which a national autonomy offers to countries capable of maintaining it, along with a good many more also, would be attained by the Colonies under a Federation of the Empire. How, then, can any colonist hesitate for a moment as to the expediency of adopting it, in default of being able to prove the course of reasoning by which we have been led to this conclusion to be incorrect?

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## CHAPTER IX.

### FEDERATION *v.* ENGLISH ISOLATION.

THE expediency of Federation has now to be considered from an English standpoint: having arrived at the conclusion that the measure would be beneficial to the Colonies, it remains to inquire whether there is fair ground to believe that its influence on the United Kingdom would be of a similar character.

The answer, it seems to us, can be reached much more readily than that to the corresponding question in reference to the Colonies. That the Fatherland would be a gainer, to an enormous extent, by Federation has been almost proved already. We have seen that emancipation could scarcely fail to present England to the eyes of the world in a manner which would gain for her a *prestige* by no means enviable, and pretty certain to prove highly mischievous; that it might tend to endanger English investments in the Colonies; that it could not fail to reduce that maritime strength on which her existence depends; that it would, in all probability, create at least as many new diplomatic difficulties as its advocates allege that it would solve; that heavy commercial losses could not fail to ensue from it; and that it would, in case of England being forced to abandon free trade, deprive her of the only resource whereby she could save her commerce from utter ruin. Against all these circumstances adverse to emancipation can be placed only the single

fact that it would render possible a reduction of about 2,500,000*l.* in the military expenditure. But as the commercial loss would probably amount to treble or quadruple the amount saved in expenditure, it follows that *even the pecuniary balance* would be against emancipation, to say nothing of the other evils, present and prospective, which it would induce. Hence it appears that it would be better for England to garrison the Colonies at her own expense, as was done prior to 1871, if that course should prove essential to the maintenance of the connection with its accompanying advantages, than dissolve it in consideration of effecting a saving of 2,500,000*l.* in her annual expenditure. But if the loss of the Colonies would entail on England evils which it would pay to spend the above sum to avert, is it needful to say one word in defence of the expediency of a scheme which would enable her to retain them without the expenditure of one farthing? This, and a good deal more too, would Federation accomplish for England. We shall strive to state categorically the benefits which would thence accrue to her.

1. The one sound argument of emancipationists is that the policy which they advocate would relieve England of the expense heretofore entailed by the possession of her colonial empire. Federation would accomplish the same result and leave that empire intact. Under it the Colonies would become sources of revenue to England. Their contributions to the common fund would, at the outset, probably range from 2,500,000*l.* to 3,000,000*l.* per annum—a sum which, we have seen, would suffice to defray all the charges which they now entail. This advantage, we doubt not, would be duly appreciated by England. But the gain to her would not end here. The growth of wealth and population in the Colonies is not correctly understood by Englishmen. All, however, know that

the rate of increase in new countries must be much more rapid than in those thickly-peopled like England. Hence it appears that not only the amount, but also the *proportion* of revenue to be paid by the Colonies would be continually on the increase, and consequently that of England on the decline. We do not say that each increase in the colonial contributions to the Federal revenue would be so much clear gain to England, as the sum total of Federal expenditure, and probably the amount of it spent in the Colonies, would grow with the growth of the Empire. But as the wealth of England has, during the present century at least, increased much more rapidly than has her expenditure, it is almost a matter of certainty that the growth of colonial wealth, and consequently of taxation, would outstrip that of expenditure in a still greater degree; in which case the relief to the English taxpayer would be permanently augmenting, from the mere increase of colonial wealth. Should any contentious colonist here exclaim that this relief would be unjust to the Colonies, we reply that it would be nothing different from that which must occur in every state, since it is impossible to secure an identical growth of wealth in every section; and that, in the present instance, the accompanying increase of influence in the national council would furnish a compensation not usually provided, and enable the Colonies to secure due attention to their interests in the expenditure of the revenue, which is all that they would in equity be entitled to claim. As we wish to keep within the limits of sober facts, we shall make no estimate of the probable growth of colonial contributions. To any who may feel sceptical we say: Look at the Colonies, see what they were and what they are. We say nothing of the dazzling growth of Australia, for that has occurred under very peculiar circumstances. But we point to the fact that



the growth of British America has far outstripped the much-vaunted progress of the United States. The population of the entire countries which now constitute British America, in the year 1750, has lately been estimated by one of our best statisticians at 81,000, which is certainly a pretty high estimate. The population of the territories of the present Union in the same year is stated by Mr. Bancroft at 1,260,000. In 1870 it had risen to 38,555,000, showing the rate of increase to have been about 2,959 per cent., whilst the population of British America in the same year was about 3,800,000, being an increase of 4,710 per cent. In 1750, the Canadian population was about one-fifteenth that of the States; in 1870 it was one-tenth! If it be replied that this comparison is unfair, as the rate of increase is apparently more rapid in the early than in the late stages of society, we turn to the fact that between 1830 and 1871 the population of the provinces of Ontario and Quebec increased from 700,000 to about 2,811,000, or over 300 per cent., whilst the increase in the States during the same time was only from 12,866,000 to 38,555,000, or 199 per cent. The population of these two provinces was about  $5\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. that of the States in 1830, and in 1871 it was almost  $7\frac{1}{2}$ . It is thus clear that the growth of the Colonies is much more rapid than that prevailing in the States, and we have before seen that the establishment of the proposed Federal *régime* could scarcely fail to increase it very materially. The former fact alone should, we think, suffice to convince the most sceptical that the relief to English finances from emancipation would be much less than that which would ensue from Federation.

2. Federation would confer an immense benefit on the United Kingdom by supplying it with legislative machinery adequate to its wants. That it does not possess this at present was pithily stated by the *Saturday Review*

of August 12, 1871, when it said: 'In every direction it is apparent that Parliament tries to do too much; does very badly very much of what it does, and leaves very much undone.' The correctness of this statement is substantiated by the annual 'slaughter of the innocents,' the large number of emendatory statutes required, and the many important questions awaiting solution and never solved.

That these evils do not arise from any laziness on the part of either ministers or legislators is confessed by all. The amount of labour which is discharged by a minister of the Crown, or even by a member of Parliament, during the session, is probably much in excess of that fulfilled by the hardest-worked of 'working men.' Their inefficiency arises chiefly from the fact that they have a great deal more work on hand than it is possible for human nature efficiently to accomplish. There is more attempted every session than it is possible to complete, and a knowledge of the large measures and careful thought needed in the settlement of great social and political problems—such as this very colonial question, national defence, or pauperism—leads wearied and badgered statesmen actually to shirk them, and by so doing to prepare for their country a terrible awakening. We do not blame them very much. The national ideal for a couple of generations has been a legislature which would follow rather than lead public opinion; and public opinion during that time has been chiefly engrossed by matters in which partisan or social jealousies and the cheapness of goods were involved, whilst a certain code of opinion was declared to constitute the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and any attempt to violate it was denounced as political blasphemy. Under such circumstances, rulers cannot fairly be blamed for the 'confusion worse confounded' that reigns in the Imperial Legislature. It is

impossible that the relations of legislators and constituents can, with safety to the commonwealth, ever be reduced to the condition in which the sovereign people say to their servant, 'Do this, and he doeth it.' Independently of the difficulty of ascertaining what the voice of the people really says, the interests of the body politic may demand many measures which that voice never asks for at all, and the Legislature should be both able and willing to supply them. It may demand measures which are either totally impracticable or essentially vicious, and the Legislature should be able to refuse them, and to convince the people or, at least, the intelligent part of the community, that it does well to do so. And it may be possible to attain the end desired much more advantageously by means of another policy than that advocated, and the Legislature should comprehend this policy and substitute it for that proposed. It is, of course, true that to the due fulfilment of these duties the presence of a large amount of knowledge and talent within the Legislature is indispensable. But it is also true that no amount whatever of talent could fulfil these duties unless it had time to apply itself to the work. This English legislators have not at present, and consequently they fail in the discharge of the duties of their office. The growth of wealth and population has enormously increased the quantity, and rendered more intricate the quality of the legislation required at their hands; and 'although this nineteenth century has produced many wonderful things, it has not produced a new mankind' who can labour seventeen hours a day with impunity, though even that time does not suffice to enable them to fulfil their work. The declaration that representative institutions are on their trial has passed into a sort of cant phrase. Let them, at least, have a fair trial; let them not suffer from legislators being required to fulfil

tasks beyond the physical power of man to accomplish, and failing to do so. That some relief must be afforded to British legislators is becoming increasingly apparent every session. Federation offers the means of furnishing it. Increase of business must be accompanied by division of labour, if the labour is to be discharged efficiently; and division of labour is the essence of the federal form of government. With the Imperial Parliament relieved of the mass of local and private business, which now constitutes really the heaviest part of its labours, and new legislatures created for the discharge of this business, we should soon see an immense improvement in both local and Imperial legislation. The legislatures would have leisure sufficient for the due examination of all questions; and consequently a decrease in the number of those neglected would ensue. They would be able to weigh all subjects thoroughly, and thence might fairly be expected to legislate more wisely. They would possess increased local independence; and, consequently, would be more likely to frame measures suited to local idiosyncrasies than would a legislature for the three kingdoms. And if means were adopted to promote the influx of talent into them, there would be men at hand capable of grappling with the various problems that would arise and of solving them. The alternative, in fact, is between the machinery of good government or that of imperfect legislation for the British Islands. There seems no reason to doubt that local Governments would prove effective in practice, in which case the gain to the strictly local interests of England, Ireland, and Scotland from their establishment would be such as should almost alone suffice to induce them to support the scheme of Imperial Federation.

3. Federation would secure to England that outlet for her surplus population which it is daily becoming more

important that she should possess ; indeed its possession may be said to have become almost a matter of necessity. The signs of the times seem to indicate that in emigration alone can the means of employment and subsistence for her teeming millions be found. According to the *Year Book* for 1871 (pp. 245, 248, and 254), the number of paupers in England on the 1st of January 1860 was 851,020, against 1,079,391 on the corresponding date in 1870 ; in Scotland, on May 14, 1860, 114,209, against 128,339 on the corresponding date in 1869 ; and in Ireland, on January 1, 1861, 50,683, against 73,921 on the corresponding date in 1870. The total number of paupers in the United Kingdom on the former dates thus appears to have been 1,015,912, against 1,281,651 on the latter. The population in 1861 was 29,538,000, and in 1871, 31,833,000. The increase of population thus appears to have been about  $8\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. whilst the increase in the pauperism was 26 per cent. It is pretty certain that, should this disproportionate rate of increase continue in force it must result in national ruin. It is still more certain that in a country where all the land available for the plough has been brought under cultivation, and scientific farming carried to a very high pitch, there is little or no prospect of the increasing population finding employment in agricultural labour. Hence it follows that the only spheres of action for it are to be found in manufacturing or commercial industry ; and the above returns prove that even the rapid rate at which these have progressed is insufficient to keep pace with the simultaneous increase in the supply of labour. Hence it is that England has become the scene of a vast social strife, in which capital and labour, employers and employed, are contending for the mastery, and in so doing becoming daily more estranged, less and less accustomed to think that they have any interest in common ; and in which the

'working-classes,' through the machinery of trades unions, are being led to look upon all above their own rank in life as foes whose destruction would be conducive to the advancement of their class interests. It is impossible to doubt that this strife must expose the framework of government and society to very serious dangers. In this, as in all other cases, the evil can be effectually eradicated only by destroying its cause. That cause is an over supply of labour. There are but two means of reducing the supply to an equality with the demand. The one is by imposing checks on the increase of population, and the other is by providing an outlet for the excess. The former policy, we fear, would prove a remedy worse than the disease; the latter would bring blessings to the sufferers, blessings to England, and blessings to the Colonies. England would find consumers of her manufactures, and contributors to her revenue, in those who at home only contribute to swell the roll of misery, the rate of assessment, and the dangers of social convulsion. The Colonies would find their resources developed, and the value of pre-existent property increased, through the labour of the immigrants; and the latter would find peace and plenty on a virgin soil, and become loyal Britons, ready, if called on, to die for the Empire, instead of dangerous foes, anxious to shake its foundations. We believe that nothing short of Federation will suffice to awaken English opinion to the enormous benefits which must accrue to all parties from the establishment of an organized system of emigration; and we feel sure that without it—unless the increase of population should be otherwise checked—communistic doctrines will, within twenty years, become much more rampant in England than in France. If it be said that the Colonies would furnish this outlet when emancipated as well as when federated, we reply that they could do so

only in the event of the prevalence of peace and prosperity in their midst, which we have shown would be at least a doubtful contingency under independence; and that England, in a matter of such vital importance to her interests, should leave nothing to chance.

4. Even supposing it to be granted that the required outlet for a surplus population could be found in the emancipated Colonies, or in foreign states, the fact remains that Federation would convert emigration from a negative benefit into a positive gain to England. When directed towards foreign countries, it certainly serves to diminish English poverty and discontent, but it also lessens her population and increases that of her rivals; whilst, if directed towards the federated Colonies, it would achieve the former end, and also strengthen her resources instead of weakening them. We have already dwelt on the probability of English emigration being turned into the Colonies by means of Federation, and on the benefits which would accrue to them from this diversion. But it must not be supposed that the gain would belong to the Colonies exclusively. England would profit by it almost as much as would they. In a pecuniary point of view she would gain immensely by sending her people to countries in which each emigrant would consume from 1*l.* 10*s.* to over 5*l.* worth of her manufactures, instead of to the States, where each inhabitant takes only 13*s.* worth. This gain would be pretty heavy, and it is astonishing that it has not received more attention from statesmen and statisticians. But along with this pecuniary gain would be acquired a most important political advantage. In the Colonies the immigrant finds his love of 'home,' or the 'old country,' rather increased than diminished, whilst abroad it either dies out or is converted into deadly hatred. It is surely of no small importance to England that the men who leave her shores should

serve to increase the numbers of her allies rather than those of her possible foes. Official returns—quoted in the *Year Book* for 1871, p. 254—state the number of emigrants, including foreigners, who left the United Kingdom from 1815 to the close of 1869, at 6,756,697. Of these there went 4,276,597 to the United States, 1,356,476 to British America, 971,358 to Australasia, and 152,266 elsewhere. Thus it appears that *almost two-thirds* of the emigrants embarking from the United Kingdom went to the States. The total number of immigrants who arrived in the Union during the thirteen years from 1856 to 1868 was 2,565,644, of whom 1,215,600 were natives of the British Islands. Hence it appears that the emigrants from the United Kingdom constituted nearly one-half of that vast tide of labour and capital which has made the Union the mighty and insolent power which it is to-day. The Irish Celt has gone there, and has carried with him his hatred of England. Anglo-Irish, Scotch, and English have gone and forgotten the love of country in the love of democracy. The result has been the creation of a power which, in spite of all the twaddle that is unceasingly uttered about the identity of the two peoples, has never yet shown itself to be a cordial ally of England, but has repeatedly acted most ungenerously towards her, and demanded and obtained concessions such as were never even sought by any other country. How very different would have been the present situation had this vast flood been poured into British America! Instead of a ‘narrow strip’ of territory in Canada, we should have had wide tracts settled and cultivated. Instead of being engaged to-day in opening a way from Lake Superior to the Red River, we should have had it opened fifteen or twenty years ago. Instead of a wide waste in the North-West, we should have had large settlements on the Red River and the Saskat-



chewan. Instead of having no internal communication with British Columbia, we should probably have a railway across the continent. Instead of having Irish Celts converted into Fenian raiders, threatening us from the States, we should have had them converted into loyal Britons in Canada, ready as any other to repel Yankee invaders ; for, with scarcely an exception, Roman Catholic Irish are as loyal in Canada as are any other class. In a word, instead of having four millions in Canada confronting thirty-eight millions of semi-contemptuous spectators in the States, we should probably have had ten or twelve millions here living alongside twenty-five or twenty-eight millions of respecting foreigners across the line. Putting the commercial advantages, which would have amounted to a gain of several millions annually, altogether aside, is it possible, we ask, easily to exaggerate the benefit which it would be to England to have such a state of things substituted for that actually in existence? Is it likely that in such a case we should have seen any Alabama treaty signed, or, indeed, any Alabama difficulty raised? We believe that neither one nor other of them would have been heard of, and that it would have been the same with many other of our 'difficulties' with the States. At all events, it is certain that we should have been much stronger and they much weaker than is actually the case, and that this single fact would have compelled them to assume a much more modest tone in their dealings with us than they have done for thirty years past. What a strong argument, then, in favour of Federation is to be found in the fact that it could scarcely fail to turn emigration from countries where the emigrant at least forgets his Fatherland, into those where he and his children would remain as loyal, and their services be as readily available, as if they had never left its shores !

5. Federation would largely increase the naval and military resources of England. The events of the year 1871 have demonstrated that the warning of Solon to Cræsus is as applicable to our time as to his own. It is as true in the nineteenth century as it was over 2,000 years before that, 'if anybody come who has better iron than you, he will be master of all this gold.' No country has gone so far in ignoring this truth as has England; and this precisely at the time when, from the increase of her gold, she should have remembered it most carefully. The national feeling on the subject has, indeed, advanced considerably beyond the idiotic phase in which it was gravely proposed to sweep away the army and navy as useless incumbrances in an age which had become too enlightened to wage war. Some rough experience quickly demonstrated the absurdity of these theories, and forced all, save a few fanatics, to admit that armaments were still necessities of political life. A new course was, therefore, recommended, and 'non-intervention' proposed as the basis of England's foreign policy. How far it has been carried, or how far it has been successful, we need not now inquire. The point which we wish to enforce is that the time has now come when it must, to all appearance, be abandoned. Conquest and military despotism have enormously increased the military resources of all Continental Europe, and the naval force of some parts of it; whilst any development of those of England, from either of these causes, has been impossible, and British armaments are to-day little, if anything, stronger than in 1815. The consequence has been that the relative importance of our country has very seriously declined. It is an undeniable fact that Belgium, with about one-sixth the population of the United Kingdom, could, in 1871, have brought at least twice as many troops into the field as could England. But even the 100,000 soldiers of Belgium

were utterly insignificant in comparison with the gigantic masses of France and Germany, and still greater than these were those of Russia. England, when confronted by them, felt herself to be utterly powerless. Still more powerless to meet them will she be in the future, when the Prussian military system has been put in force all over the Continent, as it is to be. It is impossible for her to remain in this position unless she is content to let foreign potentates erect vast empires, whose behests she would be forced to obey from inability to resist them. All the signs of the times unite in indicating that 'blood and iron' are likely to be the characteristics of the next generation. Europe is now confronted by two mighty powers which, for two centuries, have pursued a career of war and conquest with really alarming success. Prussia has grown, from an insignificant electorate, into a mighty military empire, with a population of about 40,000,000, in which every man is a soldier. Russia has now pushed her way, on the west, far into the heart of Europe; on the east has advanced into dangerous proximity to the gates of Peking; and on the south has established herself on the Oxus, in a position so close to our Indian outposts that the chances of a struggle with her on the Indus can no longer be rejected from consideration as an episode in a new Russian war. This vast empire is peopled by nearly eighty millions of people, who one and all, 'from the highest noble to the lowest serf, believe that it is their destiny to conquer the world.' In it the resources of barbarism and civilisation are in dangerous union, and in Prussia all those of learning are carefully utilised for warlike purposes. Is it possible to believe that they will now stop short in their career, especially when the worn-out dynasties of Asia almost invite Russian attack; and in Europe Austria and Turkey stand forth as tempting victims directly in their way? Besides this, England

must remember that France, bleeding at every pore and lashed into fury at her degradation, is likely to embrace any alliance which may enable her to recover her former dignity and influence, and that in the States there exists a power whose arrogance and ambition she felt pretty severely in 1871. If we compare the United Kingdom with those countries we find that it is inferior, in extent and population, to any one of them; that it is equalled by some in arts and civilization; that its facilities for development are probably inferior to those of any state in Western Europe, whilst with those of Russia and the United States it cannot attempt a comparison; that they are all ambitious of territorial aggrandisement; that, to procure it, America employs democratic energy, and Europe despotic plotting, backed by armaments against which 'the streak of silver sea' which separates England from the Continent is admitted to be her only security. We think that nobody, honestly looking these facts in the face, can allege that the isolated resources of the United Kingdom could enable it to maintain a position of equality amongst such rivals. Yet even a Radical periodical has lately confessed that 'it is requisite to maintain a first-class rank, if only to keep foreign markets open.'<sup>1</sup> It is requisite for that reason and a good many more also. But how is this to be done? What course should England pursue in order to attain it? Our answer is that she should adopt Federation; unite the Colonies more closely with herself; utilise their joint military resources for the common benefit; set to work to erect out of the free lands over which now floats the Union Jack a mighty empire, one in history, race, language, and sympathies; and that, that once done, she would exercise as great an influence in the world as in the glorious days of Quebec and Waterloo,

<sup>1</sup> *British Quarterly Review*, April 1871.

and be able to confront either despotic or democratic ambition wherever either would require to be checked. Thus it may be done, and thus only. There is no other means open whereby she can increase her military resources, and the increase of these resources in foreign countries renders it essential to her safety that she should not be left utterly behind in the race. Federation would probably enable her to hold her own. We think it has been proved that the States would meet a much more formidable foe in England and Canada than in England alone. If so, an empire embracing important strategical points in all parts of the world, and containing a population of 40,000,000, whose martial resources were duly developed, would constitute a much more powerful state than would one consisting of the British Islands alone, peopled by less than 32,000,000 inhabitants, with a large number of them dependent on foreign trade for their daily bread. It may be said that we have previously spoken in depreciatory terms of colonial military resources. It is true that we believe those of each Colony would prove incompetent to maintain its independence single-handed. But in this, as in all other cases, it would be found true that 'union is strength.' We do not say that the Colonies would be likely to constitute fertile recruiting-grounds, for there are scarcely any of their inhabitants who could not adopt a calling that would serve their interests better than enlistment. Their forces would consist almost entirely of the militia, which would be available to repel attack, and which would probably pour forth crowds of volunteers to fill the ranks of the regular army operating elsewhere in time of war. Without a consistent policy, strict discipline, and a regular army to serve as a nucleus, such a force is useless ; but with these adjuncts it can be made most formidable. They would be wanting under independence, and would be supplied

under Federation. The Imperial War-office would be less liable than that of a small democratic republic to be disturbed by the unceasing changes in the waves of popular movement, and would therefore be more likely to enforce discipline, and pursue a consistent policy, whereby all available resources would be developed, while the needed nucleus would be found in the standing army of the Empire. Hence it is that resources which would be very insignificant if isolated, would become most formidable if united with those of the mother-country. The latter would reap a most important gain almost immediately. It is certain that very large armies of colonial militia could be kept on foot ready to move at a moment's warning to repel local attack; and in case a reserve force were established throughout the Empire, liable to be drafted into the line in case of war, the Colonies would already be entitled to furnish one-fifth of it. The gain in naval resources would be still greater than that in military force. The Canadian mercantile marine is now the fourth in the world. The British American fisheries must always nurture a race of hardy seamen. There seems to be every probability of a large share of the carrying trade of America becoming the patrimony of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, these countries being evidently marked out by Nature as scenes of shipping industry. Add to these the resources of the other Colonies, and say, can there be any means of strengthening British naval ascendancy so effective as Federation? The immediate accession of strength in both departments would be very great, but it shrinks into insignificance when compared with the prospective gain. The population of the more important Colonies has been doubling itself every twenty years; the growth of wealth has been still more rapid than that of numbers, and the rate of increase in both could scarcely fail to be considerably augmented by Federa-

tion. It is in this tremendous growth of colonial resources that England's great gain would be found. Whilst other nations might possibly make conquests by the sword, she would surely make them by the plough and the axe; and thus keep their relative positions unchanged; and it is only in so keeping them that security for her national independence, political liberty, or realised wealth, is to be found. It is no small thing that is at stake—it is her life; and in her life is involved that of her offspring. Let parent and children start to their work; and—if they would retain for themselves and transmit to posterity the mighty roll of gradually-increasing blessings which the present generation has inherited from the labours of forty of its predecessors—form, by the union of their resources, an empire able to stand, if not against the world in arms, at least against the mightiest of those powers which are now beginning to eclipse the ancient glories of the British race. No one member of the Empire could stand alone against the foes which actually do, or are likely to, threaten its independence. But let them unite their forces and they will be invincible.

6. We are aware that there are many who refuse to consider an extension of the naval and military power of England as an advantage; who exclaim that a 'moral and intellectual sway' is not only the most glorious, but the only glorious national ascendancy. We must refuse to agree with them. Gold cannot be relied on to stop the advance of iron, but still less can rhetoric; and how, in face of the events of the last twenty years, people can suppose that martial virtues are not as necessary to the maintenance of liberty in the nineteenth as in any preceding century, is more than we can comprehend. Still, if by a 'moral and intellectual sway' it is meant that a country should fill a position commanding the respect and affection of other peoples, should constitute a centre to

which their leaders in the field of Thought should turn for inspiration, and thus have a considerable share in forming the institutions, literature, and philosophy of other lands, we willingly admit that it is a very glorious sway indeed, and one well worthy the ambition of England. Has it ever occurred to the special admirers of this sway that emancipation could not fail instantly to annihilate, and Federation firmly to establish it? That such could not fail to be the result of each policy can easily be proved. Like every other sway, it is one which cannot be established by appeals addressed solely to the intellect. Man's reason is that part of his nature which often exercises the least influence over his actions. That which we receive in faith from our schoolmaster we dispute when conveyed by our schoolmate. Facts which, when heard from a mother's lips, seem tales of love and beauty, to doubt which would be perfectly horrible, too often, alas! are in later years set down by those revelling in the full pride of intellect as silly romances. Neither man nor nation will ever acknowledge the moral or intellectual sway of those with whom they have no affinity, and towards whom their sentiments are those of dislike or contempt: a favourable, or, at least, a fair hearing, is essential to the acquisition or retention of any such influence. The chances of obtaining such a hearing are in a precise ratio to the respect, or affection, felt for the party seeking it. Therefore England can exercise a moral and intellectual sway over her Colonies only so long as she continues to be to them that object of fervent love and passionate admiration which she is to-day. And this we may be perfectly sure she will quickly cease to be should she thrust away the offspring who lovingly cling to her, telling them that they must shift for themselves; that she is their 'mother-country' no more than is Germany; that they constitute an expense which she will not bear;



that they may bring her into trouble; and that she desires, above all else, to 'take her ease—eat, drink, and be merry.' Any nation acting in this manner could never command a moral and intellectual sway, for the simple reason that it would present a spectacle at which the moral and intellectual faculties of the race generally, and of the injured parties universally, would revolt. There is, consequently, no surer means of destroying any such sway that England may now exercise than by adopting emancipation, and, as the directly opposite policy must induce a directly opposite effect, no surer means of strengthening and extending it than by converting the Empire into a Federation. That once done she would stand forth to her offspring, united to her by bonds of love and interest, as the *Alma Mater*, to assail whose reputation would be political sacrilege; as the great exemplar whose course would fix the way in which all should follow; and as the supreme court from whose decision, in cases of controversy, there could be no appeal. Her sway would not extend over all the world; but it would extend over about a fifth part of its terrestrial surface; whilst, in case of the occurrence of a disruption of the Empire, it is very improbable that it would extend beyond her own shores. The materials for a moral and intellectual sway are to her hands in lavish profusion. Emancipation would destroy them; Federation would erect them into a glorious edifice.

Such are the benefits which would, as we think, accrue to England from Federation. It would at once add to her revenue as largely as emancipation would diminish her expenditure, and in future would bring still larger sums to her coffers. Whilst thus accomplishing all the good which she could hope to gain from that measure, it would, also, on the one hand enable her to escape its dangerous consequences to her moral influence, her realised investments, her commercial wealth and her maritime

supremacy ; and, on the other hand, it would immensely augment her naval and military strength, open a secure outlet for her teeming population, increase her trade and place it on a much more secure basis than at present, improve very materially the internal government of the British Islands, and place them in a position of dazzling glory at the head of the mightiest Empire on the face of the earth. It is impossible to compare the relative expediency of each course, when on the one side there are evils to be encountered, and on the other benefits to be acquired.

At this point it is possible that some English reader may object to the above statement on the ground that Federation would reduce England from her lofty position of supremacy in the Empire to that of equality with the countries which are now her dependencies ; and that, besides the loss of position thus entailed, she would become liable to have her will controlled by the Colonies and her interests sacrificed to theirs. It is of course true that in the proposed Federation England would be no more than 'first among equals.' The Colonies could not submit to increased burdens without receiving some compensation therefor. But we utterly deny that any danger to England's local interests, or any diminution of her *prestige* could result from her new relationship to the Colonies. Under Federation they could exercise no more influence over the internal government of the British Islands than they do to-day. The colonial will could not even interfere with that of England in any other matters than those coming under the control of the Federal Government, which would be little more than the management of the armaments and diplomacy of the Empire. Even in the legislature which would arrange the details of these departments, the representatives of the United Kingdom would, for a very long time, immensely

outnumber those of the Colonies, and we have previously suggested means whereby the voice of the Fatherland could be guarded against that extinction which some seem to dread. But parties who fear what they would call this 'degradation' of England must go a little further than they generally seem inclined to do. Can this merely apparent 'degradation' be avoided without running the risk of encountering a real one? England to-day stands forth as the richest country in the world, and this position a great many of her people seem to consider as the *summum bonum* of political life. Granting it to be so, will they never apply their own commercial principles to their own case and examine the basis on which the wealth of England now rests? The security of any investment is usually the most important element in its value; but the security of English wealth under the present system never seems to enter into the minds of her commercial princes or political rulers. The author of *The Battle of Dorking* has well described her position where he says: 'Our people could not be got to see how artificial our prosperity was—that it all rested on foreign trade and financial credit; that the course of trade once turned away from us, even for a time, it might never return; and that *our credit once shaken might never be restored*. . . . They could not be got to see that the wealth heaped up on every side *was not created in the country*, but in India and China and other parts of the world; and that it would be quite possible for the people who made money by buying and selling the natural treasures of the earth to go and live in other places and take their profits with them.' This language is simply that of sober common sense. England's position is, doubtless, very splendid in appearance; but so long as it rests on foreign trade and financial credit, it may at any moment be shattered: there is nothing more clearly revealed in the

history of the world than that such greatness is of the most unstable character. Great as is the danger to-day, it would be enormously increased by a disruption of the Empire. Urban industry rests upon rural labour, as it is from the latter that the materials on which its *employées* work and live are derived. The field for rural labour in England may be considered to have reached its limit. Let the Colonies be cut loose, and she would have no means of finding employment for her increasing population within her own bounds, save in manufacturing and commercial pursuits. Her urban industry would thus be increased in the absence of any corresponding increase of that other industry on which it depends for working materials and food. Every such increase must add to the delicacy of the social structure. There is no sign abroad to indicate that there will be fewer storms, either internal or external, to assail it in the future than in the past. In that case it must at last succumb to some of them, and with its fall all would be lost. On the other hand, let Federation be adopted, and in the Colonies would be found the means of an almost boundless extension of agricultural industry, which extension would place the urban industry of England on a secure basis by providing a sure supply of the materials and food necessary to its sustenance, an increased number of steady customers for its products, and of fellow-countrymen interested in its defence. Such a security against the danger of an irremediable degradation would, we should say, be cheaply purchased at the cost of the slight loss of English dignity involved in Federation. As to the loss of *prestige* consequent on this descent, it may also be remarked that emancipationists who regard it as a juggle cannot object to Federation on the ground that that measure would lessen England's share of so worthless a commodity. And let those who do value *prestige* compare

the amount of it which would be possessed by the sea-girt isles in the Atlantic Ocean when standing alone in the world; confronted by mighty military monarchies; having an important member of the family at variance with the remainder; population pressing on the means of subsistence; one-third of their inhabitants dependent on foreigners for their food, and probably as many on their custom for the means of buying it—with the glory, strength, and influence which would surround the same islands when standing forth as the head of a mighty confederacy embracing lands in every clime; shores on every ocean; fortresses of ancient note; plains of virgin purity; the fisheries, the timber-lands and wheat-fields of Canada; the sugar-isles of the Mexican Gulf; the pasture-grounds, the gold-fields, and the diamond-lands of Australasia and South Africa; the tropic wealth of Ceylon; the unmatched riches of the Indian peninsula; the unequalled soil of the Emerald Isle; and the hives of Scotch and English industry—uniting the realised wealth of the mother-country with the untouched and unbounded resources of the Colonies; the science of ancient civilization with the energy of modern colonization; the lustre of historic glory with that gained from the rushing growth of young communities—and say which of these conditions is best calculated to place, not only the glory, but also the wealth, the liberty, and the independence of the Fatherland on the most stable basis? The primacy of such an Empire would carry with it an amount of substantial wealth, power, and prestige probably unexampled in the history of the world, and certainly unprecedented if to these elements of worth we add the fact that the institutions of the Empire would be based on Truth, Justice, Liberty, and Christianity!

## CHAPTER X.

## CONCLUSION.

OUR task is done : but ' we linger round a subject which nothing could tempt us to leave but a consciousness of treating it too unworthily ; ' and before closing wish to add a few words on the course of action to be pursued in case the policy which we advocate should commend itself to our fellow-countrymen.

The first and most important requisite of success in any attempt to form an Imperial Federation would be the absence of jealousy towards each other on the part of the several countries to be comprised in it. Should they enter on a discussion of the scheme in a niggard spirit ; each anxious to make the smallest concessions, and to gain the largest advantages possible for itself, and making invidious comparisons between the benefits gained by one party and by another, it may be confidently predicted that the movement would end in smoke, and had better never have been begun. The only question which, in a conference on the subject, each country would have any right to ask is, whether it could obtain equal, or superior, advantages, from the adoption of any other political career open to it. If any part of the Empire would be a loser by joining the Federation, instead of becoming independent or associating itself with some other country, it would have fair grounds for refusing to do so ; and if the United Kingdom could, by severing the connection, gain greater benefits than by establishing a union based on

perfect equality of privileges and burdens, it would be justified in rejecting the scheme. But neither the mother-country nor a Colony would have any right to reject it merely on the ground that it would subject them to certain *désagrémens* from which they are now free. That Federation would import local troubles into every part of the Empire we have no doubt; but we have equally little doubt that it would also import benefits which would heavily overbalance them, and that a disruption of the Empire would induce still greater troubles, without affording any compensation whatever. A choice must be made between the different courses open. Hence it is not the *absolute*, but the *comparative*, merits of Federation that should be considered. Should this fact be borne in mind, all will go well; but all will go ill should it be forgotten. It may, perhaps, be said that this language is trite. That is true. But it is equally true that, as a perception of the facts, and the existence of the spirit which we have indicated, are indispensable to success, it is impossible to insist too strongly on attention to them.

It is also to be desired that the subject should be kept clear of party feeling, in so far at least that no party should make the advocacy, or rejection, of Federation, a plank in its political platform. Whatever benefits may be derived from political partyism, it will scarcely be contended that unmixed love of truth is amongst the number. But the need of discovering the whole truth is in an exact ratio to the importance of the subject under legislation; and the difficulty of so doing is proportionate to its intricacy. There have been very few subjects before the British Legislature calculated to affect the destinies of our race so seriously as this Colonial Question, and, possibly, none so very intricate. It is, therefore, of supreme importance that every available means of arriving

at the unmingled truth should be put in force. This, certainly, will not be done should existing parties bind their members to an unconditional support of, or opposition to, Federation. But it will be done should they proclaim it an open question, and leave members free to speak their minds on its merits without their political standing being affected thereby. In the former case they could act only as advocates; in the latter they would be free to act as judges, nor do we think that in this question they would fall short of that standard. In the Colonies all parties are united in favour of the maintenance of British connection; and in the Imperial Parliament an emancipationist party can scarcely be said to have been yet organized. Under these circumstances no party is thus far committed to any definite policy on the question; and all are, consequently, perfectly free to adopt whatever course may seem to be most expedient. The question, moreover, is not one which specially affects English, Canadian, or Australasian classes or parties, but all England, Canada, and Australasia alike. It follows that, if these local parties wish to discharge faithfully their duties towards their constituents, they will unite to examine it with a single eye to the interests of their several countries.

To this it may be replied that, under British institutions, the only means whereby this, or any important measure can be carried is by a ministry adopting it as a part of its policy. We are aware that this is the normal state of things. But we strongly suspect that if we must wait for a ministry to undertake the settlement of the colonial question in the face of a hostile Opposition, we shall have to wait until doomsday. The question does not touch any class or party interest, so it will not stir any of those influences which force ministries to undertake the settlement of important political questions. It is un-



usually abstruse—a subject on which arguments can be found both for and against any definite policy capable of adoption. It thus offers but few chances of gaining political laurels, so ministers themselves will wish to avoid a field of action in which they are sure to find trouble and danger in case of having to face a Parliamentary opposition. Thus, neither from above nor from below does there seem to be any chance of the moving-springs of legislation being set in motion; and it is unlikely that emancipation theorists, in face of recent events, will press for any further action than that which they have won already. Under such circumstances, the adoption of the let-alone policy as that of ministries may be looked upon as almost a matter of certainty, in the absence of some extraordinary means to facilitate the accomplishment of the work. That means of facilitating it can be found we are sure; and equally so that all who desire to maintain the integrity of the Empire should hasten to afford it, since the result of the present colonial policy cannot fail to be a collision between the mother-country and the Colonies, which must lead to disruption. Almost all parties, politicians, and papers at home profess to deprecate such an event, but there are very few of them who will undertake to say that the connection can long be maintained on its present basis. If, then, that harmony of opinion which is expressed be really a fact, let the parties so agreeing unite their forces to effect the settlement desired by all, and transfer the question from the realm of partisanship to that of patriotism. This could be done by the party in opposition coming forward with a recognition of the importance of the subject, and an offer to treat it as an open question on condition of being allowed a share of influence in its settlement. This once agreed on, the way would be open for a full discussion of the question on its merits. The only policies possible

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are those of reconstruction and disruption, as that of drift must ultimately lead to one or other of them; and this, we think, could not fail to be universally seen, should British legislators set themselves resolutely to the examination of the matter. It is probable that a full examination of the merits of the case could best be effected by a Committee of both Houses, or a Commission appointed by the Crown, and consisting of leading men of all parties, empowered to summon witnesses from all parts of the Empire, and to embody the results of their inquiries in a report to the Imperial Parliament, but which it would probably be advisable to transmit also to the Colonial Legislatures for consideration. If such a body of men, after full inquiry, should arrive at the conclusion that emancipation would be the best course for all parties, it had better occur under a friendly agreement, and while they could separate with mutual respect and affection, than as the fruit of some unfortunate quarrel which would leave ill-feeling behind it. On the other hand, if they were in favour of reconstruction, they could indicate the principles on which it should be conducted, and the course of legislation necessary to give them effect. This having been done, the report would come before the Imperial Parliament for discussion, the result of which could scarcely fail to be the adoption of its more salient features. The next point would be to embody the principles adopted in the form of law. And this, we think, should be done by a Commission, on which it would be essential to have the Colonies well represented through their leading statesmen, appointed to draft and submit to Parliament a bill to provide for the reconstruction of the Empire, based on the principles previously agreed upon. This, having been passed by the Imperial Parliament, should then be submitted to the legislatures of the self-governing Colonies with the alternative of acceptance within a

given time or separation. Of their acceptance of the latter, in case they had been made to understand the points at issue, and granted a share in framing the measure, as we have recommended, we should have little fear.

This course of action, it is true, would be altogether unusual. But its justification is to be found in the fact that the question to be settled would be equally so. In extraordinary circumstances, extraordinary forces must be called into play. It is impossible to adopt *any policy* for the settlement of the colonial question which would not be liable to severe criticism, and for that reason no ministry will choose to run the risk of attempting to settle it single-handed. To discover the best policy and to put it into force, it is essential not only that one-half of the statesmanship of the Empire should be free from the opposition of the other half, but also, that all should unite their forces in the work. This they will do only on condition that the leading ideas of each party are embodied in the policy to be adopted, and their leading men are allowed a share in the glory of the work. Neither has taken any definite position on the question as yet, and until one, at least, has done so, there will be nothing to hinder them from uniting as we have proposed. A measure passed in this manner could scarcely fail to be intrinsically superior to any of a partisan character, and would possess the further merit of being likely to satisfy all, save that insignificant minority of grumblers who can never be satisfied. Every section and party in the Empire would have a voice in determining the policy to be adopted; and, in case reconstruction were determined on, in framing the measure which would put it into effect; and after that, if any part of the Empire should consider that its peculiar interests had been overlooked, it could suggest amendments; or, in case it saw a better course

open, reject it altogether. Were an Imperial Federation established in this manner, it would be, in some measure, the work of all, which fact would go far towards making it an object of affection to all.

We believe it to be highly probable that many of our readers may pronounce themselves to be strongly opposed to emancipation, and yet refuse to endorse the policy which we have recommended in its stead. Constitutional dread of change in some minds, and a like jealousy of authority in others, may lead them to shrink from Federation, and seek the means of maintaining the unity of the Empire at the cost of less innovation, or the concession of smaller prerogatives to the central government, than it would necessitate. We will not assert that success in such a search would be impossible, and that Federation is the sole and only means whereby disruption can be averted. But we do not hesitate to say that it cannot be averted in the absence of a coherent commercial policy, equality of privileges and burdens, and a ruling-power absolute for purposes of peace and war with their accessories, throughout the Empire. And we do say that countries standing in this relationship towards each other would substantially constitute a Federation; and that in this case, as in all others, the wisest course would be to recognise the fact and follow it unflinchingly to its consequences. Neither England nor the Colonies can enjoy the benefits of unity and isolation simultaneously; and if it be concluded that unity is more beneficial than isolation, to be daunted by the mere magnitude of the changes requisite to make it fully effective would be un-mixed cowardice, and to shrink from conferring on a free representative government any amount of authority requisite to ensure its conservation, most disgusting factiousness. Parties alarmed for liberty we would point to the facts that federalism, by the large amount of local inde-

pendence which it secures, is almost necessarily a strong friend to freedom, and that the prerogatives of the proposed Federal Government would be less than those possessed by that of the United States. On parties dreading change in itself we would press a reconsideration of the arguments which we have used to show that it is impossible to avoid some change in the relationship of the several parts of the Empire to one another, and that, if unity is to be maintained, there must be established some common policy and some supreme authority. Our language on these points, however, may be set down as a piece of self-opinionativeness; and, in view of such an event, we shall here fortify our position by quoting the words of a man generally admitted to be one of the most judicial-minded and liberty-loving statesmen in England. Earl Grey, in a letter dated September 4, 1869, and addressed to Messrs. Youl, Sewell, and Blaine, gentlemen who had been striving to form a conference of colonial representatives, to meet in London, for the purpose of considering the Colonial Question, says: ‘The breaking up of the great Colonial Empire of England would, in my opinion, be a calamity to the Colonies, to this country, and to the world, *and I cannot doubt that you are right in believing this to be the result which must be looked for from the policy distinctly declared by Her Majesty’s Government.* . . . The adoption of this policy, which I consider to be one of selfishness, quite unworthy of a great nation, and the prevalence of the opinion which has given rise to it, must be regarded as the direct and natural consequence of the claim put forward of late years on behalf of the Colonies, to be free from all control or the exercise of any authority over them by the Imperial Government. There is no one who has always been more opposed than myself to meddling and vexatious interference on the part of that Government in the purely *local and internal*

affairs of Colonies of which the inhabitants are capable of properly managing these affairs for themselves. But, in the administration of all Colonial Governments, questions are continually arising *which affect the interests not only of the particular Colonies, but of the Empire as a whole*; and it would not be difficult to show that, of late years, the inhabitants of many of our Colonies, urged on by those who profess to speak for them in this country, have set up a claim (which has been practically conceded) to be allowed to deal even with these questions according to their own will, without allowing the Imperial Government to exercise that authority without which a due regard to the general interests of the whole Empire, and an adherence to its policy, cannot be secured in the measures of the several local Governments. But if the Imperial Government is to exercise no authority over the Colonies, there is no reason why it should incur any responsibility or expense on their behalf, and the feeling against doing so, which has of late years been so strongly manifested in Parliament, has naturally arisen from the exaggerated claims for colonial freedom of action which have been asserted. . . . I am bound to say that, for my own part, much as I deplore what I regard as the virtual dissolution of our Colonial Empire by the adoption of the policy in question, I do not think it ought to be abandoned, except on the condition I have mentioned.' The condition referred to is 'the exercise of a larger measure of authority over the Colonies by the Imperial Government than they have of late been willing to submit to.' Lord Grey's sentiments are almost identical with those which we have expressed, save that we hold an increase of imperial authority should be accompanied by an infusion of the colonial element into it, on which condition alone do we think that the Colonies should submit to such an increase. (On this point too we should say, from other

parts of the letter, that Lord Grey's views agree with our own. But, at all events, it is clear that he believes the let-alone policy cannot fail to lead to disruption. Coming from such a source, there are few who will attempt to dispute the correctness of the theory. Let us not then strive to shrink from meeting the inevitable. To do so is at once an act of cowardice and of foolishness, and the disposition so to act an infallible token of the dissolution of the spirit essential to the conservation of national or political freedom. Such a policy, and such a spirit, should be denounced uncompromisingly in press, pulpit, and legislature, by all who value those virtues, in the shape of truthfulness, courage, and energy, which have made our race what it is to-day, and without which no nation has ever been elevated in the scale of humanity. Britons must surely have degenerated sadly in political ability if they cannot discover some means of binding together the several branches of their race without endangering the liberties whose origin is lost in the twilight of Anglo-Saxon history; and they must surely have lost the spirit which carried their banners up the heights of Quebec, through the gates of Paris, through the passes of the Himalayas, and across the Arctic Ocean—which has covered the seas with their fleets—which has enabled thousands to triumph, single-handed, over nature, beast, and savage, and cover desert lands with happy homes—and which has made the Fatherland the great emporium of the wealth of the world, if the mere magnitude of the task will make them shrink from attempting it, or if the surpassing glory of the achievement will not beckon them on to its accomplishment!

Whether it would have been possible to have formed an Imperial Federation more easily at a former period than at present, is a point which it is now useless to discuss. The scheme would, doubtless, have involved

much less legislation under the old colonial *régime* than under the present. It might then have been effected simply by the action of the Imperial Government, or at least it could have enforced on the Colonial Legislatures the adoption of any measure which it desired to pass, whilst now it would be necessary to have the reconstruction bill freely accepted by them. This fact, it is true, would increase the amount of labour to be done; but the constitutional structure, when completed by the joint efforts of all and adopted by the common voice, would stand on a much more enduring basis than if it had been framed solely by the mother-country, and forced by her on unsympathising Colonies. The Colonies are now anxious to have the connection maintained, and are prepared to give a favourable hearing to any scheme for the accomplishment of this object. It is certainly desirable that action should be taken whilst this feeling remains in force; nor is it likely, under the present relationship, ever to be stronger than at present. The political bonds which unite the different members of the Empire have been already rendered so very loose that in many of the Colonies their actual severance would scarcely be felt. This actual dissociation, and the prospect of separation which is so persistently forced on their view by English emancipationists, cannot fail to weaken those moral ties the existence of which can alone form a solid foundation for any species of political connection. Hence we conclude that the earlier the action the greater the chances of success in the glorious work of forming a world-wide British Empire, from every corner of which would ascend the poet's aspiration:—

The free fair homes of England!  
 Long, long, in hut and hall,  
 May hearts of native proof be reared  
 To guard each hallowed wall!



And green for ever be the groves,  
And bright their flowery sod,  
Where first the child's glad spirit loves  
Its country and its God!

It may perhaps be said that the invocation would arise as readily from the Colonies if 'emancipated' as if federated. Judging from the history of our relations with the United States, we should say that it would not. Indeed, we feel compelled to endorse the weighty words contained in the pages of *The Caxtons*, and to exclaim with Lord Lytton: '*Depend upon it, the New World will be friendly or hostile to the Old, not in proportion to kinship of race, but in proportion to similarity of manners and institutions.*' Federation offers the best means available for maintaining such similarity of manners and institutions.

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## APPENDIX.

It must be carefully borne in mind that the calculation of the probable amount of Colonial liability on pp. 86, 87 is not intended for anything more than an approximative estimate. We are, however, so strongly of opinion that it errs rather against the Colonies than in their favour, that we deem it advisable to bring forward some other points of the case.

Taking the value of the real property of Ontario, as we have done, at 100,000,000*l.*, it amounts—in round numbers—to about 61*l.* per head of its population of 1,620,842. Supposing the proportion to be the same throughout all the Colonies, and their population in 1869 at 8,000,000, we should have 488,000,000*l.* as the amount of their realised wealth, and the valuation of the Empire in the above year somewhat as follows :—

Gross value of real property in the United Kingdom	£5,745,000,000
Gross value of real property in the Colonies	488,000,000
Total	£6,233,000,000

Under this assessment the liability of Ontario would reach only one sixty-second part of the Federal expenditure of 36,000,000*l.* This would amount to 580,645*l.* 3*s.* 2*d.* or 7*s.* 2*d.* per head of its population. Deducting from this the 2*s.* 7*d.* per head which we have shown would be saved by the transfer of certain charges from the local revenue to that of the Empire, we have the actual increase reduced to 4*s.* 7*d.* ; and deducting again the 1*s.* 9*d.* per head, which might be saved by a Federal guarantee of the debt, we have 2*s.* 10*d.* per head as the actual

increase of taxation for which Ontario would become liable by Federation.

But even the above, we are inclined to think, might prove to be too high an estimate for British America, as the wealth of Ontario is considerably in excess of that of the other provinces. In the *Canadian Year Book* for 1867 a very carefully compiled estimate of the wealth of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland, gives 546,000,000 dollars as the cash value of farms, and 200,000,000 dollars as that of real property in cities, towns, and villages, making a total of 746,000,000 dollars, or about 150,000,000*l.* sterling. As the valuation of farm property is based on the census returns of 1861, we may assume the total to have since reached 200,000,000*l.* This would leave those six provinces liable for one thirty-first part of the Federal expenditure of 36,000,000*l.*, or 1,161,290*l.* 6*s.* 4*d.* per annum. Their population being about 3,700,000, this sum would amount to 6*s.* 3*d.* per head. Deducting from this the 2*s.* 7*d.* of saving in local expenditure, we have the increase reduced to 3*s.* 8*d.* per head; and deducting from this the saving of 1*s.* 9*d.* consequent on a guarantee of the debt, we have the total increase reduced to 1*s.* 11*d.* per head.

We repeat that our estimates on this point can be taken only as approximative. The statistics requisite to the formation of an exact calculation are, probably, not in existence: at all events we have not got them. But it must, we think, be evident that our estimate of the increased taxation which Federation would bring to the Colonies is certainly not too low; nay, that the actual increase would, in all probability, prove to be less; and that as the increase which would be necessitated by independence would be above even the highest estimated increase under Federation, financial considerations are overwhelmingly in favour of the latter policy.

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